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FAULT DIAGNOSIS OF HYBRID SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS TO GAS 
TURBINE ENGINES 
Rasul Mohammadi, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2009 
Stringent reliability and maintainability requirements for modern complex sys-
tems demand the development of systematic methods for fault detection and iso-
lation. Many of such complex systems can be modeled as hybrid automata. In 
this thesis, a novel framework for fault diagnosis of hybrid automata is presented. 
Generally, in a hybrid system, two types of sensors may be available, namely: contin-
uous sensors supplying continuous-time readings (i.e., real numbers) and threshold 
sensitive (discrete) sensors supplying discrete outputs (e.g., level high and pressure 
low). 
It is assumed that a bank of residual generators (detection filters) designed 
based on the continuous model of the plant is available. In the proposed framework, 
each residual generator is modeled by a Discrete-Event System (DES). Then, these 
DES models are integrated with the DES model of the hybrid system to build 
an Extended DES model. A "hybrid" diagnoser is then constructed based on the 
extended DES model. The "hybrid" diagnoser effectively combines the readings of 
discrete sensors and the information supplied by residual generators (which is based 
on continuous sensors) to determine the health status of the hybrid system. 
iii 
The problem of diagnosability of failure modes in hybrid automata is also 
studied here. A notion of failure diagnosability in hybrid automata is introduced and 
it is shown that for the diagnosability of a failure mode in a hybrid automaton, it is 
sufficient that the failure mode be diagnosable in the extended DES model developed 
for representing the hybrid automaton and residual generators. The diagnosability 
of failure modes in the case that some residual generators produce unreliable outputs 
in the form of false alarm or false silence signals is also investigated. Moreover, the 
problem of isolator (residual generator) selection is examined and approaches are 
developed for computing a minimal set of isolators to ensure the diagnosability of 
failure modes. 
The proposed hybrid diagnosis approach is employed for investigating faults 
in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator of a single-spool turbojet engine 
with an afterburner. A hybrid automaton model is obtained for the engine. A bank 
of residual generators is also designed, and an extended DES is constructed for the 
engine. Based on the extended DES model, a hybrid diagnoser is constructed and 
developed. The faults diagnosable by a purely DES diagnoser or by methods based 
on residual generators alone are also diagnosable by the hybrid diagnoser. Moreover, 
we have shown that there are faults (or groups of faults) in the fuel supply system 
and the nozzle actuator that can be isolated neither by a purely DES diagnoser nor 
by methods based on residual generators alone. However, these faults (or groups of 
faults) can be isolated if the hybrid diagnoser is used. 
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Modern complex systems demand high precision and reliability. Fault diagnosis is 
one of the important capabilities in complex systems for attaining high reliability. 
The use of extensive number of sensors with different types of signals in these systems 
requires systematic algorithms for fault monitoring and isolation. The large number 
of operational modes (e.g., 480 modes of operation in Livingstone [109]) adds to 
the computational complexity of diagnosis algorithms and makes fault isolation a 
challenging problem. Therefore, one of the main issues in realizing modern complex 
systems is the development of systematic algorithms for fault detection and isolation. 
Using systematic methods for designing diagnosis systems not only increases the 
accuracy and reliability of diagnosis but also reduces the future costs of system 
revisions and maintenance. In addition, human errors are less likely in systematic 
diagnosis code generation than in manual code generation. Fault diagnosis systems 
play a very important role in aerospace, manufacturing and process industries. As 
a result, a large body of work has been conducted on fault diagnosis (see, e.g., 
[94, 47, 57]). 
In order to develop systematic diagnosis algorithms for complex systems, a 
rigorous and precise model is very important. Many complex systems such as aircraft 
1 
engines, satellites and spacecraft evolve both continuously and discretely, and hence, 
require modeling tools that take into account the interactions of continuous1 and 
discrete-event dynamics. In the past two decades, a number of efforts have been 
made by researchers to develop modeling tools which are flexible to work with, 
and at the same time, reflect the complex behavior of modern complex systems. 
In particular, hybrid system models have been developed and used extensively for 
modeling complex systems [10]. 
Hybrid systems emerge from the interaction of discrete planning algorithms 
and continuous processes. The dynamics of a hybrid system in every mode evolves 
continuously until a transition takes the system to a different mode of operation. 
A transition in a hybrid system may take place autonomously as a result of the 
continuous evolution of system variables or because of a discrete event such as a 
supervisory command (a jump from one mode to another). 
Hybrid systems have been employed extensively by researchers in different 
engineering fields, as well as by computer scientists. In engineering fields, hybrid 
systems have been used as a modeling tool for developing state-of-the-art algorithms 
in many domains such as control, verification, data management and fault diagnosis 
[11, 23, 64, 6, 115, 79]. 
Generally, in a hybrid system, two types of sensors are available, namely: 
continuous sensors supplying continuous-time readings (i.e., real numbers) and 
threshold sensitive (discrete sensors) supplying discrete outputs (e.g., level 
high and pressure low). Discrete outputs can be used for the diagnosis of drastic 
failures such as stuck-closed of a valve and continuous outputs can be used for the 
diagnosis of faults that slightly change the system dynamics such as a small loss-of-
effectiveness in an actuator. 
Purely discrete-event approaches for diagnosis in a hybrid system usually rely 
l rrhe term "continuous system" in this thesis refers to a system with continuous-time variables. 
For brevity, we use the term "continuous" instead of "continuous-time". 
2 
on an abstraction of continuous dynamics and do not have the detailed information 
supplied by continuous sensors. Diagnosis approaches based on DES models cannot 
isolate failures that manifest as small continuous variations in the system's behav-
ior. Therefore, they are not suitable for diagnosis in many complex systems [45]. A 
purely continuous approach, on the other hand, may lead to very complex nonlinear 
relationships which are rather difficult to analyze in real-time. Moreover, due to the 
limitations on sensor implementation, some continuous variables may not be mea-
surable and therefore, fault diagnosis based on purely continuous dynamics may not 
be always possible. Developing hybrid diagnosis algorithms which take advantage 
of both the high-level DES and the low-level continuous dynamics may be used to 
solve a larger number of problems. 
In this thesis, we investigate fault diagnosis in systems that, for diagnostic 
purposes, can be modeled as hybrid systems. We are interested in hybrid systems 
because diagnosis problems not solvable in purely DES or purely continuous models 
may be solved using hybrid models. We develop a hybrid fault diagnosis framework 
in which the information available at the DES level is integrated systematically and 
efficiently with the information coming from the continuous dynamics through the 
continuous sensors. Since we do not only use abstracted models, we do not lose any 
information necessary for diagnosis due to abstraction. We assume that the system 
under supervision is operational and the fault detection and isolation system only 
uses the discrete outputs and continuous sensor readings in the system, and no test 
inputs are used for diagnosing faults. Thus, we only concentrate on on-line passive 
diagnosis. 
We employ our hybrid diagnosis approach for investigating faults in the fuel 
supply system and the nozzle actuator of a single-spool turbojet engine with an 
afterburner. Faults in the fuel supply system and actuators have been the source of 
many failures in jet engines [104]. As an example of a fault in the fuel supply system, 
3 
one can mention flight 236 of Air Transat [29]. Air Transat Flight 236 was an Air 
Transat route between Toronto, Canada and Lisbon, Portugal. On August 24, 2001, 
the flight ran out of fuel over the Atlantic Ocean with 306 people (293 passengers 
and 13 crew) aboard. The flight crew successfully landed the plane in the Azores 
with no loss of life. During the course of the flight, the pilots had noticed a fuel 
imbalance between the fuel tanks in the left and the right wings of the aircraft and 
had attempted to remedy this by opening a cross-feed valve between the tanks. This 
caused fuel from the operational tank to be wasted through the leak in the engine 
on the other side. After the engine flame-out, the airplane operated 19 minutes 
without engine power before landing. 
Components in a fuel supply system and a nozzle actuator such as pumps and 
solenoid valves behave in a discrete-event manner. The status of these components 
varies when the operating regime of the engine changes. The discrete-event behavior 
of these components can be described by DES models. On the other hand, thrust 
generation in an engine is a continuous process, and operation of engine components 
such as compressor and turbine can be described by continuous static and dynamic 
thermodynamic relations (i.e., algebraic and differential equations). We show that 
there are cases when the faults in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator 
cannot be isolated by a purely DES diagnosis method or by continuous approaches 
based on residual generators (continuous fault diagnosis systems) alone. However, 
the fault can be isolated if our hybrid diagnosis framework is employed. 
In the following, we briefly review the research conducted in the literature as 
related to the work in this thesis. 
4 
1.1 Literature Review 
1.1.1 Hybrid Systems 
Hybrid systems have been studied for a long time. Early models developed by sys-
tem engineers for hybrid systems were mainly based on the switched system models 
[72, 111]. Development of results in control of discrete-event systems in 80's largely 
motivated the recent interest and activity in hybrid systems. Moreover, the devel-
opment of adaptive control theory in 70's and 80's, digital control and the renewed 
interest in optimal control for sampled-data systems have a considerable impact 
on the recent trend of research in hybrid systems. Much of the work conducted 
on hybrid system modeling mostly concentrates on solving control problems (e.g., 
[10, 11, 22, 23, 51, 66]). 
There are several approaches for modeling of hybrid systems. What makes 
these approaches different is the emphasis on the continuous and discrete-event 
dynamics. In general, hybrid systems have been studied extensively by computer 
scientists and system engineers. The models developed by computer scientists are 
extensions of Finite-State Machines (FSM) or Petri-nets to present more information 
of the system. On the other hand, system engineers are more interested in the 
continuous nature of hybrid systems. In the models developed by system engineers, 
the operation of a hybrid system is represented by a set of differential equations 
each corresponding to a mode of operation. 
Hybrid Automata 
In the early 90's, hybrid automata models [6, 9] were used in the computer science 
community for extending the traditional model checking of finite-state machines to 
real-time systems. Hybrid automata are generalizations of traditional FSMs. In 
a hybrid automaton, transitions among the states are conditioned on the value of 
5 
logical propositions defined over a set of continuous dynamical processes. Hybrid 
automata models have been very influential on the research in the area of hybrid 
systems. In [77], Input/Output (I/O) hybrid automata are developed as an extension 
to hybrid automata. I/O hybrid automata can be combined into hybrid automata 
by synchronization. 
Hybrid automata have been extensively used as a general modeling formalism 
for the analysis, verification and synthesis of hybrid systems [7, 52, 77]. They are 
the most conventional models being used by researchers for modeling hybrid systems 
[10]. We use hybrid automata as the modeling tool in our work. The finite-state 
automata model which is the discrete abstraction of hybrid automata is very close 
to the natural way a human describes discrete processes. Moreover, unified formal 
mathematical models are available for hybrid automata. 
1.1.2 Fault Diagnosis 
A fault refers to a non-permitted deviation in a system's behaviour from that re-
quired by the system specifications for a bounded or unbounded period of time [56]. 
In general, there are two types of faults: permanent faults and nonpermanent 
faults. Permanent faults are those faults that when they occur, the system re-
mains in the faulty condition indefinitely. Nonpermanent faults are faults which 
have limited duration. After the occurrence of a non-permanent fault, the system 
may recover and return to the normal condition. These faults are usually caused by 
temporary malfunction of the system or some external interference. A broken valve 
can be an example of a permanent fault and a loose connection in an electric circuit 
may cause a non-permanent fault. 
Fault diagnosis is the detection and isolation of faults after they occur 
(and before they possibly cause a catastrophe in the system). Fault diagnosis is 
very important in enhancing the reliability and productivity of complex systems. In 
6 
the following, we briefly review the work done on fault diagnosis in the literature. 
Hardware redundancy is one of the most commonly-used methods for fault 
diagnosis and fault tolerance. In this approach, multiple sensors are used for mea-
suring each system variable. Then, a voter compares their outputs and determines 
the final value. If one of the sensors fails, the failure can be detected by comparing 
its value with other sensor values. This approach is also employed in diagnosing 
software code errors in the form of N-version programming. In N-version program-
ming, multiple codes are provided for a critical part of the system. Usually, these 
codes are written in different programming languages by different programmers to 
avoid language, compiler and human related errors. Although, these techniques are 
simple and fairly reliable, they impose an overhead on the system, resulting in the in-
crease of implementation cost. Moreover, they are only suitable for detecting sensor 
failures and programming errors and are not suitable for detecting common-cause 
failures. 
Expert systems are also used for diagnosing failures. Expert systems are 
designed based on the experience and knowledge of experts (stored as a set of rules) 
and use an inference engine to diagnose failures. These systems are advantageous 
in cases that obtaining a model for the system is difficult. However, gathering the 
required expertise and information for building an expert system could be a hard 
and time consuming task. In addition, it may not be possible to evaluate the com-
pleteness of the expert data base. Hardware and software redundancy and expert 
systems are examples of diagnosis techniques which perform diagnosis without uti-
lizing a model of the system and are therefore, known as model-free methods. 
In addition to model-free methods, several model-based techniques for fault 
diagnosis have been proposed in the literature. In a model-based approach, the 
observed behaviour of the system is compared against the system model, and the 
condition of the system (normal/faulty) is inferred from this comparison. 
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In the following, we review the main directions of research on fault diagnosis 
that use model-based approaches. 
Fault Diagnosis in Discrete-Event Systems 
Fault diagnosis of discrete-event systems has been investigated in the context of 
automatic control systems (see, e.g., [73, 17, 98]) and in other areas such as Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) (e.g., [15]). In [73], F. Lin proposed a state-based approach for 
diagnosis failures in DES. In state-based approaches, it is assumed that the state set 
of the system can be partitioned according to the condition (failure status) of the 
system. The goal of the diagnosis process is to determine the current state of the 
system (or at least the block of the normal/faults partition the current state belongs 
to) using the available observations (sensor measurements) and then to determine 
the current condition of the system. In [73], the problems of off-line and on-line 
active diagnosis are addressed. An algorithm is presented for computing a sequence 
of test commands for diagnosing system failures. If the algorithm converges, the 
system will be on-line diagnosable. 
In [98, 99], M. Sampath et al. present a systematic approach for passive on-line 
fault diagnosis in finite-state automata. In passive diagnosis, the diagnosis system 
does not generate any test inputs and relies on observations only. In [98], an extended 
observer for the system, called a diagnoser, is used to perform diagnosis. The issue 
of diagnosability is also addressed. The approach in [98] is event-based. In an 
event-based method, inference is made about the occurrence of fault events (based 
on the observed events). It is assumed that a fault is the result of an (unobservable) 
fault event. In [100], an integrated approach to fault diagnosis and supervisory 
control has been presented by generalizing the notion of diagnosis to active DES 
fault diagnosis. 
In [71], algorithms for testing finite-state machines are reviewed. Although 
testing algorithms are related to the problem of fault diagnosis, the framework used 
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in [71] is different: the finite-state machines are usually assumed to be deterministic 
with a fixed condition (failure status); also it is assumed that transitions can always 
be observed even if they do not result in a change in output. These assumptions 
often do not hold in fault diagnosis of control systems. 
In [48], S. Hashtrudi Zad et al. study fault diagnosis in DES using a state-based 
approach. They proposed a passive on-line method for diagnosing failures in discrete 
event systems and construct a fault detection system (diagnoser). In this framework, 
the objective is to use the output sequence to determine the current normal/faulty 
condition of the system. The condition of the system does not have to be known 
at the time that the diagnoser is started. Assuming that a failure is diagnosable if 
it occurs before the diagnoser initialization, the proposed diagnoser can eventually 
detect and isolate the failure. A model reduction method has also been introduced 
in [48] to reduce the number of diagnoser states and the computational complexity 
of the diagnoser design. 
All the above modelling approaches use automata to model DES. The complete 
system model can be generated using synchronous or parallel composition of compo-
nent models (see e.g., [112]). An alternative approach based on a structured system 
description of DES models, called causal network, has been introduced in ([31, 84]) 
for fault diagnosis. This qualitative model seems to be suitable for process diag-
nosis in local power station plants [84]. This approach has a better computational 
efficiency for diagnosing discrete-event systems when compared to DES modeling 
techniques in [17, 73] and [98]. However, it also uses logical statements describing 
the status of each component, which is partly from human experience and expertise 
[84]. 
Timed models have been considered in fault diagnosis for cases where timing 
constraints can be used to improve the accuracy of diagnosis (see e.g., [91, 26, 36, 
49]). 
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Fault Diagnosis in Continuous Systems 
There is an extensive amount of research on fault detection and isolation (FDI) 
that uses models with continuous variables (see e.g., surveys [42, 110, 41, 44, 56], 
books [101, 94, 25] and the references therein). Most of the FDI approaches which 
employ continuous models rely on analytical redundancy. In these methods, the 
inherent redundancy existing in the static and dynamic relationships among the 
system inputs and measured outputs is used for fault detection and isolation. In 
other words, sensor measurements are compared with the values of the respective 
variables which are obtained analytically based on the mathematical model of the 
system. The resulting differences are called residuals. Then residuals are processed 
to determine which residuals can be considered normal and which ones indicate 
presence of a fault. When no fault is present in the system, the residual should be 
normally zero or very close to zero, and when a fault occurs, the residual should 
be distinguishably different from zero [25]. The algorithm or processor used to 
generate residuals is called a residual generator. The FDI methods based on 
analytical redundancy can be categorized as follows [41]: 
1. Parity space approaches - In these approaches, the parity (consistency) of 
the mathematical equations of a dynamical system is verified by using sensor 
measurements (see e.g., [27, 95, 34]). 
2. Dedicated observer approaches and innovation-based approaches - In these ap-
proaches, the outputs of the system are reconstructed from the measurements 
(or a subset of measurements) by using Luenberger observer(s) in a determin-
istic setting or Kalman filter(s) in a stochastic setting. The weighted output 
estimation error or innovations is used as the residual for the fault detection 
and isolation (see e.g, [94, 43, 93]). 
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3. Fault detection filter approaches - In these approaches, a special filter is con-
structed for detection and isolation of a fault or a set of faults. These ap-
proaches were first proposed by R. V. Beard [18] and H. L. Jones [61]. See 
also [81, 80] for fault detection and isolation filter design based on linear sys-
tems and [33] for design methods based on nonlinear models. 
4. Parameter identification approaches - These approaches use the assumption 
that the faults of a dynamical system are reflected in the physical parameters 
such as mass, friction, resistance, etc. Estimation of the parameters of the 
mathematical model can be used for fault detection and isolation (see e.g., 
[56] for the first contributions and [101] for relatively more recent work). 
1.1.3 Fault Diagnosis in Hybrid Systems 
Diagnosis of hybrid systems, particularly diagnosis of hybrid automata, has been 
a subject of some research. However, the number of work done on fault diagnosis 
of hybrid automata is fewer than those in continuous systems and DES due to 
the complexity of hybrid systems and the relative novelty of the subject. In the 
following, we present some of the work done on diagnosis of hybrid systems and 
especially the work conducted on diagnosis of hybrid automata. 
Fault diagnosis based on discrete and/or temporal abstractions of con-
tinuous dynamics is among one of the conventional approaches for fault diagnosis 
in hybrid systems. In [75], hybrid diagnosis based on timed discrete-event repre-
sentations is studied. The continuous state of the system is quantized and discrete 
methods are used for diagnosis. The diagnosis method of [48] for FSMs has been 
extended to hybrid automata in [50]. In [50], the authors examine the question of 
whether a high-level DES contains enough information about the low-level hybrid 
model by introducing the notion of consistency. The high-level and low-level models 
are called consistent if the analysis and design based on the high-level model and 
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the low-level model yield the same result. A set of sufficient conditions for consis-
tency has also been provided. In [50], an output from a set of symbols is assigned 
to any state of the hybrid automaton. It is assumed that the output is constant at 
any discrete mode. Based on this assumption, the problem of diagnosis in hybrid 
automata has been reformulated as a DES diagnosis problem. 
Diagnosis of hybrid system has been studied in [115] by abstracting the systems 
with a timed Petri-net model. A hybrid automaton model with linear first-order 
dynamics is considered. Using the model of the system, a fault symptom table 
is generated off-line by simulation and then compiled into a decision tree. The 
decision tree is used on-line for diagnosis. In this approach, the mode of the system 
is estimated by processing of the continuous variable signals. The Petri-net model 
is used to generate event predictions to focus the signal processing algorithms. Due 
to the use of decision tree, the approach is confined to the assumption of only one 
fault at a time. 
The diagnosis method of [85] has been extended to hybrid systems in [78, 86]. 
Temporal causal graphs are used for modeling the abstractions of the continuous dy-
namics. Qualitative fault isolation algorithms are developed based on the temporal 
causal graphs. Faults are assumed to be abrupt; i.e., faults make instantaneous and 
persistent changes in the system (continuous) variables. A DES observer monitors 
the dynamics and notifies the diagnosis system of the fault occurrence. If qualitative 
diagnosis fails to isolate the fault, continuous parameter estimation techniques are 
used. 
Fault diagnosis based on Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) or particle filtering 
methods have been employed by researchers for diagnosis of hybrid systems, and 
mostly for isolating and identifying faults when the fault can be detected. In [79], 
a particle filtering approach is proposed to track multiple models of behavior of the 
system. An abstract model of the system dynamics is made in the form of a temporal 
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causal graph. When a fault is detected, a (high-level) candidate qualitative diagnosis 
is made using the temporal causal graph. Using continuous model-fitting techniques 
such as the Expectation Maximization Algorithm (EMA) or Generalized Likelihood 
Ratio (GLR) method, the time of the fault occurrence and its severity are estimated. 
In [79], isolation and identification of faults are achieved by backtracking through 
the system operational modes using the system's observations. This makes storing 
all the observations necessary which could be problematic in complex systems due to 
the extensive number of sensors. In [79], it is also assumed that the hybrid system 
does not have any autonomous jump; all transitions between system modes are 
triggered by a control command. This assumption does not hold in many complex 
systems. Fault diagnosis in hybrid systems using particle filtering techniques has 
also been investigated in [68, 69]. 
In [39], a two level diagnosis mechanism is developed for diagnosis of faults 
whose occurrence can be sensed by measuring system variables at the time the faults 
occur. The occurrence of faults is signalled by observable events (actions) (differ-
ent faults may yield the same events). When an event is observed, the diagnoser 
designed for the DES level performs a set of hypothesis tests and makes a diagnosis 
statement regarding the faults occurring in the DES level. Furthermore, the DES 
diagnoser generates a discrete state estimate of the system. Then, the diagnoser 
of the continuous level performs hypothesis tests (for example residual tests) of the 
discrete state estimate and generates sub-diagnosis statements regarding the faults 
at the continuous dynamics. A decision logic unit then produces the final diagnosis 
statement. A notion of diagnosability as related to the approach of [39] is presented 
in [38]. In [39, 38], it is implicitly assumed that discrete events occurring in the sys-
tem are observable. This assumption cannot be held in many control applications. 
In addition, since occurrence of faults are signaled (for example by an ALARM 
signal) diagnosers are only responsible for the isolation of the faults. 
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A different approach for diagnosing a special class of hybrid systems is pre-
sented in [16]. Here, fault hypotheses are modeled using a Markov chain with a 
Gaussian residual associated with each state and a Viterbi-like algorithm is used to 
find the most likely state trajectory. This approach does not consider the event-
driven dynamics that are present in hybrid systems. 
1.1.4 Testing Diagnosability 
Fault diagnosability is an important issue related to fault diagnosis. In the context 
of fault diagnosis using DES models, fault diagnosability has been investigated in 
[73, 98, 48, 114, 59]. The notion of diagnosability in DES has been introduced 
in [98]. A fault is considered diagnosable if it can be detected and isolated in 
a bounded number of events. Furthermore, a test for diagnosability based on the 
construction of a diagnoser has been presented in [98]. The number of diagnoser 
states, and hence the complexity of the above-mentioned test for diagnosability is in 
the worst case exponential in the number of the systems states. In [48], an approach 
similar to [98] is developed for diagnosability assuming that a faulty condition may 
be present when diagnosis starts. In [48], a fault is considered diagnosable if it can 
be detected and isolated after its occurrence or the start of diagnosis in a bounded 
number of events. The diagnosability conditions given in [48] are also in terms of 
the properties of a diagnoser and hence verifying them has a worst-case exponential 
complexity. In contrast to the exponential approaches of testing diagnosability in 
[98, 48], efficient polynomial algorithms for testing diagnosability (in the framework 
of [98]) are proposed in [114, 59]. 
Diagnosability of faults in diagnosis methods based on continuous dynamics 
of the system has also been a subject of research (see e.g., [80, 33]). Usually, in the 
context of diagnosis using continuous models, diagnosability is achieved by finding 
the conditions for the existence of a detection and isolation filter. In [80], the 
14 
necessary and sufficient solvability conditions for the existence of residual generators 
for isolating faults in linear dynamical systems have been provided using a geometric 
approach. In linear systems, faults in the system can be modeled as additive faults 
that are added to the state-flow of the system as unknown inputs. In [80], it is shown 
that additive fault signals can be used to model the faults in actuators, sensors and 
the structure of systems. In [33], using a geometric approach, the necessary and 
sufficient solvability conditions for the existence of residual generators for isolating 
faults in nonlinear dynamical systems have been provided. In these systems, faults 
are modeled by additive signals. 
In [35] and [105], diagnosability of hybrid systems is studied using a timed 
automaton abstraction of the hybrid system. Faults are only diagnosable if they 
change either the delay of the system in discrete states or the sequence of observed 
events. 
1.1.5 Problems Related to Fault Diagnosis in Hybrid Sys-
tems 
State estimation in hybrid systems - One of the approaches for monitoring 
and fault diagnosis of dynamical systems is based on the state estimation of the 
system using the observations. In [53], a hybrid estimation method is formulated as 
a fc-best search using probabilistic hybrid automata models. The hybrid estimation 
technique is compared with the estimation methods based on Interacting Multiple 
Model (IMM) technique [20]. A state estimation approach based on banks of ex-
tended Kalman filters is presented in [54]. In this approach, only a limited number 
of trajectories that have high probabilities are traced. State estimation in hybrid 
systems has also been studied in [65, 19, 37]. 
Observer design and state observability in hybrid systems - Observer 
design and state observability are issues that are related to fault diagnosis. In 
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[13], observer design for linear hybrid automata is discussed. For the existence 
of the observer, it is required that the (affine) continuous system associated with 
each discrete state (location/mode) be observable. Therefore, observability reduces 
to identifying the current discrete state. The observer has two units: a location-
observer which identifies the current discrete state (or a set of possible discrete 
states), and a continuous observer which gives the current continuous state in the 
current discrete state. In [14], a set of sufficient conditions is provided under which 
the hybrid system becomes observable. A hybrid system is called observable if for 
any initial continuous state, XQ, a n d initial discrete state, qo, and any input, the 
continuous state and current discrete state can be identified asymptotically. 
Observability in linear hybrid systems has also been discussed in [107]. Ob-
servability is studied for a class of hybrid systems called jump-linear systems with 
no inputs; the continuous system in each discrete state is autonomous. A set of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions is provided under which the switching signal and the 
continuous state can be recovered uniquely from the output of the jump system. [28] 
extends the results of [107] to affine hybrid systems whose discrete transitions take 
place by enabling guard conditions on continuous states. In [87], building hybrid 
observers are discussed based on the proposed algorithms in [85, 78]. 
1.1.6 Applications of Diagnosis in Hybrid Systems 
High-tech systems demand advanced systematic methods for health monitoring and 
diagnosis. In the following, we mention some real-world applications for diagnosis 
in hybrid systems. 
In [79], NASA's Sprint AERCam is used as an application of diagnosis in 
hybrid systems. The AERCam is a small spherical robotic camera unit with 12 
thrusters. Thrusters allow the camera to have linear and rotational motion. The 
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system has been modeled as a hybrid system, and fault isolation has been stud-
ied using particle filtering approaches. Diagnosis of the propulsion system of an 
experimental rocket-powered vehicle called X-34 has been studied in [69]. X-34 is 
modeled by a 10th order hybrid system with nonlinear dynamics containing both 
commanded and autonomous transitions. Fault diagnosis of a document processing 
factory modeled by a hybrid automaton has been studied in [115]. The authors use 
Xerox Document Center DC265 printer as the focus of their application. DC 265 is 
a multifunction system that can print 65 pages per minute. It is composed of a large 
number of moving components such as motors, solenoids, clutches, gears, rolls and 
belts. The system is modeled as a hybrid system with first-order linear dynamics 
in each mode. The diagnosis algorithm has been tested on a DC265 printer in the 
laboratory. Diagnosis in power systems modeled as hybrid systems is also studied 
in [40]. 
1.1.7 Fault Diagnosis in Gas Turbine Engine 
Aircraft engines are complex systems that require high reliability to ensure flight 
safety and timely maintenance. There is a large body of research on health monitor-
ing and fault diagnosis of aircraft engines (see e.g., surveys [74, 106, 58, 92] and the 
references therein). Fault diagnosis in gas turbine engines has been investigated us-
ing model-free data-driven methods as well as model-based approaches. Most of the 
model-based approaches for fault diagnosis in aircraft engines use the continuous dy-
namic models and rely on analytical redundancy (see e.g. [92, 63, 62, 82, 83, 30, 46]). 
In [63] and [62], fault diagnosis in sensors and actuators of a gas turbine engine 
has been investigated using a bank of Kalman filters. In [82], a bank of Kalman filters 
was used for fault detection and isolation of failures in the sensors and actuators 
of the F-16 aircraft assuming that the faults are known. In [30], an observer-based 
method is developed for fault diagnosis of actuator and sensor faults in a gas turbine 
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engine. In [63, 62, 82, 30], the authors do not try to identify the components (such as 
valves and pumps) responsible for the actuator faults. Fault detection and isolation 
of engine sensors has been studied in [83] using a bank of Kalman filters. A review 
of different model-based methods for fault diagnosis in engine sensors is reported in 
[92]. 
1.2 Thesis Objectives 
In this work, we focus on the problem of fault detection and fault isolation in hybrid 
systems. The objective of this research is the development of a hybrid framework 
for fault diagnosis in hybrid systems modeled as hybrid automata. The motivation 
for this framework comes from the fact that in a complex hybrid system, there are 
discrete sensors that generate discrete outputs which are available at the DES rep-
resentation of the system, and continuous sensors that generate continuous outputs 
which are present in the continuous model of the system. Discrete outputs can be 
used more efficiently for diagnosis of drastic faults such as valve stuck-closed, and 
continuous outputs can be used to diagnosis faults that slightly change the system 
dynamics such as the small loss-of-effectiveness in an actuator. Moreover, some 
faults may not be diagnosable if one uses purely DES abstracted models alone, and 
some faults may not be isolable if one uses only continuous sensor readings. 
In this framework, we use a bank of detection and isolation filters (residual 
generators) for diagnosis of faults at the continous-variable level of the system. We 
develop a novel approach for systematically integrating the information coming from 
the low-level residual generators with the information available at the DES level to 
construct a hybrid diagnoser. The hybrid diagnoser can be used efficiently for 
diagnosing faults in the system. 
Diagnosability of faults in our hybrid diagnosis framework is a challenging 
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problem that we also investigate in this dissertation. The results obtained on di-
agnosability will be used to solve the problem of residual generator selection in 
hybrid systems. To study the applicability of our results in real-world applications, 
we model a gas turbine engine with hybrid system and apply our hybrid diagnosis 
framework to detect and isolate fault in the gas turbine engine. 
1.3 Thesis Contributions 
The thesis contributions are as follows. 
Development of a hybrid framework for fault diagnosis of hybrid au-
tomata 
In this thesis, we develop a hybrid framework for passive on-line fault diagnosis in 
systems modeled by hybrid automata. Generally, there are two types of sensors 
in the system: continuous sensors that generate a continuous output signal, and 
discrete sensors such as level sensors that are used for measuring different levels 
of a liquid in a tank. Diagnosis results based on a purely DES abstraction model 
will be conservative in the sense that a diagnosable failure mode may be rendered 
undiagnosable due to the abstraction and lack of sufficient information. On the 
other hand, fault diagnosis based on the purely continuous dynamics may not be 
possible at all times because some continuous variables may be unmeasurable due to 
the limitations on implementing continuous sensors. We develop a novel diagnosis 
approach in hybrid systems which systematically integrates the information at both 
DES and continuous levels for detecting and isolating faults. In our framework, all 
faults are modeled at the continuous level as unknown signals that are added to 
the system's dynamics similar to control input. Every fault signal corresponds to a 
fault or a set of faults in a component. Fault signals can model drastic failures such 
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as stuck-open and stuck-closed faults of a valve and faults that slightly change the 
systems dynamics such as loss-of-effectiveness faults. We use a bank of residual gen-
erators that are designed based on the continuous-varibale dynamics of the system 
for detection and isolation of faults. We develop a systematic approach for modeling 
the residual generators by DES models and combining these DES models with the 
DES abstraction model of the hybrid system to construct an extended DES model. 
The extended DES model is used for fault diagnosis and diagnosability analysis. As 
opposed to approaches in [75, 50, 115], we do not lose a major amount of information 
that is available at the continuous-varible level due to the abstraction. 
Using a bank of residual generators, an observer design methodology is inves-
tigated in [13]. In [13], a residual generator is designed for every discrete state. In 
our work, residual generators are not necessarily designed for all the discrete states 
of the system. We also develop a systematic method for merging the information at 
the DES level with the information generated by the residual generators. 
Similar to our framework, the diagnosis approach of [86] performs diagnosis 
by using the information at both the DES and the continuous dynamics levels of 
the system. In our hybrid diagnosis framework, the information gathered from both 
the DES and the continuous-varibale dynamics levels is systematically integrated 
together. Therefore, our diagnosis approach is more efficient and general in the 
sense that it can be used in a convenient way for diagnoser design and diagnosability 
verification. Moreover, our framework provides a suitable tool to investigate, in 
a systematic way, the problem of residual generator selection for rendering faults 
diagnosable. 
Investigation of the diagnosability of failures in hybrid automata 
We develop a systematic approach for verifying the diagnosability of faults in our 
hybrid diagnosis framework. We introduce a notion of diagnosability in hybrid 
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automata. Our diagnosability analysis can be viewed as a more general form of 
(^-diagnosability that is introduced in [35] and [105] where diagnosability in hy-
brid systems is studied using a timed automaton abstraction of the hybrid system. 
We show that if a fault is diagnosable in the extended DES model (developed for 
representing the hybrid automaton and residual generators), then it will be diagnos-
able for the hybrid system. The integrated information received from discrete and 
continuous sensors may contain redundant information which in turn can be used to 
detect and isolate faults in the presence of false alarm and false silence signals. 
We also investigate diagnosability of faults in the presence of false alarm and false 
silence signals. 
Investigation of residual generator selection in hybrid automata 
We investigate the problem of isolator (residual generator) selection and develop 
approaches for computing a minimal set of isolators to maintain the diagnosability of 
a failure mode. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for isolator selection 
in a hybrid automaton so that a fault becomes diagnosable in the extended DES 
model of the hybrid system and isolators. The problem of isolator selection studied 
for hybrid automata can be considered as the counterpart of the sensor selection 
problem that is discussed in [90, 32, 5] for purely DES. 
Application of the hybrid diagnosis framework to gas turbine engines 
We employ our hybrid diagnosis approach for investigating faults in the fuel supply 
system and the nozzle actuator of a single-spool turbojet engine with an afterburner. 
First, we develop a hybrid automaton model for the gas turbine engine. We model 
components in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator using DES models. 
The status of these components varies when the operating regime of the engine 
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changes. A DES abstract model can be developed for the engine by parallel compo-
sition of all the component models. We also develop a nonlinear system model for 
describing the continuous dynamics of the engine. We develop simpler linear system 
models for representing the continuous dynamics of the engine in different operating 
regimes by linearization of the nonlinear model about different operating points. 
A hybrid automaton model for the engine is constructed by combining the DES 
models of the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator with the linear systems 
representing the engine dynamics in different operating regimes. A bank of residual 
generators is designed based on the linear system models. Each residual generator is 
modeled by a DES and an extended DES is developed by combining the DES models 
of the residual generators and the DES model of the engine. Based on the extended 
DES model, a hybrid diagnoser is constructed. We show that there are cases where 
the faults in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator cannot be isolated by 
, a purely DES diagnoser or by methods that are based on residual generators alone. 
However, the faults can be isolated if the hybrid diagnoser is used. A number of 
simulation studies are conducted to demonstrate and verify the advantages of our 
proposed hybrid fault diagnosis approach. 
Due to the criticality and complexity of gas turbine engines, employing more 
descriptive and efficient modeling tools and algorithms has always been the subject 
of research in control and fault diagnosis of gas turbine engines. To the best of our 
knowledge, the hybrid fault diagnosis in gas turbine engines presented in this thesis 
is the first work which models a gas turbine engine with hybrid automata models 
and investigates fault diagnosis in the gas turbine engine using hybrid diagnosis 
approaches. 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
In Chapter 2, we briefly review the background material which will be used in the 
following chapters. We review modeling of systems with DES and in particular 
Finite-State Automata (FSA). We also review fault diagnosis and diagnosability 
analysis in DES and fault detection and isolation in continuous linear systems. In 
Chapter 3, we describe our hybrid diagnosis framework. We study diagnosability 
of faults in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, we assume that all the residual generators 
that can be designed based on the continuous dynamics of different discrete states 
are constructed and used for diagnosability analysis. In Chapter 5, we investigate 
the problem of isolator (residual generator) selection and develop approaches for 
computing a minimal set of isolators to maintain the diagnosability of a failure 
mode. In Chapter 6, we employ our hybrid diagnosis approach for investigating 
faults in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator of a single-spool turbojet 
engine with an afterburner. Finally, in Chapter 7, we present a summary of our 




In this chapter, we present an overview of the background material related to our 
work. In this work, we study fault diagnosis in systems modeled by hybrid automata. 
In this chapter, we first explain Discrete-Event Systems (DES) and in particular 
Finite-State Automata (FSA) as a tool for modeling discrete-event systems. FSA 
are used in our work for modeling the DES level of hybrid systems. Next, we 
review diagnosis in FSA and provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the diagnosability of faults in FSA. The diagnoser design method described here 
will be later used in Chapter 3 for designing a diagnoser for a DES representing a 
hybrid system and its residual generators. We also briefly explain model-based fault 
diagnosis in continuous systems and present the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the existence of residual generators in linear systems. 
2.1 Discrete-Event Systems 
A Discrete-Event System (DES) is a dynamical system equipped with a discrete 
state set and an event driven state transition structure. An event in a DES occurs 
instantaneously causing transition from one state to another. Automata theory [55] 
provides one of the most comprehensive sets of mathematical tools for studying 
24 
do ^-^- ^ d> d7 
a 
Figure 2.1: A simple FSA with three states. 
DES. Many of the other models (such as Petri nets) for describing DES are rooted 
in the automata theory. In automata models, the system evolution is represented 
by transitions from one state to another. The reader is referred to [96, 97, 112] for 
details. In this dissertation, we use Moore finite-state automata to model DES. 
First we review some basic definitions and operations on automata. 
2.1.1 Languages and Finite-state Automata 
An alphabet E is a finite set of symbols. Symbols correspond to events in DES 
models. A symbol sequence over E has the form a\a2---an for n > 1, where 
dj £ E with 1 < i < n. The set E + denotes the collection of all possible finite 
symbol sequences over E. The set E* = {e} (J E + represents the set of all strings 
sequences over E. Here, e denotes the empty sequence (sequence with no symbols). 
Definition 2.1.1. A language over alphabet E is any subset o/E*. • 
The empty language is shown by 0. 
A finite-state Moore automaton (generator) G is a 6-tuple: 
G=(Q,i:,T,D,X,qQ) 
where Q is the non-empty state set; qo is the initial state; T : Q x E x Q is the set 
transitions; D is the set of discrete outputs and A : Q —> D is the output map. 
Example 2.1.1. Fig. 2.1 shows a simple FSA consisting of three states. In a Moore 
FSA, the output is associated with state. Here, Q = {A,B,C}, E = {a,b,c}, 
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go = A, T = {(A,a, B), (B,b,A),{B,c,C), {C,a,A)}, D = {dQ,dud2}, X(A) = d0, 
\{B) = d1 and\(C) = d2. • 
For any q^ G Q, <7j G S with i G {1, • • • , n} , and n > 2, a path Xi —* £2 -^ 
• • • ^ xn, is called a cycle if x\ — xn. In this thesis, sometimes, the states of the 
path of a cycle are also referred to as a cycle. 
Definition 2.1.2. [48] Suppose two states q and q' of Q satisfy \(q) 7^  X(q'), and q' 
can be reached from q through a path along which the output is equal to X(q) (except 
at q'), then we say q' is output-adjacent to q and write q => q'. • 
Let Gi = (Qi .E i .T i^ i .Ai .gb . i ) and G2 = (Q2, %2,T2, D2, A2,g0,2) be two 
FSA. Consider a product of G\ and G2 shown as G\ ® G2 in which the shared 
events of two FSA are synchronized. Specifically, 
G1®G2 = (Q,Z,T,D,\,q0) 
where 
Q = Q\ x Q2 
£ = £!US2 
<7o = (9o,i»9o,2) 
D = Di x D2 
T = {{(qi,q2),o;(q[,q2)) I a G S i P | E 2 and (qi,cj,q[) eT^ and (q2,cr,q'2) G T2} 
[j{((Qi,Q2),o-, (q[,q2)) \ <? G Ei - £ 2 and (qi,(T,q[) G T j 
lJ{((9i,92),o-, (?i,Q2)) I °~ e E2 - S i and (q2,a,q'2) E T2} 
Function A : Q —> D is the output map such that A((<?i,g2)) = (-M^i)' M^))-
The synchronous product or parallel composition of G\ and G2, shown 
as sync(Gi, G2), is defined to be the reachable sub-generator of G\ <g> G2. Operator 
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sync models the joint operation of automata. Note that sync is a commutative and 
associative operation, namely: 
Commutative Property: 
sync(Gi ,G 2 ) = sync(G2,G!) 
Associative property: 
sync(G 1 , sync(G 2 ,G 3 ) ) = sync(sync(Gi, G2),G3) 
Consider three FSA G\, G2 and G3. The synchronous product of G\, G2 and 
G3, sync(Gi,G 2 , G3), is defined as: 
sync(G l 7 G2 ,G3) = sync(Gi ,sync(G 2 ,G 3 ) ) = sync(sync(Gi ,G 2 ) , G3) 
The synchronous product of more than three FSA can be defined similarly. 
Example 2.1.2. Two FSA, G\ and G2 are shown in Figure 2.2(a) The synchronous 
product of G\ and G2 is depicted in Figure 2.2(b). • 
Another operation on FSA is meet . The result of the meet operation of G\ 
and G2, shown as meet (Gi , G2), is a reachable generator in which only the common 
events may occur and in synchrony. In the case that Ej — E2, meet (G! ,G 2 ) = 
sync(Gi ,G 2 ) . 
The hybrid diagnoser that we develop for a hybrid system is constructed based 
on a DES model representing the hybrid system and the residual generators. In the 
next section, we briefly review diagnosis in FSA. 
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G, G2 
(a) FSA Gi and G2 
(b)sync(Gx,G2) 
Figure 2.2: Example 2.1.2- a) Two FSA G\ and G2, b) Synchronous product of G\ 
and G2 • 
2.2 Diagnosis in FSA 
We use the state-based method of [48] for diagnoser design in DES which is briefly 
reviewed below. 
Consider a non-deterministic Moore finite-state automaton G = (Q, S, T, D, A, qo). 
It is assumed that S = E0 |JEU0 , where E0 represents the observable event set and 
Eu o consists of unobservable events. 
Suppose there are m failure modes Fl ,F2, • • • , Fm in G. Each failure mode 
corresponds to a failure (or a set of failures) in the system. A valve stuck-closed or 
a motor stuck-off are examples of failure modes. Let 
K = {N,F\--- ,Fm,Fh2,--- , F m - 1 ' m , - - -
 ]F1'-'m} 












Figure 2.3: Diagram of a DES and diagnoser. 
condition corresponding to a combination of failure modes. Thus, for example, for 
p = 2, the condition set will be /C := {N, F 1 , F 2 , F 1 ' 2 } , where F 1 , 2 corresponds to 
the case where both failure modes F 1 and F 2 have occurred. 
The event set can be partitioned as E = E/ljE/v, where E/ = {/*, • • • , / m } 
is the set of fault events and E ^ is the set of non-fault events. Each fault event 
corresponds to a failure mode. We assume, without loss of generality, that all fault 
events are unobservable, i.e., Ey C Eu0 . That is, the occurrence of a failure mode 
does not result in an output change that identifies the failure mode. The system 
enters faulty conditions as the consequence of the occurrence of fault events. We 
assume that the state set can be partitioned according to the condition of the system: 
Q = QN\J(QFI\J • • • \JQF™)\J(QF1,2\J • • • (jQF™-l,m)(J • • • (jQFl,.~ .m 
The condition map K : Q —> K. is defined such that for every q G Q, n(q) is the 
condition of the system at the state q. The definition of K is extended to the subsets 
of Q: K(Z) = {K(q)\q € z}, for any z Q Q. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Sampath et al. developed the concept of 
diagnoser to perform diagnosis [98]. In the event-based framework of [98], the diag-
noser can be viewed as an extended observer for the system which gives an estimate 
of the current state of the system and information on potential past occurrences of 
failure events. In the state-based framework [48], however, the diagnoser is a dy-
namical system that generates an estimate for the condition of the system by using 
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the output sequence (d\d2 • • • dn) generated by the system. This is done by calcu-
lating a set zn C Q to which q must belong at the time that dn was generated (see 
Figure 2.3); tz{zn) will be the estimate of the system condition. After the generation 
of the next output (dn+\), the diagnoser updates zn. 
In [48], the diagnoser designed for G is defined to be a finite-state Moore 
automaton Do = ( ^ U ( ^ o } ' D,£,,za,K,n), where Z | J { l o } ' D a n d & Q 2K — {0} are 
the state, event and output sets of D\ z0 := (z0,0) is the initial set with z0 € 2^ —{0}; 
Z C 2*5 — {0}, and £ : Z | J{ lo} x D —> Z represents the transition function; 
K
 '• ^ U i ^ o } "~* & denotes the output map. Given the state estimate zn and upon 
observing dn+\, the state estimate is updated according to 
^i=^nA" i(K})(n=°) 
^n+i = Z(zn,dn+i) = {q | \{q) = dn+i & (3?' e zn : q' => q)} (n > 1) 
The state estimate z0 holds the information available about the state of the 
system at the time that the diagnoser is started. 
Example 2.2.1. Consider the FSA in Figure 2.4(a) with the set of fault events 
£ / = {/} and the failure mode F. The event set is E = {a, b, c, e, f, g} with E0 = 
{a,b,c, g} and T,uo = {e,f}. The unobservable events are shown by dashed lines in 
Figure 2.4(a). The condition set is K. = {N, F}. Here, for example, we have 1 =>• 7, 
2 => 8 and 2 =$• 4. Figure 2.4(b) shows the diagnoser designed for the system. 
Initially, the state of the system is assumed unknown. Therefore, ZQ = Q, and the 
condition of the system is uncertain, i.e., {N,F}. Suppose after the initialization of 
the diagnoser, output "d\" is observed. Thus, the state of the system must be "2", 
"3", "1" or "9", and the condition of the system is {N,F}. Similarly, if "d^" is 
observed first, then the state of the system must be "5 " or "8 " and the condition of 























































ure 2.4: Example 2.2.1- A finite-state automaton and its diagnoser. 
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of the system must be %" and the condition of the system is {N}. This means that 
the fault has not occurred. • 
This diagnoser has a cycle {5,8} —> {3,9} —> {5,8} corresponding to the 
output sequence d^didz, which is called an "F-indeterminate" cycle because the 
condition estimate in the diagnoser cycle is {N, F} and hence uncertain. It should 
be noted that there are two cycles in the system in Figure 2.4(a) with the same 
output sequence d3did3, namely: the states 5 — 3 — 5 in the normal mode (N) and 
the states 8 — 9 — 8 in the failure mode F. The diagnoser cannot distinguish between 
these two cycles. Therefore, if the system is trapped in the faulty cycle 8 — 9 — 8, 
the diagnoser will not be able to detect the failure. Fault diagnosability is reviewed 
in Section 2.3. 
The fault diagnosis method developed in [48] relies on the output sequence 
and output-adjacent states. Therefore, it is useful to store the information about 
the output-adjacent states of G in a Reachability Transition System (RTS) 
[48]. The RTS (corresponding to G) is defined to be the transition system G = 
(Q,R,D,X) which has Q, D and A as the state set, output set and output map, 
respectively; R C Q x Q is a binary relation, and (gi, (fe) £ R if and only if q\ =» q2. 
The number of states of the diagnoser in the worst case is exponential in the 
number of system states |Q|. Therefore, for fault diagnosis, instead of constructing 
the diagnoser DQ, it is computationally more practical to compute the RTS of G 
off-line and use it later for online implementation of the diagnosis algorithm [48]. 
In other words, having zn and the observation dn+x, use G to compute zn+\ and 
k(zn+i). 
The RTS (in the form of a table) corresponding to the system in Figure 2.4(a) 
is shown in Table 2.1. From a computational point of view, RTS can be computed 
in d?(|<2|2 + |C?||T|) time because a breadth-first search reachability analysis for each 












































Table 2.1: Reachability transition system of the FSA in Figure 2.4(a). 
The DES diagnoser discussed in [48] only uses the discrete outputs of the sys-
tem for diagnosis. In general some of the events are observable. If the occurrence of 
these observable events cannot be inferred from the output sequence, then the infor-
mation about the occurrence of the observable events can be included in the output 
map [48]. In the following, we discuss diagnosability of faults in the framework of 
[48]. 
2.3 Diagnosability of Faults in DES 
The example in Section 2.2 illustrates the importance of diagnosability in DES. 
Let J7 = K. — {N} denote the set of faulty conditions. Also let Tl be 
the set of faulty conditions in which the failure mode Fl is present, and let F* = 
T — T\ For example, consider a system with three failure modes F1 , F2 and 
F 3 and assume that K = {N, F\F2, F 3 ^ 1 - 2 ^ 1 ' 3 , F2-3, F1-2-3}. We have T = 
{F\F2,F*,Fl'2,Fx'\F2'\Fl>2<z} and F 1 = {F\Fl>2,Fl*,Fl>2*}. 
Let Qjn be the set of all discrete states corresponding to the condition set J71. 





Figure 2.5: A FSA with two failure modes. 
T — Fl. For example, in the FSM shown in Figure 2.5, we have Qjri = {1,3,5,7}, 
Qjr2 = {2,3,6,7} and QJT = {0,2,4,6}. Define G?i as the sub-generator of G 
consisting of the states of Qjn only. Similarly, define GN, Gy? and GNj^ as the sub-
generators of G consisting only the states of QN, QT and QN {JQJT, respectively. 
In the following, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
failure diagnosability in FSA. First, we bring in some related definitions. 
Definition 2.3.1. [48] If the occurrence of a failure mode Fl can be directly con-
cluded from the generation of an output symbol 'd' G D, then 'd' is called F 1 -
indicative. • 
For example, in the FSA shown in Figure 2.4(a), discrete output "c?4" is F -
indicative. 
A state z of the diagnoser corresponding to a state estimate for the system 
is called F'-certain if n(z), the corresponding estimate of the system's condition, 
indicates that the failure has occurred [48]. A state z of the diagnoser is defined 
as F'-uncertain if n(z), the corresponding estimate of the system's condition is 
consistent with the occurrence of F% but doesn't conclusively indicate that the failure 
has occurred. For example, in the DES diagnoser shown in Figure 2.4(b), the states 
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with the condition estimate {JV, F} are F-uncertain, and the state with the condition 
estimate {F} is F-certain. 
The output language L0(G, q) generated by G from the state q G Q is defined 
as 
L0(G, q) :—{d\d2 • • • dm G D+ such that d\ = X(q) and 
[3qi G Q (1 < i < m) : qi = q, &_! =4> qt, dt = A ^ ) , (2 < i < m)]} 
The output languages L0(Gjn,q), L0(GNji,q), L0(Giy,q) and L0(Gjn,q) are defined 
similarly. 
The diagnosability of a failure mode Fl is defined as follows [48]. 
Definition 2.3.2. [48) A permanent failure mode Fl ofG is said to be diagnosable 
if F% can be detected and isolated in a bounded number of events in G following both 
the occurrence of Fl and the initialization of diagnosis. • 
Theorem 2.3.1. [90) Assume that ZQ = Q. A permanent failure mode Fl is diag-
nosable in G if and only if: 
1. ForanyqeQ^i, if there is no transition out of q, then X~l(X(q))f]{Q—Qjri) = 
0; 
2. If there is a cycle in Qjn consisting of discrete states having the same output, 
say d, then \~~l{d) f](Q - Qri) ~ 0; 
3. For any q G Qjn and q' G (QN [JQji) satisfying X(q) = X(q'), we have: 
{s\s G L0(GN^,q')f]L0(G^,q),\s\ > \Q\2} = 0 
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Condition (1) in Theorem 2.3.1 states that there should be no deadlock state 
in Qjri with no transition out of the state unless the output in that state can be 
generated only when Fl has occurred. In other words, such an output has to be 
F-indicative. Similarly, condition (2) states that there should be no cycles with 
constant output in Qjn unless the constant output is F-indicative. Finally, condition 
(3) states that there should be no cycle in QTi having a sequence of outputs that 
can also be generated by a cycle in Q^ U QJT (otherwise, Fl cannot be distinguished 
and hence will be undiagnosable). 
In [90], it is shown that testing diagnosability for nondeterministic FSA has 
complexity C(|<5|4). In the next section, we briefly describe fault diagnosis in con-
tinuous systems and present the conditions for the existence of residual generators 
for linear systems. 
2.4 Model-based Fault Diagnosis in Continuous 
Systems 
As explained in the previous chapter, model-based approaches for fault diagnosis 
in continuous systems rely on analytical redundancy. In these approaches, there 
are residual generators which generate residual signals from the difference between 
actual measurements and their estimates obtained using the system's model. Faults 
are detected by setting fixed or variable thresholds on residual signals. A number 
of residual generators can be designed with each being sensitive to only one of the 
faults. Fault isolation is achieved by analyzing each residual once the threshold is 
exceeded. 
A general diagram of the model-based fault diagnosis in continuous system is 
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Figure 2.6: Diagram of fault diagnosis in continuous systems adopted from [101]. 
Res idual genera t ion: This block generates residual signals by using the 
available inputs and measured outputs of the system. The residual must contain 
information regarding the occurrence of a fault. Normally, it should be zero or close 
to zero if no fault is present in the system. In contrast, it has to be distinguishably 
different from zero when a fault occurs. The residual generation can be designed 
based on any method that is described in the previous chapter. 
Res idual evaluat ion: This block consists of a decision rule and examines the 
residuals to determine if any fault has occurred. It may perform a simple threshold 
test on the instantaneous values or moving averages of the residuals. It may also use 
statistical methods, for example, generalized likelihood ratio testing or sequential 
probability ratio testing to detect and isolate faults. 
Residual generators used in our work can be designed using any method that is 
mentioned in the previous chapter. However, without loss of generality, we assume 
a simple threshold passing test for the evaluation of residual signals. In the next 
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Chapter, we will describe how the information contained in the value of the residuals 
can be incorporated in our framework for isolating faults. 
Diagnosability of a fault in a continuous system is related to the existence of 
residual generators for the system to detect and isolate the fault. Using geomet-
rical approaches, the existence of residual generators has been studied in [80, 81] 
for linear systems and in [33] for nonlinear systems. In our work, the continous-
variable dynamics of the system can be linear or nonlinear. However, in the follow-
ing, we present the well-known Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation 
(FPRG) as discussed in [80, 81] for Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) systems. The solv-
ability conditions for the existence of residual generators provide the solutions to 
the FPRG. 
2.4.1 Fundamental Problem of Residual Generation (FPRG) 
Let X and y be linear spaces over the field of real numbers R. Let C : X —> y 
denote a linear transformation (or map) from X to y. The vector space X is called 
the domain of C, and y is the codomain. The kernel (or null-space) of C is the 
subspace 
Ker C := {x | x E X and Cx = 0} C X 
The image of C is the subspace 
Im C := {y \ y € y and 3x G X : y = Cx}cy 
Consider an LTI system 
S: < 
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) 
{ y(t) = Cx(t) 
(2.1) 
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where A G Rnx™, B 6 Rnxp and C e Wxn are the system matrices. The system 
S sometimes is represented by the triple (C, A, B). In the following, < Ker C\A > 
denotes the unobservable subspace of the pair (C, A) and is defined as 
< Ker C\A >= Ker Cf]A-lKerCf]---f]A~n+1Ker C 
Definition 2.4.1. [113] A subspace S C Rn is a (C,A)-unobservability sub-
space ifS =< Ker HC\A + DC > for some maps D : Rl —• Rn and H : Rl —> 
Definition 2.4.2. [113] The system (C,A,B) is called input-observable if B 
monic and < Ker C\A > f] Im B = 0. 
Now, consider the LTI system 
m 
x(t) = Ax{t) + Bu(t) + J2Lifi(t) 
is 
cm *=i (2.2) 
y(t) = Cx{t) 
where u(t) and y(t) are the input and output of the system, respectively, and are as-
sumed to be known. They are referred to as the observables. Functions fi(t) E R"XSi, 
for i G {1, • • • ,m}, are arbitrary and unknown functions of time and called fault 
type signals. For simplicity, these functions in our hybrid diagnosis framework 
discussed in Chapter 3 are called fault types. Note that the fault functions are not 
necessarily scalars. The matrices U are called fault signatures. Without loss of 
generality, assume that the system has two faults and is in the form: 
s} x{t) = Ax{t) + Bu(t) + Llfl(t) + L2f2{t) 
y(t) = Cx(t) 
Given the system Sj in Equation 2.3, we want to design an LTI residual 
generator which is sensitive to f\(t) but insensitive to /^(i)- This problem is called 
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the FPRG [80, 81]. 
Consider the residual generator RG of the form 
RG • < ™{t) = Fw{t) ~ Ev{t) + °U{t) (2 4) 
r(t) = Mw(t) - Hy(t) + Ku(t) 
where F, E, G, M, H, and K are the matrices with appropriate dimensions. Resid-
ual generator RG takes observables u(t) and y(t) as inputs, and generates residual 
r(t), with the following properties. 
• r(t) —> 0 if f\{t) = 0, i.e., transfer matrices u —> r and $2 —> r are zero, 
and modes observable from r(t) are asymptotically stable. 
• The transfer matrix f\ —> r is input-observable. 
Theorem 2.4.1. [81] The FPRG has a solution if and only if 
S * p ) / m L 1 = 0 (2.5) 
where §* is the infimal (C,A)-unobservability subspace containing Ira L2. • 
The FPRG can be extended to the case of multiple faults as follows [81]. 
Assume that k faults are present in the system. The objective is to design a filter 
which generates k residuals, r,(i) (i e {1, • • • , fc}), such that the failure of the z-th 
component, i.e, nonzero /»(£)> can only affect the z-th residual Ti(t) and no other 
residuals Tj(t) (j ^ i). This problem is called the Extended Fundamental Problem 
in Residual Generation (EFPRG). 
Theorem 2.4.2. [81] The EFPRG has a solution if and only if 
S*P|/mL, = 0 (2.6) 
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where §* is the infimal (C', A)-unobservability subspace containing ]T} ^rn Lj- • 
The geometric relations in the above theorems provide a general solution to 
the problem of residual generation in LTI systems. In [81] and [80], a procedure 
is described for calculating the matrices F, E, G, M, H, and K of the residual 
generator for the case that FPRG and EFPRG have solutions. 
In the following, we extend the results of [81] to study the existence of residual 
generators which are sensitive to a set of fault types and insensitive to the rest. 
Consider the LTI system in Equation 2.2 with m fault types. Let FT = {f1,--- , fm} 
be the set of fault types, and let $ = {/fcl, • • • , fkj} be a subset of FT with $ ^ 
0. We want to design an LTI residual generator which is sensitive to all fl(t) E 
$ but insensitive to all fj(t) E $ , where $ = FT — $. We call this problem 
the Generalized Extended Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation 
(GEFPRG) . Let RG in the form of Equation 2.4 be the residual generator that is 
designed. Residual generator RG takes observable signals u{t) and y(t) as inputs, 
and generates residual r(t), with the following properties: 
1. The transfer matrices u —> r and /* —> r are zero for all fl(t) e $ , and the 
modes observable from r(t) are asymptotically stable. Therefore, r(t) —> 0 if 
p{t) = 0, for all fj(t) E $ and 
2. The transfer matrix [fhl, • • • , fki] —> r is input-observable. 
Corollary 2.4.3. (Corollary of the EFPRG Theorem in [81]) The GEFPRG has 
a solution if and only if §* f] J2 I'm I>% = 0, where S* is the infimal (C,A)-
unobservability subspace containing ^ Im L3' > and Ll *s ^ e fault signature of 
f\ M 
If $ = FT, the fault isolation problem becomes equivalent to the fault de-
tection problem. In this case, the solvability condition is that the transfer matrix 
[fkl i • •' > fkj] — y V is input-observable. 
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In the next chapter, we describe our hybrid diagnosis framework. 
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Chapter 3 
FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN HYBRID 
SYSTEMS 
In this chapter, we develop a hybrid framework for fault diagnosis in hybrid systems. 
As described in Chapter 1, normally there are two types of sensors in the system: 
continuous sensors that generate a continuous output signal, and discrete sensors 
such as level sensors that are used for measuring different levels of a liquid in a tank. 
Diagnosis results based on purely DES abstract model and the outputs of discrete 
sensors will be conservative in the sense that a diagnosable failure mode may be 
rendered undiagnosable due to the abstraction and lack of sufficient information. 
On the other hand, fault diagnosis based on purely continuous dynamics and the 
outputs of continuous sensors may not be possible at all times. An efficient diagnosis 
approach in hybrid systems must be able to use the information at both DES and 
continuous levels for detecting and isolating faults. We motivate the need for this 
approach through the following examples. 
Consider the system of two cascade tanks and three valves in Figure 3.1. A 
chemical with temperature T\ flows into Tankl through valve V\. Another chemical 
with temperature T2 flows into Tankl through the valve Vi- The chemicals are mixed 
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in Tankl and then flow to Tank2, where they are drained through pipe d. When the 
chemicals are mixed, the temperature of the resultant is governed by a differential 
equation in terms of T\ and T2. Some of the mixed chemicals are pumped back 
by pump P and through the valve V3 to Tankl. The chemical flowing into Tankl 
through valve V3 has the same temperature as in Tankl. When all three valves 
are open and the pump is working, the height of the chemical in Tankl is at H2. 
Assume that all the three valves are open, and pump P is working. Also assume that 
the valves may have a loss-of-effectiveness fault when they are commanded to open 
fully. Pump P is assumed fault free. Assume that only one fault may be present at 
a time in the system. Suppose that a discrete level sensor with two readings HI and 
H2 monitors the liquid level and a temperature sensor measures the temperature 
of the liquid in the tank and generates a continuous signal. The readings of the 
discrete sensor will represent the discrete outputs in the hybrid automaton model 
of the system. 
The continuous output of the hybrid automaton model will be a function of 
the temperature sensor readings. First, assume that only the readings of the level 
sensor are available. In this case, if one of the valves fails, the level of the chemical 
in Tankl reaches HI and the fault can be detected. However, it is not possible to 
determine the valve in which the fault has occurred, i.e, the fault cannot be isolated. 
Now assume that only the signal generated by the temperature sensor is at hand. 
Thus, if one of the valves Vi or V2 fails, the temperature of the liquid changes and 
the corresponding fault can be detected and isolated. However, if valve V3 fails, 
the temperature of the liquid does not change and the fault of valve V3 cannot be 
detected and isolated. Now assume that the readings of both sensors are available. 
Using the reading of the level sensor the faults can be detected. Faults in V\ and V2 
change the temperature and therefore, can be isolated using the temperature sensor. 
A fault in V3 can be isolated when the temperature does not change, but the level of 
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Figure 3.1: A system of tank and two valves. 
the liquid reaches HI. Therefore, if any of the valves fails, the fault can be detected 
and isolated in the system. 
As another example demonstrating the advantages of integrating the informa-
tion at the DES level with the readings of the continuous sensors for fault diagnosis, 
consider the system shown in Figure 3.2. The system consists of a gas turbine en-
gine and its fuel supply system and nozzle actuator. Next, we briefly describe the 
system. The details of modeling and fault diagnosis in the gas turbine engine are 
provided in Chapter 6. 
The gas turbine engine is composed of six sections: intake duct, compressor, 
combustion chamber, turbine, afterburner and nozzle. The air is taken into the 
engine through the intake duct and compressed with the compressor. Fuel is then 
added to the air, and the mixture is burned in the combustion chamber. The high-
pressure and high-temperature gases produced turn the turbine. Then they are 
reheated using the afterburner and expanded through the nozzle to produce thrust. 
A fuel supply system provides the fuel to the engine. The fuel supply system has two 
branches: one controlling the fuel mass flow rate entering the combustion chamber 
and the other controlling the fuel entering the afterburner. The pumps PM and P&B 
are in charge of pumping the fuel to the engine. The governors GM and GAB are 
servo-valves that control the mass flow rate of the fuel passing through them. The 
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Figure 3.2: A gas turbine engine and its fuel supply system and nozzle actuator. 
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engine is off. 
The shut-off valve VAB is used to ensure that no fuel is supplied to the af-
terburner when the afterburner is not in operation. The pressurizing valves VPM 
and VPAB ensure that the fuel entering the engine has a high pressure for efficient 
atomization. The area of the nozzle is variable and changes with a hydraulic ac-
tuator. The pump P/v pumps the oil to the hydraulic actuator. The governor Gjv 
controls the area by controlling the amount of oil passing through it. There are 
three discrete sensors PSAB , PSM a n d P5JV installed in the fuel supply system and 
the nozzle actuator generating "low" and "high" symbols at Pi, Pi and P3. There 
are also continuous sensors installed in the engine to measure the turbine inlet tem-
perature T03, turbine inlet pressure P03 and shaft speed N. It can be verified that 
the effects of the afterburner fuel mass flow rate and the nozzle area on the con-
tinuous sensors are opposite and proportional. Therefore, the failure modes in the 
components of the afterburner fuel supply system cannot be distinguished from the 
failure modes in the nozzle actuator. 
Moreover, discrete sensors cannot sense small deterioration of the compo-
nents. For example, consider the following faults in the components: small loss-
of-effectiveness of GM and stuck-closed of Vs. Suppose a small loss-of-effectiveness 
fault in GM occurs. This fault cannot be picked up by using discrete sensors alone. 
Also, it can be verified that by using residual generators, the loss-of-effectiveness 
fault in GM cannot be distinguished from the stuck-closed in Vs. However, integratg 
the information coming from the discrete sensors and the information provided by 
the residual generators, the fault in GM can be isolated. 
Undiagnosable failure modes in the engine may become diagnosable if more 
sensors are used. However, it should be noted that installing sensors in the engine 
may be difficult or very costly due to the very high temperature and pressure in the 
engine. 
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Figure 3.3: A hybrid automaton modeling a heating system with a fault. 
We develop a systematic approach for fault diagnosis in hybrid systems in 
which information at both DES and continuous levels is used for detecting and 
isolating faults. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, 
we describe the modeling of the system in our framework. Our diagnosis method 
developed for hybrid automata is described in Section 3.2. We conclude the chapter 
by presenting a summary of the chapter. 
3.1 System Model 
In this section, we describe the modeling of a hybrid automaton with faults in our 
framework. 
3.1.1 Hybrid Automata 
Figure 3.3 shows a hybrid automaton modeling a heating system consisting of an 
electrical heater and a thermostat. The heater is energized with an electrical power 
supply unit. Suppose that the heating system is in charge of keeping a room's 
temperature in the range of 23° to 26°. The temperature is denoted by x. The 
continuous output is denoted by y. There are two discrete states for the normal 
behavior of the system: ON-N and OFF-N. Assume that initially, the temperature 
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is 24°; the temperature is in the desired range and therefore, the heater is off. 
When the heater is off, the temperature of the room falls according to x = —0.2x. 
When the temperature reaches 23°, the power supply unit energizes the heater with 
maximum power. 
The heater turns on and the system transitions to the discrete state ON-N. 
A discrete event (OFFtoON) is associated with this autonomous transition. While 
the system is in the discrete state ON-N, the heater may have a loss-of-effectiveness 
fault. If the heating system fails, the system transitions to the discrete state ON-F 
with an unobservable transition labeled with / shown by a dashed line. The loss-
of-effectiveness fault is modeled by a fault signal / that is added to the state flow 
dynamics of the system in the discrete state ON-F. There are two sensors available in 
the system: a temperature sensor that generates a continuous signal, and a discrete 
sensor that by using the status of the power supply unit, generates the symbols 
"on" and "off" at the discrete states of the system. The system has two operational 
modes: the normal mode and the failure mode. The discrete states OFF-N and 
ON-N belong to the normal mode and the discrete states OFF-F and ON-F belong 
to the failure mode. 
We assume that the system under control, i.e., the system along with low-level 
continuous controllers and DES supervisors, can be modeled as a hybrid automaton. 
In the following, we present a formal definition of hybrid automata in our work which 
is a modified form of the definition in [60]. Our definition models the faulty behavior 
of hybrid automata. Moreover, in our definition, there is a discrete output associated 
with each discrete states of the hybrid automata. 
Definition 3.1.1. A hybrid automaton is defined to be a 14-tuple 
H = (Q,X,U,y,FT,Init,S,Z,T,G,p,D,\,qo) (3.1) 
where Q is the set of finite discrete states; X C EJ1, U C W and y C R r are the 
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set of vector spaces of continuous state, control input and output, respectively; FT 
is the set of m fault types f1, • • • , fm with fl{t) € R for 1 < i < m; Init C X is 
the set of initial continuous states; S — {Sq \ q E Q} is the set of dynamic models 
defining the continuous dynamics of the system; T, is a set of symbols representing 
the discrete events labeling the transitions among discrete states; TQQxY*xQis 
the set of discrete transitions; G : T x X xU —• {True, False} is the set of guard 
conditions; p : T x X —> X is a reset map; D is the set of discrete output symbols; 
A : Q —• D is the discrete output map and qo is the initial discrete state. • 
For instance, in the heating system example, we have: 
Q = {OFF ~N,ON - N, OFF - F, OFF - N}; 
x,u,ycm-
FT={f}-
Init = {x = 24}; 
S = {SOFF-N,SON-N,SQFF~F,SON-F} with SQFF-N = SQFF-F — 
x = 0.3(30 - x) J x = 0.3(30 - x) - f 
SoN-N = { , SoN-F = \ i 
y=x [y=x 
E = {OFFtoON,ONtoOFF, / } ; 
T= { r 1 ) 7 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 } withT! = {OFF - N,OFFtoON,ON - N), 
T2 = {ON -N, ONtoOFF, OFF - N),T3 = {ON - N, f,ON - F), 
T4 = {OFF - F, OFFtoON, ON - F),T5 = {ON - F, ONtoOFF, OFF - F)} 
G{Tu{x | x <23} ,R) = True,G{Tu{x \ x> 23}, M) = False, 
G{T2,{x | x > 26}, R) = True,G{T2,{x \ x < 23},R) = False, 
G(T3 )R,R) = True, 
G{T4,{x | x <23} ,R) = True,G{T4,{x | x> 23},R) = False, 
G{T5,{x | x >26} ,R) = True,G{T5,{x \ x < 23},R) = False; 
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p(tr, x) = x for any tr G T and i S ^ ; f l = {off, on}; 
\{OFF -N) = X(OFF -F) = off, X(ON - N) = \{0N - F) = on; 
qQ = OFF - N 
In the above definition of hybrid automata, a discrete event is associated with 
any transition between two discrete states. In other words, in addition to the guard 
conditions, every arc in a hybrid automaton is labeled by a discrete event. Every 
transition tr £ T can be represented by a triple tr = (<?i,cr,q2), with q\,q2 E Q and 
a G E. Here, c/i is the source of t, (72 is the destination of tr and a is the label of tr. 
The map label : T —> E gives the label of the transitions. In general, we assume 
two types of transitions: 
• Transitions which have a discrete nature such as commands from a DES su-
pervisor. The guard conditions for these transitions are always true. 
• Autonomous transitions that depend on the continuous state and control input 
of the system. We assume that when the guard conditions of these transitions 
become true, the system may stay in the source state or have a transition to 
the destination state. 
For any discrete state q, Sq is the dynamical model 
x(t) = jq(x(t),u(t)j\t),--.r(t)) 
Sa := -j (3.2) 
w y{t) = Mq(x(t),u(t)) 
where x(t) 6 X, u{t) e U and fl € FT for 0 < i < m are the continuous state, 





define the state flow and the output map of the continuous dynamics at q, respec-
tively. 
The dynamical system of equation (3.2) can model linear or nonlinear dynam-
ics with faults. For example, the continuous dynamics at the discrete states of the 
hybrid automaton model of the heating system in Figure 3.3 is represented by a 
linear system. 
As described earlier, observations in the system come from the readings of 
the discrete and continuous sensors. The discrete output at each discrete state is 
generated by using the readings of discrete sensors. The continuous output at each 
discrete state, on the other hand, is a function of the signals generated by continuous 
sensors. 
It can be seen from Def. 3.1.1 that the tuple (Q,T,,T,D,X,q0) defines a Moore 
FSA representing a DES level abstraction of the system. We refer to the tuple Habs = 
(Q,T,,T,D,X,q0) as the DES abstraction of H. We assume that S = £0 | JEU 0 , 
where E0 represents the observable event set and Eu o consists of unobservable events. 
The commands that are generated by a supervisor or the events generated by discrete 
sensors are the examples of observable events. The set S / C S u o is the set of fault 
events. 
Next, we describe the modeling of faults in hybrid automata and describe the 
faulty behavior of the system. 
3.1.2 Fault Modeling in Hybrid Automata 
In general, we have two kinds of faults in the system: faults whose effect on the 
system's dynamics is drastic such as a stuck-on fault of a heater or a stuck-open 
fault of a valve, and faults that slightly change the system dynamics such as a small 
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bias in a sensor reading or a small drift in the output of a valve. In this thesis, we 
study fault diagnosis in hybrid systems with both kinds of faults. 
The system can be in normal mode of operation or in a failure mode corre-
sponding to a fault. In our work, faults are represented by fault types. Each fault 
type corresponds to one or more failure modes in a component of the system. 
Initially, the system is in normal mode of operation and fault types have zero val-
ues. When a fault occurs in the system, the value of the corresponding fault type 
becomes nonzero and the system enters the failure mode corresponding to that fault. 
Definition 3.1.2. A fault type f is called active in a discrete state q if fit) is a 
nonzero function for the time that the system is in q. 
For instance, in the heating system example, / is an additive fault type which 
represents the loss-of-effectiveness fault. Additive fault types are modeled by adding 
fault signals to the state flow dynamics as inputs. Fault type / is active in the 
state ON — F. When the heating system fails it enters the failure mode F which 
corresponds to the loss-of-effectiveness fault. The unobservable event / is a fault 
event and represents the occurrence of the fault; the discrete states ON and OFF 
belong to the normal mode; and ON — F and OFF — F belong to the failure mode 
F. 
As another example, consider the hybrid automaton of Figure 3.4. This hy-
brid automaton models a solenoid valve. The flow rate passing through the valve 
shown by the variable x is related to the input voltage u by a linear dynamical 
system. The valve may fail stuck-closed or stuck-open, or it may have a 10% loss-
of-effectiveness fault. Each fault takes the system into a specific failure mode. The 
failure modes F\ (respectively, F2) corresponds to the operational mode of the valve 
when it fails stuck-closed (respectively, stuck-open). Failure mode F3 corresponds 
to the operational mode of the valve when it has a 10% loss-of-effectiveness fault, 
and N corresponds to the normal mode of operation. 
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Figure 3.4: A hybrid automaton modeling a solenoid valve with three faults. 
The faults in the valve can be represented by an additive fault type fv. Each 
fault can be specified by a specific value assigned to fv. For instance, the stuck-
closed fault can be specified by /„ = —u, the stuck-open fault can be specified 
by fv = umax — u, where umax is the maximum of the input, and a 10% loss-of-
effectiveness fault can be represented by fv — — O.lu. In Figure 3.4, the fault events 
/ i , f2 and / 3 represent the occurrence of faults stuck-closed, stuck-open and a 10% 
loss-of-effectiveness, respectively. 
Each fault type represents a set of failure modes in a component with each 
mode corresponding to a set of (nonzero) fault signals. The system is taken to a 
failure mode of operation when a fault occurs. Assume that there are m failure 
modes in the system (m > m), and let FM be the set of failure modes in the 
system. The mapping 
£ : FT —> 2FM - {0} 
yields the failure modes associated with a fault type. 
We assume that faults are permanent. This means that if the system enters 
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a failure mode it stays in that failure mode forever. It should be noted that fault 
types are not necessarily active in all the discrete states of their corresponding failure 
mode. This typically happens when a faulty component is not used or is off in a 
given mode of operation. For example, in the system in Figure 3.3, / is not active 
in OFF - F. 
Let F J be a failure mode associated with the fault type / ' for i e {1, • • • , m}. 
We say Fj occurs at time t0 if ft{to) = 0 for t < t0 and for t > t0, fl(t) takes a 
value corresponding to FK The occurrence of a failure mode Fj is modeled by an 
unobservable fault event denoted by ft at the DES level. Let 
K = {N,F\--- ,F,h,F1'2,--- ,F™-1- rV-- ,F1 ' - 'T f l} 
denote the condition set. The system can be in normal condition (N) or a condition 
corresponding to a combination of failure modes. Thus, for example, for a system 
with two failure modes F 1 and F2, the condition set will be K := {N, F 1 , F 2 , -F1 '2}, 
where F 1 ' 2 corresponds to the case where both failure modes F 1 and F 2 have oc-
curred. We assume that the discrete state set can be partitioned according to the 
condition of the system: 
Q = QN\J(QF>\J • • • \JQF*)\J(QFI.*\J • • • \JQF*-^)[J • • • IJQFX.-.* 
For instance, in Figure 3.3, we have K = {N, F } , QN = {OFF - N, OFF - N} and 
QF = {OFF-F,ON-F}. 
Let E ; = {/i, • • • , fm} Q Euo denote the set of fault events. The fault event ft 
labels the occurrence of the failure mode Fl for i e {1, • • • , rh}. Function n : Q —> K. 
denotes the condition map of the system, and is defined such that for every q G Q, 
n(q) is the condition of the system at the discrete state q. We say q is a normal 
discrete state if K(q) = N, otherwise it is called a faulty discrete state. The 
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definition of n can be extended to the subsets of Q: 
K(Z) = {«;(<?) | q G z}, for any z C Q 
Let T — K — {N} denote the set of faulty condi t ions. Also let J71 be the set 
of faulty conditions in which the failure mode F% is present, and let J71 = T — T1. 
For example, consider a system with three failure modes F1, F2 and F3 and assume 
that 
lC = {N,F1,F2,F3,Fh2,F1'3,F2>3,F1'2'3} 
We have F = {F\F2,F3,FX>2,FX>3,F2<3,FX*>3} and JF1 = { i ^ . F ^ F ^ . F 1 - 2 - 3 } . 
Fault diagnosis is to find the condition of the system by detecting and isolating 
failure modes in a bounded time after they occur in the system. In the next section, 
we describe our diagnosis method for hybrid automata. 
3.2 Hybrid Diagnosis of Hybrid Automata 
Fault diagnosis is to detect the occurrence of the failure modes and isolate the failure 
mode that the system is in. In our framework, the DES abstraction of the system 
includes all the failure modes present in the system. Therefore, if the discrete state in 
which the system is evolving can be identified at each time, the fault diagnosis can be 
accomplished. However, the occurrence of failure modes is modeled by unobservable 
events and therefore, using only the information at the DES level (discrete outputs) 
may not be sufficient for diagnosis and diagnosability analysis. 
As described in the tank and valve example, using only the DES abstract 
model of a system, some failure modes may remain undiagnosable. On the other 
hand, it is possible that no isolator can be designed for isolating some fault types. 
By integrating the information available from discrete and continuous sensors and 
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the DES level and continuous level models, we may be able to provide a more precise 
diagnosis and diagnose failure modes that are undiagnosable based on only DES or 
only continuous models. 
We assume that there is a bank of residual generators (isolators) designed 
based on the continuous dynamics to isolate fault types at the continuous level. Each 
residual generator takes the continuous input and output of the system and produces 
a residual. The solvability conditions for the existence of residual generators for 
isolating faults in linear dynamical systems and nonlinear dynamical systems have 
been studied in [80] and [33], respectively. In the remainder of the thesis, we refer 
to the residual generators designed for detection and isolation of faults as isolators. 
We develop a method for constructing a hybrid diagnoser that integrates the in-
formation generated by the isolators with the information available at the DES level 
(outputs of discrete sensors) to diagnose failures. Figure 3.5 shows the schematic 
of our diagnoser design methodology. First, a DES abstraction of the information 
generated by each isolator is constructed which represents the isolator. The DES 
model of the isolators is then integrated with the DES abstraction of the system 
to construct an Extended Discrete-Event System Abstraction (EDESA) of 
the system and isolators. The hybrid diagnoser is a diagnoser which is designed 
based on the EDESA of the system and isolators. Although the diagnoser is con-
structed based on a DES model, we denote it a hybrid diagnoser because it uses the 
information from both the discrete and the continuous dynamics. 
In general, we follow the following four steps to construct the EDESA: 
1. Each isolator in the system is modeled by a DES; 
2. The DES abstraction of the system (Habs) is modified (by adding appropriate 
self-loop transitions) to make the transitions in the DES models of isolators 
(step 1) consistent with the system transition system; 
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Figure 3.5: The schematic of the hybrid diagnosis framework. 
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3. We assume that the isolators generate an event between every two consecutive 
transition of the system. This assumption is enforced by an appropriate DES 
model. This will be discussed in more detail subsequently. 
4. The EDESA will be constructed by combining the DES models of the iso-
lators, modified DES abstraction of the system and the DES enforcing the 
assumptions (step 3) using the synchronous product operation. 
In the following, we first describe the modeling of isolators that are designed at 
the continuous level in our work. We then describe a systematic approach to perform 
each of the aforementioned steps for building the EDESA of a hybrid automaton 
and isolators. 
3.2.1 Modeling of Isolators 
Isolators are designed based on the continuous dynamics of each discrete state. 
The solvability conditions for the existence of isolators for isolating faults in linear 
systems has been studied in [80]. In linear systems faults in the system can be 
modeled as additive faults added to the state-flow of the system similar to inputs. 
In [80], it is shown that additive fault signals can be used to model the faults in 
the actuators, sensors and the structure of the system. In [33], isolator design for 
isolating faults in nonlinear dynamical systems has been studied and conditions for 
the existence of isolators has been provided. In these nonlinear systems, faults are 
also modeled by additive fault signals. 
In this work, we assume that faults can be modeled by additive fault type sig-
nals. Therefore, the dynamics of the system at each discrete state can be represented 
by 
^ * = * ( * , « )
 + G.(/) ( 3 3 ) 
y = Mq(x,u) 
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where / is a subset of the fault types present in the system. 
Two discrete states q^ and q2 are called EM-similar if Eqi(x,u) = EQ2(x,u) 
and Mgi(x,u) = Mq2(x,u) (for every x, u). For instance, in Fig. 3.3, ON-N and 
ON-F are EM-similar. 
Assume that there are d distinct pairs (E, M) for the continuous dynamics of 
the system. The discrete state set of the system can be partitioned based on the 
(E, M) pairs: 
Q = QEM>\jQEM>...\jQi ->£Md 
where the continuous dynamics of all the discrete states in every QEMi for i G 
{1, • • • , d} have the same (E, M). We group EM-similar discrete states and design 
a set of isolators based on the continuous dynamics of each group. 
Let QEM be a set of EM-similar states and let FTQBM = {ffBM, • • • , ffEM } be 
the set of fault types active in the discrete states of QEM. Each isolator designed for 
QEM takes the continuous input and output of the system and produces a residual 
vector to isolate some fault types from the others while the system is evolving in 
one of the discrete states of QEM. For simplicity, we assume that the isolators are 
initialized to zero. We also assume that the system stays in each discrete state for at 
least Tmm, and the isolators are designed so that their responses reach steady state 
in less than rmm. More precisely, the transient response due to the mismatch in the 
initial conditions of isolators and the system dies out in less than rmm. Let $ C 
FT® be a nonempty subset of fault types. The isolator Is® ($) is designed to 
be sensitive to the fault types of $ and be insensitive to the fault types of FTQ — $. 
Assumption 1. An isolator Is® ($) designed for isolating fault types in QEM 
generates a nonzero residual for all inputs u ElA after the transient response due to 
the mismatch in the initial conditions of Is® ($) and the system dies out if the 
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Figure 3.7: The augmented dynamics of the system and the isolator Is when the 
system is in q. 
Assumption 1 is not a very limiting assumption because the continuous dy-
namics of the system in the discrete states of QEM is different from the continuous 
dynamics of the system in any other discrete state, and therefore, it is unlikely that 
the isolator designed based on the dynamics of QEM generates a zero residual while 
the system is not evolving in one of the discrete states of QEM. In this work, we show 
how Assumption 1 can be verified for a hybrid automaton with linear dynamics. 
Let q E Q — QEM and Is be a linear isolator with dynamics as in (2.4) designed 
based on the dynamics of QEM. Figure 3.6 shows the block diagram of the system 
and the isolator Is when the system is in q. The isolator Is takes the continuous 
input and output of the system and produces a residual vector r. Figure 3.7 shows 
the augmented dynamics of the system and the isolator Is when the system is in 
the state q. In order to have a nonzero residual r, we must verify that the transfer 
matrix from / and u to r is not zero for all q G Q — QEM. A more restrictive 
condition is that for all q G Q — QEM, the series system shown in Figures 3.7 is 
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input observable: 
Im [Ba La] f] < Ker Ca\Aa > = 0 
where Aa = 
Aq 0 
ECq F_ 
, Ba = 
' Bq' 
G 
i La — 
' L q ~ 
0 
and Ca — -HCq M 
An isolator Is® ($) is a detection and isolation filter designed based on the 
continuous dynamics of QEM. It initializes with zero, takes the continuous input 
and output of the system and produces a residual vector r$ (t) with the following 
properties. 
• ||?$ {t)\\ > e$ after the transient response due to the mismatch in the 
initial conditions of isolators and the system dies out if the system is evolving 
in one of the discrete states of QEM and a fault type of $ is active. 
QEM OEM 
• llr<5> \t)\\ < e$ after the transient response due to the mismatch in the 
initial conditions of isolators and the system dies out if the system is evolving 
in one of the discrete states of QEM and no fault type is active or one of the 
fault types of FTQ — $ is active. 
• ll7* (Oil — e* after the transient response due to the mismatch in the 
initial conditions of isolators and the system dies out if the system is not 
evolving in one of the discrete states of QEM. 
QEM 
where e^ > 0 is a threshold chosen to evaluate the residual. The choice of this 
threshold has been explained in Section 2.4. 
In the case that $ = FT® , IsQ ($) will be the isolator sensitive to all 
the fault types present in QEM, or simply a fault detector. An observer designed 
based on the continuous dynamics of QEM without considering faults can be a fault 
detector. If $ = 0, IsQ ($) will be an isolator which generates a zero residual if the 
system is in any state of QEM and produces a nonzero residual vector if the system 
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is in any state of Q — QEM. In this case, Is® ($) is called an EM-distinguisher. 
In the case that no fault type is active in QEM, i.e., FT® = 0, the continuous 
dynamics of all q e QEM will be similar, and an observer designed based on the 
dynamics of any q £ QEM will be an EM-distinguisher. 
Let Qf^ C QEM be the set of discrete states of QEM in which no fault type 
is active: 
QfnMact = {q\ 9 e QEM and /(•) EE 0 in q for all / e / « * " } 
The function active : Q —> 2 F T yields the fault types active in a discrete 
state. 
active(q) = {/ | / € F T and / is active in g} 
The mapping active can also be extended to state sets as follows. Let Q C Q, 
then 
active(Q) = Mac£iue(g) 
The inverse function active-1 : 2FT —• 2^ maps a set of fault types of FT to 
the set of discrete states of Q in which the fault types are active. Let $ C FT, then 
active'1^) = {q \ active{q)C\§ ^ 0} 
For a single fault type / , we have: 
active^1 ({/}) = {q \ q G Q and / is active in q} 
Also, we have: 
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Figure 3.8: Example 3.2.1: DES abstraction of a hybrid automaton with two failure 
modes. 
We have Qfn^ = active-1 (Q) f| QEM • 
Example 3.2.1. The graph of the DES abstraction of a hybrid automaton is shown 
in Figure 3.8. In each discrete state in Figure 3.8, the EM group the state belongs 
to, the fault type active in the state and the discrete output generated by the system 
at that state are also displayed. Two fault types f1 and f2 with the corresponding 
failure modes F 1 and F2 are assumed. Fault type f1 may occur when the system is 
in the discrete state qo or q2. Fault type f2 may occur when the system is in qo- The 
occurrence of the failure modes F 1 and F2 are modeled by transitions labeled with 
the events f1 and f2, respectively. Symbol 'u' is an unobservable event changing 
the discrete state of the system in the normal mode. The discrete stste set is Q = 
{<?o,-'- >9io}- The condition set of the system is K. = {N, F 1 , ^ 2 } . The discrete 
states of the system can be partitioned according to the condition of the system. 
Here, QN = {<?o,<?i,<?2,<75,<?6}, QF* = {93,97,99} and QF2 = {<?4,<?8,9io}- In this 
example, we assume that the discrete states qo, q^ and q$ are EM-similar discrete 
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states with functions {El,Ml): QE M = {qo,qz,q$}- Also the discrete states q2, qi 
and qs are EM-similar discrete states with functions (E2, M2): QE2M = {<?2, <77, <7s}-
The rest of the discrete states have different (E, M) functions. 
The fault type fi is active in the discrete states q^ and q-r, i.e., active'1 (fl) = 
{93,97}- We also have active'1 (f2) = {q4,qs}, active(qx) = 0, Qf^t = active'1^) f] 
QE^ = {q0}andQfnlMct2 = {q2}. • 
Let W C QEM denote the set of discrete states that the system can be in when 
a fault type of $ becomes active: W = active'1^) f]QEM. An isolator IsQ ($) 
distinguishes the set of discrete states W from QEM — W. The properties of the 
residual vector r$ (£) produced by Is® (<3?) can be expressed as follows. 
• \\r% (*)ll < e% m steady state if the system is evolving in one of the 
discrete states of QEM - W; 
• ll r* Wll ^ e$ m steady state if the system is evolving in one of the 
discrete states of (Q - QEM) |J W; 
We assume that there is a signal processing unit that takes residual vector 
r$ (t) and generates an output signal f$ (t) as follows: 
;Q EM 
^ (t) 
0 if | |?$ {t)\\ < e$ in steady state 
. . QBM QEM 
1 if IIrJ {t)\\ > e% in steady state 
The binary output of the signal processing unit allows us to model an isolator with 
a DES. In the following, we denote the binary signal r$ (t) when we refer to the 
output of the isolator Is® ($). 
3.2.2 Model ing the Isolators with DES 
Every isolator in our work can be modeled as a finite-state Moore automaton with 
two states ZERO and ONE. Let IS t o i be the set of all isolators designed based on 
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the continuous dynamics of the system. For any isolator Is € IS i o t , 
7s'=(QIs,ZIs,TIs,DIs,\Is,q,Qs) 
will be the FSA model of Is. We have 
QIs = {ZERO,ONE} 
DIs = {0,1} is the set of discrete output symbols with XIs(ZERO) = 0 and 
XIs(ONE) = 1. The FSA Ts stays in the state ZERO as long as the output of 
Is is zero. There will be a transition from ZERO to ONE when the output of Is 
becomes one. Figure 3.9 shows the FSA model of the isolator Is. In Figure 3.9, 
the events 'Is : 0 —• 1' and 'Is : 1 —* 0' label the transitions from the state ZERO 
to ONE and from the state ONE to ZERO, respectively. The unobservable events 
'Is : 0' and 'Is : 1' are fictitious events added for design consistency (to be discussed 
subsequently). These self-loop transitions (transitions from one discrete state to it-
self) are unobservable and do not change the output. We have 
E / s = {Is : 0 -» 1, Is : 1 -> 0, Is : 0, Is : 1} 




Figure 3.9: The FSA modeling the isolator Is. 
3.2.3 Consistency Between the System and the Isolator DES 
Models 
Let QEM C Q b e a set of EM-similar discrete states. We are developing DES models 
for the system and isolators. These models must capture the interactions between 
the system and each isolator. These interactions, as explained in the following, 
correspond to changes in the output of isolators in response to changes in the system 
such as mode changes and occurrences of faults. 
While the system is evolving in any q E QEM, the isolators designed for the 
discrete states q £ Q — QEM can only have transitions from ZERO to ONE or 
stay at ONE (if already at ONE). Assume that the system enters the discrete state 
q G QEM. While the system is in q, an isolator Is® ($) has a transition from 
ONE to ZERO or stays at ZERO if q 0 active'1 ($) f]QEM. Otherwise, it has a 
transition from ZERO to ONE or stays at ONE. 
We modify the DES model of the system Habs to enforce the above-mentioned 
consistency requirements. Let Habs — (Q,T,,T,D,X,q0) be the new FSA. The FSA 
Habs is constructed by modifying the DES abstraction of H, Habs, by adding appro-
priate self-loop transitions to Habs. In Habs,we have: S = S | JE I S t o i ; 
f = rU^IJ^IJ^IJ^ 
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r\,r2,r5,r6 r],r2,rs,r6 Isolator Events: 
D
o a D l D , r0=Is'-2:0 
" ^ ^ ^ r , = Zs ' ' 2 :0 -»1 
q\ L, b r2 = Isx-2A 
r 3 = / s 1 2 : l - » 0 
r4 = ls2:0 
r5 = Is2:0->'\ 
r6=Is2A 
r7 = Z s 2 : l — 0 
i \J rhr2,r5,r6 y-' v rur2,r4,r7 n,r2,r5,r6 
Figure 3.10: Example 3.2.1: The modified DES abstraction of system (Habs)-
where 
TX = {(q,Is^EM^) : 0 - l,q), \ q G (Q - QEM) \J(active-\^) f]QEM)} 
T2 = { ( g , / ^ E M ( $ ) : 1,9), \qZ{Q-QEM){J{active-\$)f}QEM)} 
T3 = {(qJs^W : 1 -> 0,q), \ q € {QEM - (active-1^) f]QEM))} 
T4 = { ( g , / ^ E M ( $ ) :0,q),\qe (QEM - (active'1^) f]QEM))} 
Example 3.2.2. (Example 3.2.1 Continued): Assume that we are only able to design 
the following two isolators for the hybrid system shown in Figure 3.8: the isolator 
7s ({ / 1 , / 2 }) (denoted as Is1'2) for QE M and the isolator Is({f2}) (denoted as 
Is2) for QE M . The FSA Habs satisfying the consistency specification is shown 
in Figure 3.10. The FSA Habs is constructed from Habs by adding certain selfloop 
transitions at each discrete state. For instance, at the discrete state q0, the events 
Is1,2 : 0, Is1,2 : 1 —» 0, Is2 : 1 and Is2 : 0 —• 1 label the selfloop transitions. 
This implies that the isolator Is1,2 cannot have a transition labeled with Is1,2 : 1 or 
Is1'2 : 0 —> 1 while the system is in q^. • 
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y/s 
Figure 3.11: The FSA ASMIs. 
3.2.4 Enforcing the Assumptions by DES Models 
As mentioned earlier in this section, we assume that the system stays in each discrete 
state long enough ( r m m ) so that the transient response due to the mismatch in the 
initial conditions of isolators and the system dies out. Hence, the time between the 
occurrence of two consecutive events is sufficient to evaluate and use the output 
of the isolators for diagnosis. This assumption is captured at the DES level as 
follows: one event of every isolator must occur between the occurrence of any two 
consecutive events in the system. We also assume that before the first event in 
the system occurs, the isolators reach their steady state. The FSA ASMis shown 
in Figure 3.11 enforces these assumptions for an isolator Is. The transition labeled 
with E implies that any event in the event set of the system can label that transition. 
3.2.5 Constructing the EDESA of the Hybrid Automata 
and Isolators 
Assume that there are b {b > 0) isolators designed for the system, and let IS t o t = 
{Is\, • • • , Isb} be the set of FSA modeling the isolators. The EDESA of the hybrid 
system and isolators, denoted as H, is an FSA defined as 
H=(Q,t,f,D,\,q0) 
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Figure 3.12: The EDESA of the system and isolators, 
and is constructed by combining Habs, the FSA modeling the isolators and the FSA 
enforcing the assumptions ASMiSl, • • • , ASMiSb: 
H = sync{Habs,7s~,ASM) 
where 
Is = sync(7si,- •• ,Isb) 
and 
ASM = sync(ASMIsi, • • • , ASMIab) 
Example 3.2.3. (Example 3.2.1 Continued): Figure 3.12 shows the EDESA of 
the hybrid automaton as shown in Figure 3.8 and the isolators Isdf1, f2}) and 
70 
Is({f2}). The discrete output of each discrete state of the EDESA is an array with 
three elements. The first element is coming from the discrete output of the system; 
the second element is the discrete output of Is({fl, f2}) and the third is the discrete 
output of Is({f2}). In the following, we describe the operation of the diagnoser 
designed for the EDESA shown in Figure 3.12 for the event sequence 'ad' generated 
in the system. 
Assume that the initial state estimate of the diagnoser designed for the EDESA 
is ZQ = Q. Therefore, the initial condition estimate provided by the diagnoser 
is K(ZQ) = {N,FX,F2}. Suppose when the diagnoser starts, the discrete output 
'[Do 1 1] ; is generated by the EDESA. The state estimate provided by the diag-
noser is updated to zx = {8,12,14,16,18,19}. The condition estimate is n(z\) = 
{N,Fl,F2}. Now assume that the event 'a' is generated in the system and the 
discrete output \D\ 1 1]' is observed in the EDESA. The state estimate provided 
by the diagnoser is updated to Z2 = {20,23,24}, and the condition estimate is 
K{Z2) = {N,Fl,F2}. Suppose after the isolators reach their steady state, we observe 
\D\ 1 0] ' in the EDESA. The state estimate provided by the diagnoser is updated to 
z3 = {30,35} and the condition estimate is updated to K(Z3) = {F1}. This implies 
that the failure mode F1 has occurred in the system. Now assume that the event 
'd' is generated in the system and the discrete output '[D3 1 0] ' is observed in the 
EDESA. The state estimate provided by the diagnoser is updated to z4 = {39} and 
the condition estimate is K{Z4) = {F1}. 
Figure 3.13 shows a part of the diagnoser designed for the EDESA correspond-
ing to the above-mentioned output sequence. The failure mode F1 can be detected by 
using only the discrete outputs generated in the system when the F1 -indicative dis-
crete output 'Ds ' is observed. However, as described above, by using the information 
provided by the isolators, Fl is detected before discrete output D3 is generated. • 
Remark 3.2.1. In the previous discussion, it was assumed that the isolators provide 
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z 0 =e 
N,F \F 1 E-2 
[D0 1 1] 
8,12,14,16,18,19 
N,F\F2 
[£>, 1 1] 
20,23,24 
N,F\F2 










[D0 1 1] 
Figure 3.13: A part of the diagnoser constructed for the EDESA shown in Fig-
ure 3.12. 
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Is:2 ls:0 ls:1 
Figure 3.14: The FSA modeling an isolator with a three-level residual. 
information to help with the determination of fault types. Next, this information 
is integrated with the information coming from the discrete sensors by the hybrid 
diagnoser to determine the failure mode. In general, the residual signals can be 
further processed to assist in the determination of failure modes. In this case, the 
output of the signal processing unit of each isolator would be a multi-level signal, 
say, zero to n, with each level corresponding to one failure mode. The construction 
of DES models for isolators and an EDESA for the integrated model of system and 
isolators is similar to what has been previously discussed in this chapter, and is 
omitted for brevity. Here, as an example, we have provided an FSA model for an 
isolator with three levels of output (Figure 3.14)-
In the next chapter, we discuss diagnosability of failure modes in our frame-
work. 
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we developed an approach for fault diagnosis in systems that are 
modeled by hybrid automata. Generally, the information available for diagnosis 
comes from the discrete outputs and continuous output and control input signals. 
In this approach, we developed a systematic method to integrate the information at 
both DES and continuous levels and use it for diagnostic purposes. In our framework, 
all faults are modeled at the continuous level as unknown input signals. Every 
fault type signal corresponds to a set of failure modes in a component. We used 
a bank of isolators (residual generators) for detection and isolation of fault types 
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at the continuous dynamics. We developed a systematic approach for modeling the 
isolators by DES models and integrating these DES models with the DES abstraction 
of the system to construct an extended DES model. We use the extended DES model 




FAILURE MODES IN HYBRID 
AUTOMATA 
In this chapter, we investigate diagnosability of failure modes in hybrid automata. 
We introduce a notion of diagnosability in hybrid automata and provide sufficient 
conditions under which a failure become diagnosable in hybrid automata. Further-
more, we study diagnosability of failure modes in the case that a number of isolators 
produce unreliable outputs (false alarms and fault silences). 
4.1 Diagnosability of Failure Modes 
Consider a hybrid automaton 
H = (Q,X,U, FT, y, Init, S, S, T, G, p, D, X, q0) 
with DES abstraction 
Habs = (Q,i:,T,D,X,q0) 
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Let T be the set of failure modes. Also let IS t o t be the set of isolators and 
H = {Q,t,f,D,~X,Qo) 
be the EDESA of the system and isolators. We intend to investigate the diagnos-
ability of the failure modes in H. We will show that a failure mode is diagnosable in 
H, if it is diagnosable in the EDESA of H and the isolators designed for H. First, 
we discuss diagnosability of a failure mode in the EDESA. 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the diagnosability of failure modes in DES. We also 
reviewed the necessary and sufficient conditions for the diagnosability of a failure 
mode in Theorem 2.3.1. Diagnosability results discussed in Chapter 2 for DES do 
not consider time. In other words, it is assumed that at any state, one of transitions 
defined at that state will definitely occur. In a hybrid automaton, the system may 
become stuck in some discrete states forever even if a transition defined at that 
discrete state exists. Therefore, the assumption that one of the transitions defined 
at a discrete state will eventually occur may not hold. Therefore, before studying 
the diagnosability of EDESA and relating it to the diagnosability of H, the above 
issue needs to be addressed. 
We assume that the discrete states can be partitioned into two sets: 
Q = Qinf\jQf™ 
where Qfm is the set of discrete states in which the system never stays longer than 
a finite time, say rm o x , and Qmf is the set of discrete states in which the system can 
remain indefinitely. Similarly, partition Q as: 
Q = Qinf\jQfin 
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The value of Tmax can be calculated based on the type of events labeling the 
outgoing transitions, and the dynamics of the system at the discrete states and the 
guard conditions. We assume that rmQX is given. In the following, we briefly address 
how it is determined whether a state q G Qmf or q G Qfm, and discuss the ways 
Tmax m a y k e c a i c u i a t ed . 
As explained in Chapter 3, there are two types of transitions in a system: 
autonomous transitions whose occurrence depends on the values of the continuous 
state and the control input of the system, and transitions that have a pure DES 
nature such as supervisor commands. All transitions in our framework are labeled 
with events. We assume that the events labeling the transitions can be partitioned 
into prospective events and remote events1. Prospective events are those events that 
will occur before an upper time bound unless they are preempted by another event. 
Remote events are those that can take an arbitrarily long time to occur or may 
never occur even if eligible (enabled) to occur. For example, supervisor commands 
are prospective events and fault events are remote events. 
The events labeling the autonomous transitions can be prospective events or 
remote events. For example, in the gas turbine engine described in Chapter 6, 
the event "max2abv labeling the autonomous transition that takes the engine to 
the operating regime "Afterburner on" is a remote event because the engine may 
never go to this operating regime, but the event "ab2max" labeling the autonomous 
transition that takes the engine from the operating regime "Afterburner on" to the 
operating regime "Max power" is a prospective event because the engine cannot 
stay in the operating regime "Afterburner on" for ever due to the fuel limitation. 
However, the event "a62maa;" can be preempted by the event "ab2maxab" that 
takes the engine to the operating regime "Max afterburner thrust". 
If there is no outgoing transition at q labeled with a supervisory command and 
1Here, we have adopted the terminology used in [21] for timed DES. 
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Figure 4.1: A hybrid automaton modeling a heating system with a fault. 
some of the outgoing transitions at q are autonomous, by using analytical methods 
or by simulation, it can be inferred whether q G Qm^ or q G Q^m. In order to 
use analytical methods or simulation, we assume (as often is the case) that when a 
guard condition of a transition becomes true, the system cannot stay any longer in 
the source state of that transition and the transition will occur unless it is preempted 
by another transition. For example, in the heating system example in Chapter 3 
(shown in Figure 4.1), when the temperature of the room reaches 23°, the transition 
from OFF — N to ON — N takes place, and when the temperature reaches 26° the 
transition from ON — N to OFF — N occurs. Therefore, verifying if a discrete state 
q belongs to Qfm can be investigated analytically by reachability analysis in hybrid 
automata, even though it may not be simple. For example, if the region of states 
specified by the domain of the guard conditions of q can be reached from the initial 
state of the system, then q G Qf™. 
Let r™ax be the maximum time that the system may stay in q. Thus, rmax 
will be the maximum of T™ax for all q G Qfm. If q G Q*m, and there is no outgoing 
transition at q labeled with a supervisory command, and some of the outgoing 
transitions at q are autonomous, then T™ax depends on the continuous dynamics 
at q and may be computed analytically by solving the differential equations of the 
system. For instance, in the heating system example shown in Figure 3.3, assume 
that the initial temperature is between 23° and 30°, i.e., 23° < x(0) < 30°. When 
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the system starts, the discrete state is OFF — N. There is only one outgoing 
autonomous transition labeled with "OFFtoON" defined at OFF — N. This event 
occurs if x(t) = 23°. The event "OFFtoON" is a prospective event because there 
exists a time t0 such that x(tQ) = 23°. Therefore, OFF-N e Qfin. The differential 
equation in the discrete state OFF — N is 
x(t) = -Q.2x(t) 
and the solution of the differential equation in OFF — N is 
x{t) = C i e -5* 
where C\ is a constant and can be calculated based on the initial condition. The 
event "OFFtoON" will occur at OFF - N if x(t) = 23°. Assume that the event 
"OFFtoON" occurs at t = t0. If x(0) = 23°, then t0 = 0 sec , and if x(0) = 30°, 
then t0 = 1.33 sec. If 23° < x(0) < 30°, then 0 < t0 < 1.33 sec. Therefore, rffixF_N 
can be taken as 1.33 sec. or any finite value greater than 1.33 sec. The system 
transitions to the discrete state ON — N at t = t0. There are two outgoing transitions 
defined at ON — N: autonomous transition labeled with "ONtoOFF" and the 
remote transition "/"• The event "ONtoOFF" occurs if x{t) = 26°. The event 
"ONtoOFF" is a prospective event because if "ONtoOFF" is not preempted by / , 
there exists a time tx such that xfa) = 26°. Therefore, ON - N E Qfin. Let tx be 
the time that "ONtoOFF" occurs. Initially, assume that the fault does not occur 
when the system is in ON — N. The differential equation in ON — N is 
±(t - t0) = -0.3(20 - x(t - to)) 
the initial state in ON — N is x(t0) = 23° and the solution of the differential equation 
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in ON - N is 
x(t - to) = 20 + 3e^ ( t~ i o ) 
The event "ONtoOFF" occurs at tx = i0 + 2.31 sec. Therefore, T%ffLN can be taken 
2.31 sec. or any finite value greater than 2.31 sec. Now assume that the fault event 
/ occurs at t = t'0 > to and the system is taken to the discrete state ON — F. Also 
assume that 0.25 < f(t) < 0.5 for t0 < t < t\. It can be verified that there exists 
a time t2 such that x(t2) = 26°. Hence, "ONtoOFF" is a prospective event at 
ON - F, and ON - F e Qfin. Moreover, it can be verified that t2 <= t'Q + 3.93 sec. 
Therefore, 
T'O'N^-F can be taken 3.93 sec. or any finite value greater than 3.93 sec. 
It can be also verified that OFF — F e Q*in, and TQ,FF_F can be taken 1.33 sec. 
or any finite value greater than 1.33 sec. Thus, rmax for the heating system can be 
taken 3.93 sec. or any finite value greater than 3.93 sec. 
The reachability analysis in hybrid automata is an open area of research (e.g., 
see [76]). Let Rgq denote the region of continuous states specified by the guard con-
ditions of q. Verifying the reachability of Rgq may not always be possible. There are 
also approaches that investigate reachability in hybrid automata by approximation, 
e.g., see [8, 12, 67]. If the reachability of Rgq is not easy to guarantee, the reacha-
bility of a region inside Rgq may be investigated and a more conservative value may 
be found for r^ a x . 
If all the outgoing transitions at q are labeled with remote events, the system 
can stay in q indefinitely and q £ Qmf. 
Next, we discuss how to determine whether q G Qin^ or not. The events of 
the FSA modeling the isolators are all prospective. As explained in Chapter 3, each 
state of the EDESA of the system with b isolators is a (b + l)-tuple in which the 
first component is a state of the DES abstraction of the hybrid system and the rest 
of the components comes from the FSA modeling the isolators. Let q G Q and q be 
the component of q corresponding to the DES abstraction of the hybrid system. We 
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have q e Qfm if and only if q G Q^in and there is no outgoing transition defined at 
q labeled with the events of the isolators. 
Remark 4.1.1. Computing rmax may be useful in online diagnosis for reducing the 
size of the discrete state estimate provided by the diagnoser. For example, assume 
that at time t — to, the discrete state estimate provided by the diagnoser is zn = 
{91,92} with 9i e Qmf an<^ & £ Qfm. If there is no transition by t — t0 + Tmax, it 
can be concluded that the system is in a discrete state of Qm-f. Therefore, zn can be 
updated to zn = {92}- B 
Remark 4.1.2. As explained earlier, calculating an exact value for Tmax using an-
alytical methods depends on the dynamics of the hybrid system and may not be 
easy. Therefore, calculating rmax based on simulation and approximation methods 
is more common, however, the obtained result may not be correct. As a result, the 
system may stay in a discrete state q € Qfin for a time greater than Tmax. For 
example, suppose at time t = to, the discrete state estimate provided by the diag-
noser is zn = {91,92,93}- Assume that 91,92,93 £ Qfm, but no transition occurs by 
t = t0 + Tmax. There may be different strategies to deal with this situation. One 
approach is to give different weights to different failure modes, and then, make a 
decision based on the criticality of the condition estimate. For example, if K(Z) con-
tains a condition which is very critical and may result in disaster in the system, one 
may take the system to a safe mode. In this case, some failure modes may remain 
undiagnosed. • 
In order to be able to use the results of Theorem 2.3.1 in our work to study the 
diagnosability of EDESA, we add an unobservable self-loop transition labeled with 
a fictitious event to every discrete state of Qmf which has an outgoing transition to 
another state. By doing this, we allow transitions to occur at these discrete states 
without changing the discrete state of the system and thus model EDESA getting 
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stuck in a state. Therefore, for the diagnosability of a failure mode in H, we can 
use the results of Theorem 2.3.1. For instance, in Example 3.2.1, F1 is diagnosable 
but F2 is not diagnosable because it violates condition (3) of Theorem 2.3.1. 
For F 6 T, define Hp as the sub-generator of H consisting of the states of 
QF only. Similarly, define HN, H?, H?i and HN-^ as the sub-generators of H 
corresponding to the states of QN, Q?, Qjn and QN U Qyi-
Now we extend the definition of output language described in Chapter 2. 
The output language L0(H, q, q') generated by H from the state q G Q to state 
q' € Q is defined as follows: If q ^ q', L0(H,q,q') := {did2 • • • dm such that d* G 
D for (1 < i < m),d\ = X(q),dm = X(q') and [ there exists q~i e Q (1 < i < m) : 
<ji = q,q^ => qi,qm = q',d~i = A(ft), (2 < i < m)}}. If q = q', L0{H,q,q') := 
{~Kq)}\J{did2---dm 
such that di 6 D for (1 < i < m),d\ = A(g),dm = X(q') and [ there exists qr 6 
Q (1 < i < m) : qx = q,q~i-i => qiyqm = q',d~i = ^(?t) .(2 < * < m)]}-
L0(Hjri,q,q'), L0(HNj-,q,q'), L0(HN,q,q') and L0(Hjr,q,q') are defined sim-
ilarly. 
Proposition 4.1.1. Let b be the number of isolators designed for the system. Also 
let \Q\ be the cardinality ofQ. The complexity of verifying the diagnosability of the 
failure mode F* in H is 0(24b\Q\4). 
Proof - As explained in Chapter 2, the complexity of verifying the diagnos-
ability of the failure mode F% in an FSA with the state set Q is C(|Q|4) [90]. Since 
each FSA modeling an isolator has two discrete states, and the synchronous product 
of Habs and isolators are used for constructing H, the size of the state set Q has the 
order of 0(\2bQ\). Therefore, the complexity of verifying the diagnosability of the 
failure mode Fi in a H is 0(\2bQ\4) = 0(24 6 |Q|4) . • 
The complexity of verifying the diagnosability of the failure mode F* in H is 
exponential in the number of isolators, but polynomial in the number of discrete 
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states of H. 
In [114], it is shown that the occurrence of a diagnosable failure mode F% can be 
detected within \Q\2 discrete transitions after the fault occurs. Now, we investigate 
the diagnosability of a failure mode in the EDESA of the system and isolators with 
a constraint II on the number of events. 
Definition 4.1.1. We call a failure mode Fl U-diagnosable if it is always possible 
to detect after at most a bounded number of events U generated in the system (fol-
lowing the occurrence of the failure mode and initialization of the diagnoser) whether 
the system has entered and stayed in the set Q?i. • 
Theorem 4.1.2. Let b = \IStot\ be the number of isolators in the system, and 
assume that ZQ = Q. A permanent failure mode Fl is Yl-diagnosable if and only if: 
1. For any q e Q^, if q e Qinf then \-\\{q)) f |(Q - Qj*) = 0/ 
2. For any q € Qjn and q' G (QN\JQ^) satisfying X(q) — X(q'), we have: 
{s\se L(Hjrt,q), \(s) e Lo(HNtTi,q')f]L0(Hri,q),\s\ > ((b+l)U + b)} = 0 
Proof - Condition (1) states that there should be no deadlock states in Qjn 
with no transition out of the state unless the output in that state can be generated 
only when Fl has occurred. In [48], such an output is called F l-indicative. More-
over, the system should not stay in any discrete state for ever unless the output of 
that state is FMndicative. We assumed that all isolators generate an event between 
two consecutive events generated in the system. Therefore, before II + 1 events 
are generated in the system, there will be bU + b events generated by the isolators. 
Thus, before the system generates (II + l) th event after the occurrence of F\ the 
number of events generated in H will be (6+1)11 + 6. Condition (2) states that there 
should be no sequence of events with a length greater than (6+ 1)11 + 6 in H that 
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generates common output sequence in Qjn and Q — Q^i = QJV |J Qyi (otherwise, 
Fl cannot be distinguished before the (II + l) th event generated in the system after 
the occurrence of Fl and hence F% will not be Il-diagnosable). 
(If part) Assume that condition (1) and condition (2) hold. Following the 
occurrence of the failure mode and the initiation of diagnosis, if the system generates 
upto II events and then stops generating new outputs, then by condition (1), Fl will 
be diagnosed. If the system generates II + 1 events or more, before the system 
generates the (IT + l) th event, the discrete output sequence generated by H in Qpi 
will be different from the discrete output sequence generated by H in Q — Qjn. 
Thus, Fl will be Il-diagnosable. 
(only if part) Condition (1) is necessary because if condition (1) does not hold, 
there will be q G Q?i f\ Qmf and q' G {Q — Q?i) such that X(q) = A(<f). If the system 
is in q, it may not generate any new event. If the diagnosis is started after system 
enters q, Fl will not be diagnosed. Condition (2) is necessary because if condition 
(2) does not hold, there will be q G Q?i and q' G (QN U QT~) an<^ a sequence of 
events 5 generated in H such that \s\ > ((b + 1)11 + b) and the sequence of outputs 
generated by H for s belongs to L0(HNy:, q') f] L0(H:Fi,q). Therefore, Fl will not be 
distinguished in H before the system generates (11+ l)th event after the occurrence 
of F\ Thus, F% will not be Il-diagnosable. • 
E x a m p l e 4 .1 .1 . Figure 4-2 shows the DES abstraction of a hybrid automaton H 
with two fault types f1 and f2 and corresponding failure modes F1 and F2, respec-
tively. The occurrence of the failure modes F1 and F2 are modeled by transitions 
labeled with the events f1 and f2, respectively. The unobservable event lU\' changes 
the discrete state of the system in normal mode. The labels 'u2 ' and 'uz' are unob-
servable event changing the discrete state of the system in the failure mode F2 and 
form a cycle of states with the same discrete output. The set of discrete states is 
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Figure 4-2: DES abstraction of a hybrid automaton with two failure modes. 
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at q%, a fictitious unobservable selfoop event is added at q&. The condition set of 
the system is K, = {N, F1, F2, F1'2}. The discrete states of the system can be par-
titioned according to the condition of the system. Here, QJV = {90,9i, 92,95) 96,99}) 
QFI = {93,97,910,913}, QF^ = {94,98,912,915} and QFi,2 = {911,914}. We also 
have Q?i = {93,97,9io,9n,9i3,9i4} and Q^ = {94,98,9n,9i2,9i4,9i5}- Moreover, 
we have QE^ = {90,93,94}, QE*M2 = {92,97,9s}, QEsM3 = {96,912}, QEiM* = 
{9io,9n} and QEsMs = {99,913,914}. The rest of the discrete states have differ-
ent (E,.M) functions. Besides, active*1 ({f1}) = {93,97,913} and active*1 ({f2}) = 
{94,98,911,912,914}- The set of discrete outputs of the system is: D = {D0,Di,D2, 
D3}. 
Let ZQ be the initial state of the diagnoser designed for Ha^s and assume that 
ZQ = Q. None of the failure modes are diagnosable using the diagnoser designed for 
Habs. Failure mode F1 is not diagnosable because the cycle of discrete states 97 and 
gio generate the similar output sequence as the cycle of discrete states q\ and 55. 
Therefore, condition (3) of Theorem 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 is violated. Furthermore, 
<7i3 and 914 belong to Qmf but have the same discrete output as q$. Thus, condition 
(1) of the theorem is violated. Failure mode F2 violates condition (1) of that theorem 
because qu £ Qm^ but it cannot be distinguished from 99 and 913 by using the discrete 
outputs generated in the system. Failure mode F2 violates condition (2) of that 
theorem too because cycle q% and cycle qu and qi5 do not have F2-indicative outputs. 
Let the set of isolators that can be designed for the system be: IS t o t = 
{ / 5 ^ M 2 ( { / 1 } ) , / S ^ 2 M 2 ( { / 1 , / 2 } ) , / 5 ^ M 2 ( { / 2 } ) , / S ^ 3 M 3 ( { / 2 } ) 1 / 5 Q £ 5 M 5 ( { / 1 } ) , 
IsQE5M5{{f2}),IsQEsMs{Q)}. Here, Is^BaMs($) is an E8M8-distinguishes We can 
verify that both failure modes are diagnosable in H. Failure mode Fl becomes diag-
nosable in H because the outputs produced by the isolators Is® 2 2 ({ / 1 }) , 
Is® 2 2 ( { / 1 , / 2 } ) and Is® 2 2 ({/ 2}) when the system is in cycle q-j and qi0 are dif-
ferent from the outputs produced when the system is in cycle q\ and q$. In fact, q-j can 
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be distinguished from q5. Therefore, condition (3) of Theorem 2.3.1 is satisfied for 
the failure mode F1. Also the isolators Is® 5 5 ({ / 1 }) and Is® 5 5 ({ / 2 }) generate 
a set of F1-indicative outputs to distinguish gi3 and q\\ from qg. Hence, condition 
(1) of the theorem is satisfied too for the failure mode F1. Failure mode Fl be-
comes diagnosable in H because the outputs produced by the isolators Is® 2 2 ({ / 1 }) , 
IsQ 2 2 ( { / \ / 2 } ) and Is® 2 2({/ 2}) can distinguish q8 from q2, q*> and qj, and the 
outputs produced by the isolators Is® 3 3({/ 2}) and Is® 8 8(0) can distinguish the 
cycle of q\2 and q^ from q^. Therefore, condition (2) of Theorem 2.3.1 is satisfied 
for the failure mode F2. 
We can verify that failure modes F1 and F2 are H-diagnosable for any U > 1. 
This implies that when F1 or F2 occur, they can be detected and isolated after a 
maximum of one event generated in the system. • 
So far, we have studied diagnosability in the EDESA of a hybrid automaton 
with isolators. The diagnosability results developed for the EDESA are based on 
the discrete outputs of the system and outputs generated by the isolators designed 
for the system. Generally, the constraints for diagnosability analysis in DES is 
expressed in terms of the number of events generated in the system. However, 
in hybrid automata, the notion of time is included in the model. Therefore, it is 
desirable to develop diagnosability results with respect to time requirements. In 
order to discuss diagnosability of failure modes with time constraints, we describe 
the notion of execution in hybrid automata. First, we define a hybrid time set. 
Definition 4.1.2. A hybrid time set [60J is either a finite sequence of intervals 
T — {Ii}iLo such that 
• Ii = [n, T/] for allO <i < N with r0 < T'Q = n < T[ < • • • < " r ^ < T ^ ; 
or an infinite sequence of intervals r = {/j}~0 such that 
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• h = [TI,TI] for all i > 0 with r0 < r'Q = T\ < T[ < • • • . • 
The T;'s are the times at which discrete transitions take place. We assume 
that all the continuous models Sq are time-invariant. Therefore, without loss of 
generality we assume that r0 = 0. Let |r | = N + 1 be the cardinality of r that gives 
the number of intervals. For a hybrid time trajectory r = {Ii}$LQ, we define < r > 
as the set {0,1, • • • , N} if N is finite and {0,1, • • • } if N = oo. In the following, we 
define an execution of hybrid automata in our work. 
Definition 4.1.3. An execution of a hybrid automaton [60] is a tuple e = (re, qe, xe), 
where re = {If}^0 is a hybrid time set with time intervals If = [T^T^] for all 
0 < i < Ne; qe :< r e >—> Q is a map such that qe(0) = qo; xe = {x\ : i G< r e >} is 
a set of differentiable maps x\ : If —> X, such that 
• XQ(0) € I nit; 
• for all t £ [nX), z e i (0 = Eqe{i)(xl(t),ut(t)) + G^V^t), • • • , / ^ ( t ) ) , 
where u\ : If -^ U and f?t : /j —> K. f/or 1 < j < m) are the maps which give 
the input signal and the signal of active fault types in interval If, respectively; 
• ifNe is finite, for alii E< r > \{^Ve}, there exists a G S : d = (qe(i),a,qe(i+ 
1)) G T, G(d,xf(Ti)) = {True} and x?+1(r i+1) = /9(d,x?(^)). 
• if N = oo, for all i G< r >, i/iere exists a G S : <i = (qe(i), a, qe(i + 1)) G 
T, G(d,x?(7^)) = {True} and xei+1(ri+1) = p(d,x?(r/)). • 
The maps ge and xe describe the evolution of the discrete states q and the 
continuous state x, respectively. They satisfy the discrete and the continuous dy-
namics and their interactions (initial state, guard conditions and reset maps) in the 
system. The map qe is the discrete state trajectory, and xe is the continuous 
state trajectory of the system for execution e. 
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Let £ be the set of all executions of H. For any execution e E £, we have 
|e| = |re | . In this paper, we assume that all hybrid executions are defined for all 
t > 0. In other words, we study non-blocking hybrid automata. We do not have 
Zeno executions [60] (executions with infinite discrete transitions in a finite time) 
in our framework, therefore, the executions are infinite, i.e., Sjc'l0(r^e — r | ) = oo. 
However the hybrid time sets may be finite or infinite. 
Let e 6 £ be an execution. The continuous output signal ye for execution 
e is the set of maps ye = {yf : i E< re >} with y\ : If —» y, such that for all 
ym = Mqe{l)(xel(t),um) 
Let ti E If and tj E Ij with i < j . The map xe\t3. denotes the continuous state 
trajectory from time ti to tj for execution e: 
z l t l = {*?(*) | U < t < 7f ,x j + 1 > - • • . ^ . ^ ( i ) | r? < * < *,-} 
Similarly, « e |^ , /e|4^ and ye|t^ denote the control input, fault type and output signals 
from time U to tj for execution e. 
The map // : £ —> Z?* associates a sequence of discrete output to each execu-
tion e as 
Me) = A(ge(0))A(ge(l))---A(ge(|e|)) 
We denote by fjt(e)\t3 the sequence of the discrete outputs associated with e from 
time U to time tj\ 
M\u = A(9e(^))A(ge(z + 1)) • • • \{qe{j)) such that ^ E If and ^ G I) 
We omit all discrete outputs A(<?e(j)) such that \{qe(j)) = A(ge(j + 1)) from //(e) 
and denote the new sequence by //(e). For instance, if //(e) = aa&, then //(e) = ab. 
89 
The map /t(e) shows only the output changes that are used for diagnosis. The map 
A(e)l4 wiH b e similarly constructed from fj.(e)\t3.. 
An execution e G £ is called an F l-faulty execution if there exists 0 < fcj < |e| 
such that for all A; < ki, qe(k) £ Q?i and qe(ki) G Q -^*. Let teFi be the time that Fl-
faulty execution e enters Qjn. Since the occurrence of each failure mode is modeled 
by an unobservable transition, execution e enters Qjn at time tpi = r | . Let £F' be 
the set of all F'-faulty executions. For diagnosability analysis, we assume that the 
failure modes are permanent. 
Definition 4.1.4. Failure mode Fl is permanent if for any e G EF% such that 
(f{ki) G Qj7i, then qe(k) G Qjn for all kt < k < \e\. 
We intend to express diagnosability in hybrid automata in terms of measured 
variables. Measured variables in our hybrid automata model are discrete outputs 
at discrete states and the continuous input and output signals at the continuous 
dynamics. In the following, we present a definition for diagnosability in hybrid 
automata in terms of discrete outputs and continuous input and output signals. 
Let A > 0 be a positive real number. We call a failure mode Fl A-diagnosable 
if it is always possible to detect, with a delay no longer than A following the occur-
rence of Fl, whether the system has visited the set Q?i (by using the sequence of 
discrete outputs and continuous output signal of the system. 
Definition 4.1.5. Assume that a permanent failure mode Fl occurs at t = tQ > 0 
and the diagnosis starts at t& > 0. Also let tm = max(to,t,i). Failure mode Fl is 
A-diagnosable in H if for all e G SF' and e' € S-EF\ £ ( e ) | ^ + A ) ± A(e')|llT+A) 
ue tm + A V" 
2We say ue\\\ ^ ue'\\\ if the set {t | h < t < t2 and t <= If and t e tf : uf{t) = uf (t)} is of 
measure zero. Similarly, we say ye\tt2l / ye ||* if the set {t | t\ < t < t% and t € If and t G t? : 
Vi{t) = Vj {t)} is of measure zero. 
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Proposition 4.1.3. / / a failure mode Fx is not A-diagnosable in H, Fl is not 
A''-diagnosable in H for all A' < A. 
Proof - Consider the contrary and assume that Fl is A'-diagnosable in H. 
Therefore by definition, for all e e £F% and e' G £ -£F\ /i(e)|||nm+A ') ^ M e O l i l r ^ 0 
or u e | ^ + A ' + we ' |t^+A ' or ye\tZ+A' ¥" ye'\tZ+A'- A s a result, for any A > A', we 
also have for all e G £F% and e' e £ - £F\ /}(e)|^m+A) + /t(e') | | lm+A) or u e | ^ + A + 
Ue'itm+A o r yeiim+A ^ ye'itm+A T h ^ . A-diagnosable in H. • 
In addition to discrete outputs generated by the system, the EDESA includes 
the information provided by the isolators between every two consecutive discrete 
transitions. In the following, we show that a failure mode is diagnosable in H, if it 
is diagnosable in the EDESA. 
Theorem 4.1.4. Assume that the diagnoser of H is initialized with ZQ = Q. For any 
A > 0; a permanent failure mode Fl is A-diagnosable in H if Fl is TL-diagnosable 
in H for some U < [-^}. • 
Proof - By contradiction, we prove that if Fl is not A-diagnosable (for a 
A > 0) in H, there exists no II < [ ^ j ] such that Fl is Il-diagnosable in H. 
Assume that the failure mode Fl corresponding to the fault type fl is not 
A-diagnosable in H. Thus, there exist e G £F' and e' G £ — £F% such that both 
executions e and e' will generate the same sequence of discrete outputs and identical 
continuous input and output signals from tm to tm+A, i.e., / i ( e ) | t ^ + = jl(e')\i^+ 
and u6|'™+A = ue'\lt2+A and y e | ^ + A = ye'\\Z+A- Therefore, any isolator Is G IS t o t 
that takes the continuous input and output of the system generates identical outputs 
for e and e' from tm to tm + A. Thus, the FSA modeling Is will generate identical 
discrete outputs and events for e and e' from tm to tm + A. Let 0 < i < j < \e\ 
such that tm G If and (tm + A) G I]. Also let 0 < i! < f < \e'\ such that tm G If,' 
and (tm + A) G Ip. The output sequence generated by H consists of the system 
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Figure 4.3: A hybrid automaton with two failure modes. 
discrete outputs and outputs generated by all isolators between each system output. 
Hence, the output sequence generated by H from tm to tm + A will be identical for 
both executions e and e'. Let qe(i) and qe (i') denote the initial discrete states of H 
on e and e', respectively. Also let qe(j) and qe'{j') denote the final discrete states 
of H on e and e', respectively. If the diagnoser for H is started at tj = tm, then 
qe{i),qe'(i') € ZQ, and since the output sequences of H on e and e' are the same, 
then qe(j),qe (f) € z(tm + A), where z(tm + A) is the state estimate provided by 
the diagnoser at tm + A. Thus, z(tm + A) is Fi-uncertain. If all the discrete states 
from qe(i) to qe(j) are not in Qmf, then during e, at least - ^ events must have 
been generated by H. If one or more of discrete states from qe(i) to qe(j) is in 
Qmf, considering the fictitious self-loops for the states of Qmf, then the sequence 
from qe(i) to qe(j) can be considered to have an arbitrary large number of events. 
Since the final diagnoser state is F'-uncertain, then Fl is not IT-diagnosable for any 
n < [^]. • 
Example 4.1.2. (Example 4-1-1 Continued): Assume that Tmax = 100 sec. There-
fore, F1 and F2 are A—diagnosable in the hybrid system shown in Figure 4-2 for 
any A > 100 sec. • 
Example 4.1.3. Consider the hybrid automaton in Figure 4-3 with fault types f1 
and f2 corresponding to failure modes Fl and F2, respectively. Assume the following 
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Let Fl(s) and F2(s) be the Laplace transform of fl and f2, respectively. The 
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continuous output of the hybrid system in the discrete state q^ is 
Y(s) = 0.1 
2 s + 1 
The continuous output of the hybrid system in the discrete state q\ is 
Y(s) = 
1.2 
- 0 . 3 5 + 1 
It can be verified that the continuous output of the hybrid system in q3 is different 
from that in q4. Therefore, according to Definition 4-1-5, F1 and F2 are diagnos-
able. Let Isq3(fl) be the isolator designed based on the dynamics of q$. According to 
the properties of the isolators in our framework, 7s9 3(/1) must generate zero if the 
system is in an EM-similar discrete state (here, a discrete state with the same A, 
B and C matrices) where f1 is not active. Otherwise, 7s9 3(/1) must generate one. 
It can be verified that 7s9 3(/1) can be designed. Also let Isqi(f2) be the isolator de-
signed based on the dynamics of q^. Similarly, it can be verified that Isq*(f2) exists. 
The isolator 7sg 3(/1) generates one in q^ and q$ (see Assumption 1 in Section 3.2) 
at all times. Similarly, the isolator Isq4(f2) generates one in q^ and q^ at all times. 
Hence, the transitions and discrete outputs that Js 9 3( / 1) and Isq4(f2) insert in the 
EDESA of the system and isolators are identical and failure modes Fl or F2 remain 
undiagnosable in the EDESA. This simple example demonstrates that the diagnos-
ability of a failure mode in the EDESA is not necessary for the diagnosability of that 
failure mode in the hybrid automaton. • 
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4.2 Fault Diagnosis and Diagnosability of Failure 
Modes in the Presence of Unreliable Isolators 
So far, we have assumed that isolators function without error. However, in practice, 
isolators may generate incorrect output (error). The generation of incorrect output 
by isolators may have several reasons. One common reason that isolators may gen-
erate unreliable output is the sensitivity of isolators to thresholds due to modeling 
uncertainty and noise. In some cases, when the residual should be zero, due to noise 
and modeling uncertainty, a nonzero residual close to the threshold may be gener-
ated which triggers a false alarm. Some times even in the presence of failures, the 
residual does not reach the threshold because of the interference by noise or model-
ing uncertainty. In this work, we assume that the generation of incorrect output by 
the isolators is intermittent implying that an isolator may generate incorrect output 
every now and then. An isolator that may generate incorrect output is not reliable 
for fault diagnosis. 
4.2.1 Problem Formulation 
The problem that we solve in this section is the diagnosability of failure modes 
in the presence of unreliable isolators. If the isolator generating incorrect output 
can be identified, it can be removed from the set of isolators. In this case, the 
diagnosability of failure modes can be investigated using the new set of isolators. 
However, in practice, identifying the incorrect output of an isolator is not an easy 
task. One solution is removing all the isolators that may generate incorrect output 
from the set of isolators. This solution is not reasonable because the isolators do 
not generate unreliable output at all time. Moreover, it is very unlikely that all 
isolators generate incorrect output simultaneously. We will assume that the number 
of isolators generating incorrect output at a given time is bounded and the upper 
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bound is known. We formulate the problem as follows. 
Given a set of b unreliable isolators IS(0t = {Is\, • • • ,1st,} designed for the 
system, and assuming that at any given time up to ksim < b isolators may gen-
erate incorrect output simultaneously, we want to investigate if there is sufficient 
redundant information from isolators and discrete sensors to make a failure mode F 
diagnosable in the EDESA of the system and isolators. 
In the following, we develop a systematic approach for verifying diagnosability 
of failure modes in the presence of unreliable isolators. In this approach, we first 
modify the model of an isolator to take into account potential isolator errors. Then, 
we construct the EDESA for the system and isolators. Diagnosability of the failure 
modes will be verified in the EDESA of the hybrid system and isolators similar to 
that explained in Section 4.1. 
4.2.2 Modeling Unreliable Isolators 
In general, an isolator may generate incorrect output in two cases. 
1. The isolator should produce zero (no fault) but it produces one (fault present). 
In this case, the output of the isolator is called a false alarm. 
2. The isolator should produce one (fault present) but it produces zero (no fault). 
In this case, the output of the isolator is called a false silence. 
We modify the model of a residual generator to include these two types of 
errors. Let Is be an unreliable isolator. Figure 4.4 shows the FSA modeling the 
isolator Is with unreliable behavior. The isolator has three modes of operation: 
normal, false alarm and false silence. The generation of incorrect output by the iso-
lator is modeled by the occurrence of unobservable events. The unobservable event 
' I s : / a ' labels the transition from normal to false alarm mode, and the unobservable 
event lIs : / s ' labels the transition from normal to false silence mode. Isolator errors 
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"Is : 1 
Figure 4.4: A finite-state automaton modeling an unreliable isolator. 
are assumed intermittent. Therefore, the isolator may have a transition from false 
alarm mode or false silence mode to normal. Both of these transitions are assumed 
unobservable. The transition of the isolator from false alarm mode to normal mode 
is labeled by the unobservable event 'Is : fa\ and the transition of the isolator from 
false alarm mode to normal mode is labeled by the unobservable event lIs : fs\ 
For any isolator Is £ IStot, 
Ts = {QIs,ZIs,TIs,DIs,XIs,qI0s) 
will be the FSA model of Is. We have 
QIs = {NO, Nl, FAO, FA1,FA211, FSO, FSOO, FS1} 
DIs = {0,1} is the set of discrete output symbols with A/s(A^0) = 0, A/s(JVl) = 1, 
XIs{FA0) = 0, XIs(FAl) = 1, XIs(FAU) = 1, XIs(FS0) = 0, XIs(FS00) = 0, 
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Figure 4.5: Finite-state automaton ASMksim for the case that ksim = 3. 
XIs(FSl) = l. The isolator event set is 
Els = {Is : 0 - • 1, Is : 1 -» 0, Is : 0, i s : 1, I s : / a , Is : / a , 7s : fs, Is : / s } 
Let S„* = {/s : fa, Is : / s } and S ^ = {/s
 : fa, Is : / s } be two event sets. 
We define S,1,?'0' and E^to< as follows: 
ylStot _ I I y / s 
IselStot 
ylStot _ I I y / s 
ur1 
/ se lStot 
4.2.3 Constructing EDESA of the System and Isolators in 
the Presence of Unreliable Isolators 
The assumption that at any given time up to fcs,m < b isolators may generate 
incorrect output simultaneously can be enforced by an FSA denoted as ASMksim. 
Figure 4.5 shows the FSA enforcing this assumption for the case that /csim = 3. 
Similar to the diagnoser design procedure described in Chapter 3, we make the 
following assumption: one event of every isolator (not considering events introduced 
for modeling isolator errors, i.e, Is : fa, Is : fa, Is : fs and Is : fs) must occur 
between the occurrence of any two consecutive events in the system. We also assume 




Figure 4.6: Finite-state automaton ASMIs. 
Moreover, the isolators may have a state transition only when an event occurs in 
the system. Let ASMjs be the FSA enforcing these assumptions for Is. The FSA 
ASMjs is shown in Figure 4.6. The transition labeled with E implies that any event 
in the event set of the system can label that transition. 
Let IS4ot = {Is\,--- ,Isb} be the set of FSA modeling the isolators. The 
EDESA of the hybrid system and isolators, denoted as H, is an FSA 
H=(Q,£,f,D,\,qQ) 
and is constructed by combining Habs, the FSA modeling the isolators, the FSA 
ASMksim and the FSA enforcing the assumptions ASMiSl, • • • ,ASMjSb: 
H = sync(Habs,TS,ASMksim,ASM) 
where 
IS = sync( / s i , - •• ,Isb) 
and 
ASM = sync(ASMIsi, • • • , ASMISb) 
A DES diagnoser is designed for the EDESA of the hybrid system and isolators 
similar to that explained in Section 2.2. Diagnosability of the failure modes will be 
verified in the EDESA similar to that explained in Section 4.1. 
Remark 4.2.1. Here we assumed that all the isolators designed for the system may 
generate incorrect output. In other words, all the isolators have been assumed to be 
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unreliable. However, in practice, only a subset of isolators (depending on the method 
used for designing the isolators) may be assumed unreliable. In this case, the set of 
isolators IStot can be partitioned as follows. 
unrel 
where IS r e/ is the set of isolators that always generate reliable output, and IS u n r e ; 
is the set of unreliable isolators. For the set ofISTei, we construct the FSA Habs 
as explained in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 to guarantee the consistency between the 
transitions of isolators of IS r e/ and the hybrid system. Isolators of ISunrej may have 
arbitrary transitions. Therefore, we do not consider isolators of IS u n r e / in the FSA 
Habs- The EDESA H can be computed as 
H = sync{Habs, Is, ASMksim,ASM) • 
E x a m p l e 4 .2 .1 . (Example 4-1-1 Continued): Again we assume that the set of isola-
tors that can be designed for the system is IStot = { I s^2™2 {{f1}), I s^*2"2 ({f1, f2}), 
IsQE2M2({f2}), IsQE3M3{{f2}), IsQEbM\{f1}), Is^M&{{f2}), 7s^ 8 M 8 (0) }. As ex-
plained earlier, both failure modes F1 and F2 are diagnosable in H when kSim = 
0. We can verify that if kSim = 1, the failure mode F2 remains diagnosable be-
cause for distinguishing q$ from q2, q*, and q7 two of the isolators Is® 2 2{{f1}), 
Is® 2 2 ( { / \ / 2 } ) and Is® 2 2({/ 2}) are sufficient. Moreover, for distinguishing the 
cycle of qu and q\5 from qe, only one of the isolators Is® 3 3 ({ / 2}) and IsQ 8 8 ( 0 ) 
is required. Also for distinguishing qu from q§ and q\$ only one of the isolators 
Is® 5 5 ({ / 1 }) and Is® 5 5 ({/ 2}) is necessary. We can also verify that if fcs,m = 1, 
the failure mode F1 becomes undiagnosable because for distinguishing q\s and qu 
from q9 both of the isolators Is® s ^{Z1}) and Is® s 5 ({ / 2 }) are required. • 
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4.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we investigated diagnosability of failure modes. We introduced the 
notion of diagnosability in hybrid automata and showed that a failure mode in a 
hybrid automaton is diagnosable if the failure mode is diagnosable in the EDESA 
of the hybrid automaton and isolators. We also investigated diagnoser design and 
diagnosability of failure modes in the case that some isolators generate unreliable 
outputs. 
In this chapter, we assumed that all the isolators that can be designed are 
used for diagnosability analysis. In the next chapter, we investigate the problem of 
isolator selection and develop approaches for computing a minimal set of isolators 
ensuring failure diagnosability. 
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Chapter 5 
ISOLATOR SELECTION IN 
HYBRID AUTOMATA 
In Chapter 3, we developed a framework for diagnosis in hybrid systems. Combining 
the DES abstraction of the system and the isolators designed for isolating the fault 
types, we developed an Extended Discrete-Event System Abstraction (EDESA) for 
the system and the isolators. We introduced a notion of diagnosability in hybrid au-
tomata based on the sequence of discrete outputs and the continuous output signal. 
We showed that if a failure mode is diagnosable in the EDESA of a hybrid automa-
ton and isolators, it will be diagnosable in the hybrid automaton. In Chapter 3, we 
assumed that all the isolators that satisfy the existence conditions are designed and 
used for diagnosis. However, some of the isolators may be redundant. For example, 
let QEM C Q be a set of EM-similar discrete state and FTQEM = {f\ f 2 } . Assume 
that the following isolators have been designed: 
/ S Q B M ( { / 1 } ) , ^ Q £ M ( { / 2 } ) , / 5 Q B M ( { / 1 ) / 2 } ) 
Suppose the system is in a discrete state of QEM. Since we can individually iso-
late f1 and / 2 by IsQ ({Z1}) and IsQ ({/2}), respectively, we do not obtain 
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Figure 5.1: A hybrid automaton with one fault type. 
more information from the isolator Is® {{P,f2})- Therefore, Is® ( I / 1 ) / 2 } ) is 
a redundant isolator and can be discarded from the set of isolators. As another ex-
ample, consider the hybrid automaton in Figure 5.1. Suppose QEM — {q\,q[} and 
QE M _ {q2jq'2y a r e two sets of EM-similar discrete states. The fault type present 
in the system is / with the corresponding failure mode F, and / G FTQ and 
f
 e FT® . Assume that we can design the isolators IsQ ({f}) and Is® ({/}) 
and the diagnosis system starts simultaneously with the system. As can be seen in 
Figure 5.1, F can only occur when the system is in QEM. Therefore, when / be-
comes active, the isolator Is® ({/}) can isolate F, and there is no need to use 
Is^'M\{f}). 
In this chapter, we study the problem of isolator selection, that is, the problem 
of selecting sufficient isolators for ensuring the diagnosability of a failure mode in a 
hybrid automaton. We investigate the problem of "minimal isolator set" which is to 
find a minimal isolator set for attaining the diagnosability of a failure mode in the 
EDESA of the hybrid system and isolators. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we 
formulate the problem of isolator selection. Isolator selection for distinguishing 
discrete states from each other is studied in Section 5.2. A bottom-up algorithm for 
isolator selection in a hybrid automaton is developed in Section 5.3. 
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5.1 Problem Formulation 
In our framework, we use the observations of discrete sensors and residuals generated 
by the isolators for fault diagnosis. Therefore, failure diagnosability depends in part 
on the set of discrete sensors and the set of isolators used. Discrete sensor selection 
for DES has been studied for example in [90, 32, 5]. In this work, we study the 
problem of isolator selection in hybrid automata. Assuming failure diagnosability, 
some of the isolators may provide redundant information and therefore, they may 
be not necessary for fault diagnosis. Thus, we want to investigate the problem of 
selecting a minimal set of isolators to ensure the diagnosability of failure modes in 
the system. 
In this chapter, we study the problem of minimal isolator selection. In this 
problem, we are given a hybrid automaton model of the system with a set of failure 
modes and a set of isolators that can be designed for the system. The objective is 
to find a minimal isolator set such that a specific failure mode remains diagnosable 
in the EDESA of the system and isolators. Assume that the system to be diagnosed 
is a hybrid automaton 
H = {Q,X,U,y,FT,Init,S,Z,T,G,p,D,\,qQ) 
and let IS ( o t be the set of all isolators designed for the system. For a set of isolators 
IS C IS t o t , let H(IS) denote the EDESA constructed based on the system H and 
isolators of IS. Also let SISF ' be the set of isolator sets for which a failure mode 
Fl is diagnosable in the EDESA of the system and isolators H, namely: 
SISF i = {IS I IS C IStot and F is diagnosable in H(IS)} 
In this chapter, we investigate the problem of finding minimal elements of 
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SIS F \ An isolator set IS is a minimal element of SISF ' if IS € SISF ' and for any 
IS' C IS (IS' + IS), we have IS' £ SIS F \ 
If by using IStot, Fl is not diagnosable in the EDESA of the system and 
isolators, no subset of the IS toi can make F% diagnosable, and we assume that SISF ' 
does not exists. 
A straightforward top-down solution for finding a minimal element of SISF1 is 
given in Procedure 5.1. In Procedure 5.1, IS^ i n is a minimal element of SIS F \ 
Procedure 5.1: Given an isolator set IS to t. 
1. Initialization: ISJ^in = IS tot 
2. For all Is G IS tot 
*SMin = IS M i n — {Is} 
Check the conditions of Theorem 2.3.1 for H(IS^in) 
If ISjJin 0 SISFi (conditions of Theorem 2.3.1 fail) 
ISMin = ISMj„(J{-^s} 
End (If) 
End (For) 
In general, IS to t may consist of a large number of isolators. Verifying the solv-
ability conditions for the existence of all the isolators of IStot may be computationally 
intensive. Moreover, in Procedure 5.1, H has to be computed and the conditions of 
Theorem 2.3.1 have to be verified at each iteration. Therefore, computing a smaller 
set IS C ISto4 s u c n that IS 6 SISF ' and applying Procedure 5.1 to IS (instead of 
ISjot) reduces the computational complexity. This would be a bottom-up approach. 
In this chapter, we investigate the problem of isolator selection by developing 
a bottom-up algorithm for finding a set IS C ISiot such that IS € SIS F \ A minimal 
set of isolators is calculated from IS by using the top-down Procedure 5.1. In this 
algorithm, diagnosability of a failure mode is initially investigated based on the DES 
abstract model. The isolator selection procedure is based on the diagnosability at 
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the DES level. If the information gathered from the discrete outputs of the system 
is not sufficient for diagnosis of a failure mode, appropriate isolators are selected to 
make that failure mode diagnosable in the hybrid system. 
Fault diagnosis in our work is to determine the system's condition (normal/ 
faulty), and if the condition is faulty, specifying the failure modes present in the 
system's condition. The system's condition and the failure modes present in the 
system's condition can be determined if the discrete state of a failure mode can be 
distinguished from the rest of states. Therefore, a failure mode F% can be diagnosed 
if the discrete state of the system after the occurrence of Fl can be distinguished from 
any state q e Q — Q?n based on the output sequence (obtained from discrete sensors 
and isolators). For example, in Figure 5.1, the failure mode F can be diagnosed if the 
discrete state q\ can be distinguished from the discrete state q\, or the discrete state 
q2 can be distinguished from the discrete state q'2. In the next section, we provide a 
systematic method for computing a minimal set of isolators that can distinguish a 
set of discrete states from another set. 
5.2 Minimal Discrete State Distinguishers 
In our framework, a bank of isolators is constructed for each set of EM-similar 
discrete states. As described in Chapter 3, the function active(q) can be used for 
determining the fault types active in a discrete state q. We use this mapping to 
develop a systematic method for computing a minimal set of isolators that can 
distinguish a set of discrete states from another set of discrete states. 
Let QEM be a set of EM-similar discrete states, FTQ be the set of fault 
types present in QEM, and I S ^ be the set of all isolators that can be designed 
for QEM. As described in Chapter 3, an isolator IsQEM ($) e IS*5 isolates the 
set of fault types $ from the rest of fault types in FTQ . The isolator IsQ ($) 
106 
is sensitive to fault types of $ and insensitive to the fault types of (FT® — <E>). 
Recall that the isolator Is® ($) generates zero output only if the system is in a 
discrete state of QEM where no fault type of $ is active. Therefore, the output 
generated by an isolator can be considered as a function of the discrete state of the 
system. We associate a binary function with any isolator Is® designed for QEM 
as follows. 
EM , 
Definition 5.2.1. The function YIs ^ : Q —> {0,1} is defined as 
rIsQBM^(q)=l 
lifq?QEM 
lifqE QEM and active(q) f| $ + 0 
OifqE QEM and active(q) f| $ = 0 
Let IS = {Is1, • • • , Is1} C IStat be a set of isolators that can be designed for 
the system. Function T IS associated with a set of isolators IS defined as 
Tls(q) = TIsl(q)x---xTIs\q) 
gives the output of the isolators at q. 
Two discrete states are called distinguishable if by using the outputs of the 
isolators, one can identify which of the discrete states the system is in. In other 
words, two discrete states are distinguishable if there exists an isolator that generates 
different outputs for each of the two discrete states. 
Definition 5.2.2. Two discrete states q,q' E Q are called distinguishable from 
each other (by using I S * ^ if there exists an isolator Is G IS iot such that 
TIs(q) + TIs(q') 
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Alternatively, q and q' are distinguishable if 
q ^ q' mod ker TIS 
where ker TIS is the equivalence kernel of r I s . 
Given q,q' G QEM, q and g' are distinguishable if there exists an isola-
tor IsQEM{§) G I S Q B M such that $f)active{q) ^ 0 and ^f)active(q') = 0, or 
$f)active{q') ^ 0 and $f)active(q) = 0. Given g G Q £ M and g' G QE'M' and 
Q £ M T^  QE'M', q and g' are distinguishable if there exists an isolator Is® (4>) G 
I S ^ such that $ C F T Q and active(q) f] $ = 0, or there exists an isolator 
/SQE 'M ' ($ ') e ISQ£ 'M ' such that $ ' C FT« B ' M ' and active(q') f | $ = 0. 
Example 5.2.1. Consider a hybrid automaton with the set of fault types FT = 
i / 1 , / 2 , / 3 , / 4 , / 5 , / 6 } - Suppose the EM-similar state sets are QElMl — {g0, qi,q2}, 
= {93,94} andQE3M3 = {q5,q6} with active(q0) = { / \ / 2 , / 4 } , active{qx) = {f\f2}, 
active{q2) = { / \ / 3 , / 4 } , active(q3) = { / \ / 5 } , active(q4) = { / 2 , / 5 } , active(q5) = 
i / 1 * / 4 ) / 6 } a r i ^ active(qe) — { / 2 , / 5 , / 6 } - Consider a set of isolators lStot = 
{/*Q£lMl a n ) , /S Q E 1 M I ({/2}), /^BlMl ( { / 3 D , /^£ l M l up, / 4», /sQElMl ({/3, /4}), 
/ ^ 2 M 2 ( { / I , / 2 } ) , / ^ 2 M 2 ( { / 5 } ) , ^ ° E 3 M 3 ( { / 4 } ) , ^ B 3 M 3 ( { / 1 , / 6 } ) , 
•^ •s^  ( I / 1 ) / 2 , / 6 } ) } - ^ c a n be verified that qo and qi are not distinguishable. The 
QE1 M1 . 3 
discrete states q± and q2 are distinguishable because Vs ( " ''(qi) = 0 but 
Y's (u i>(q2) = 1. The discrete states q0 and q2 are also distinguishable be-
B^ M EM 
cause TIsQ {{f3])(q0) = 0 but FIsQ {{f3])(q2) = 1. The discrete states q0 
and q\ are also distinguishable from qz, q^, gs and q$ because T ( ^ "{qs) = 
r ^
£ l M l ({ / 3 }) (g 4 ) = r'°QBlMlM3»(qi) = rIsQElMl«f3»(qi) = l. The discrete state 
F M F M 
q2 is distinguishable from q§ becauseTIs M ^{qe) = 0 butTIs ^ ^(92) = 1-
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It can be verified that qi is distinguishable from q^, q^ and q^. Moreover, it can be 
verified that q$ is not distinguishable from qi, q\ and q^, and q^ is not distinguishable 
from q2, q$ and q5. • 
The definition of distinguishable discrete states can be extended to discrete 
state sets as follows. 
Let P,P'QQ be two discrete state sets. We say P and P' are distinguishable 
from each other if for any q G P and q' G P', q and q' are distinguishable from each 
other. Let IS C IStot be the set of isolators such that P and P' are distinguishable 
from each other by using the isolators of IS. The isolator set IS is called a P | P ' -
dis t inguisher . 
Let SDS(P |P ' ) denote the set of all P|P'-distinguishers. 
Definit ion 5.2.3. Let the isolator set IS be a P\P'-distinguisher, i.e, IS G SDS(P |P ' ) 
An isolator set IS is called a minimal P |P ' -d i s t i ngu i sher if none of the proper 
subsets of IS is a P\P'-distinguisher. • 
L e m m a 5.2.1. Let P,PQQ be two sets of discrete states. Also let V C P and 
V C P'. If IS G SDS(P |P / ) , then IS G SDS(V|F ' ) -
P roof - Let IS G SDS(P |P ' ) . Suppose IS g SDS(V|V')- This implies 
that there are states q E V and q' G V such that Tls(q) = TIS(q'). Therefore, 
IS 0 SDS(P |P ' ) which contradicts the assumption. Thus IS G SDS {V\V). • 
T h e o r e m 5.2.2. Let P, F C Q. 
SDS(PIP ' )=n n sDS({g}i{g'}) 
qePq'€P' 
Proof - Suppose IS G SDS(P |P ' ) . According to Lemma 5.2.1, we have IS G 
SDS({g}|{g'}) for any q G P and q' G P'. Therefore, IS G f \ e P H^P' SDS({^}|{g'}). 
Now, let IS G n g e p n g ' 6 p ' S D S ( { 9 } | { 9 ' } ) - T h i s implies that for any q G P and 
109 
q' e P ' , TIS(g) ^ Tls{q') and by Definition 5.2.2, IS e SDS({g}|{g'}). Therefore, 
IS e SDS(P |P ' ) . As a result, SDS(P |P ' ) = H , e p f)q'zP> SDS({g}|{g'}). • 
Obviously, if P f | P7 7^  0, then SDS(P |P ' ) = 0. 
Example 5.2.2. (Example 5.2.1 Continued): We want to calculate 
SDS({q0,qi}\{q2,q4}) 
It can be verified that 
SnS({q0}\{q2}) = { / ^ l M l ( { / 2 } ) , / ^ £ l M l ( { / 3 } ) } 
SDS({g0}|te}) = {/^£lMl({/3})} 
SDS({9l}|{g2}) = { / ^ E l M l ( { / 2 } ) , / ^ E l M l ( { / 3 } ) > / ^ £ l M l ( { / 3 , / 4 } ) } and 
SDS({qi}\{q4}) = { / 5 « £ l M l ( { / 3 } ) , / S ^ l M l ( { / 3 , / 4 } ) } 
Therefore, by Theorem 5.2.2, we have 
SDS({q0,qi}\{q2,q4}){Is^M\{f})} 
• 
In the following, we develop a "DES-first" approach for isolator selection in 
hybrid automata. 
5.3 DES-first Approach for Isolator Selection in 
Hybrid Automata 
The problem of isolator selection is to choose a minimal set of isolators such that a 
failure mode remains diagnosable in the EDESA of a hybrid system and isolators. In 
this section, we develop a "DES-first" approach for isolator selection in our frame-
work. In this approach, the diagnosability of failure modes is initially investigated 
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using discrete outputs in the DES model. Isolators are used if the diagnosability of a 
failure mode cannot be attained by using the information from the discrete sensors. 
The isolators are selected so as to resolve the ambiguity in the DES level that has 
made a failure mode undiagnosable. Theorem 5.3.1 provides guidelines for isolator 
selection in the DES-first approach. 
Let q G Qjn. The state set Amb(q) denotes the set of discrete states of 
Q — Qjri from which the system can generate an infinite output sequence identical 
to one generated from q, that is 
Amb(q) = {q'\q' EQ -Qrt and 
{s\s G UH^^q^f^LoiH^^),^] > \Q\2} ± 0} 
Theorem 5.3.1. Assume that ZQ = Q. For an isolator set IS, a permanent failure 
mode Fl will be diagnosable in H(IS) if and only if: 
1. For any q G Qjn such that q G Qinf, if \~l(\(q)) f|(<5 - Qj*) + 0, then 
ISeSBS({q}\X-\X(q))f](Q-Q^)) 
2. For any cycle of discrete states QcTi in QTi consisting of states having the same 
discrete output in Habs, say d, if \~l{d) f){Q — Qr{) ¥" ®> then there exists 
Q\ Q Qcjri such that for any qj G Q\ there exists Qj C A -1(d) f~){Q — Q^) and 
IQi l 
IS G SDS({fc}|Q,-) and |J Qj = \-\d) f | (Q - Q^); 
3. For any cycle of discrete states Q^ in Qjn, if there exists a cycle of discrete 
states QCN-^- Q (QN{JQ~FT.) generating the same unbounded discrete output 
sequence in Habs, then there exist q G Q0^ and q' G Q c - - and q' G Amb{q) 
such that IS e SY>S({q}\{q'}). 
Proof: (If part)- Conditions (1) guarantees that after F% occurs, if the system 
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remains indefinitely in a discrete state q G Qm*, the isolator set IS generates new 
output symbols so that q can be distinguished from any q' G Q — Qjn having the 
same discrete output as q. The output generated by the isolators in the isolator set 
IS (integrated with those of discrete sensors) will be FMndicative. Conditions (2) 
guarantees that after Fl occurs, if the system remains in a cycle of discrete states 
with the same discrete outputs, the isolator set IS can distinguish any q' G Q — Q^i 
having the same discrete output from some state of that cycle. Therefore, as the 
system evolves in the cycle, outputs of the isolator set IS isolate F%. Condition (3) 
guarantees that after F% occurs, if the system enters a cycle of discrete states Q ^ 
generating an unbounded sequence of outputs that can be also generated by a cycle 
of discrete states Qc -=r in Q — Qjri, then there exists a discrete state q G Q0^ such 
that the isolator set IS can distinguish q from one q' G Amb(q). When the system is 
in QcTi, the sequence of discrete outputs generated by the isolator set will be different 
from those generated in QCN^FI- Hence, faulty behavior J71 will be isolated. 
(Only if part) Suppose either conditions (1) or (2) does not hold. After Fl 
occurs, the system may stay indefinitely in a discrete state q G Qin* or a cycle of 
faulty discrete states whose discrete output is not ^-indicative. If the diagnoser 
is initialized after this last output and the isolator set IS does not generate F%-
indicative outputs, then F% will be undiagnosable in H. Condition (3) can be also 
proven to be necessary by using a similar discussion. • 
In the following, by using the results of Theorem 5.3.1, we develop a procedure 
to compute a set of isolators that makes a failure mode F% diagnosable. The out-
put of the procedure is a minimal isolator set IS F ' i n that makes Fl diagnosable in 
# ( I S ) . First we develop a bottom-up algorithm to compute a set I S F ' that makes 
Fx diagnosable in i?(IS). The set I S F ' may not be minimal. Thus, by using the 
top-down Procedure 5.1, we can calculate a minimal isolator set. 
Initially, I S F ' = 0. First, we add enough isolators to I S F ' to satisfy condition 
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(1) in Theorem 5.3.1. For any states q G Qjn f}Qmf and q' G Q — Q?i such that 
X(q) = X(q'), we compute a g|g'-distinguisher. If glg'-distinguisher does not exists, 
Fl remains undiagnosable in H(IS) for any IS C IS t o t . If <?|(/-distinguisher exists, 
we add it to I S F \ 
Secondly, we add enough isolators to IS * to satisfy condition (2) in Theo-
rem 5.3.1. Let Q^i C Qjn be a set of discrete states having the same output that 
make a cycle in Qjn, and A(Q^) is not F'-indicative. Also let Q ^ be the set of 
all these sets. For any QcTi G Q'jn, we compute a set of isolators to distinguish one 
of the states q G Q^ from a state q' G Q — Qjn having the same output. If a 
(/|</-distinguisher exists, we add this set to I S F \ If there exists a cycle Q^ such 
that for all q G QcTi no gig'-distinguisher exists, Fl remains undiagnosable. 
Thirdly, we add enough isolators to ISF" to satisfy condition (3) in Theo-
rem 5.3.1. Let Q°Ti C QTi be a set of discrete states that make a cycle in Qjn and 
there exists q' G Q — Qjn such that q' G Amb(q) for some q G Q°Ti. Also let Q^ be 
the set of all these state sets. We compute a set of isolators to distinguish one of the 
states q G Q°Ti from the state q' G Amb(q). If a g|g'-distinguisher exists, we add this 
set to I S F \ If there exists a cycle Q^ such that for all q G Q^ no g|g'-distinguisher 
exists, Fl remains undiagnosable. Finally, by using Procedure 5.1, we compute a 
minimal set ISF* in. 
Let Q^-r C Q - Qjri be a set of discrete states that make a cycle in Q — Qjn 
and there exists q G Q^ such that q' G Amb(q) for some q' G Q^, and let Q~ 
be the set of all these state sets. We are now in a position to formally present our 
procedure. 









is£ i n = 0, i s F ' = 0 
End (Procedure Initialization) 
Procedure VerifyConl 
For all q' e Q - Qjn 
For all q e Qjr, 
If A(g) = \(q') and
 9 G Q i n ' 
Compute SDS({g}|{g'}) 
IfSDS({9}|{9 '}) = 0 
F l is not diagnosable 
End of Procedure 
END (If) 




End (Procedure VerifyConl) 
Procedure VerifyCon2 
For all q' eQ- QT< 
Q(Q') = {Qcr< I 0% e Q £ and \(q>) = A(Q^,)} 
For all q € Q^ 
If A(<j) = A(g') and q £ Q ^ for some Q ^ e <?£, 
Compute SDS({g}|{g'}) 
IS F i = IS F i (JIS for one IS 6 SDS({g}|{g'}) 
Q(?') = Q{q') - {QJri I Qcr, e Q% and 9 e Q$*} 
End (If) 
End (For) 
If QW) ± 0 
Fl is not diagnosable 




End (Procedure VerifyCon2) 
Procedure VerifyCon3 
For all q' G Q - QTi 
For all q G Q?i 
If \{q) = A(<?') and q' £ Amb(q) and {QH_ | Q|_ e Q2_ and <?' G Q|-} / 0 
Compute SDS({9}|{9'}) 





If Q% ± 0 
Fl is not diagnosable 
End of Procedure 
END (If) 
End (Procedure VerifyCon3) 
Procedure Top_downProc 
For all Is G I S F ' 
ISFX = ISF" - {Is} 
Check the conditions of Theorem 2.3.1 for H(ISF') 
If I S F ' £ SISF* (conditions of Theorem 2.3.1 fail) 
ISF" = IS F i \J{Is} 
End (If) 
End (For) 
i a f " _
 T a f 
la
min — x o 
End (Procedure Top.downProc) 
Remark 5.3.1. In Theorem 5.3.1 and Procedure 5.2, we need to verify if for two 
states q € Q^i and q' € Q — Q^i, we have q' E Amb(q). In the following, we briefly 
explain a method for verifying if q' £ Amb(q). Details of the method can be found 
in [90]. 
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Let Habs be the Reachability Transition System (RTS) of the DES abstraction 
of the hybrid system. Also let Habs(q) denote the reachable sub-generator of Habs 
corresponding to the states of Q^i with the initial state q, and Habs (q1) denote 
the reachable sub-generator of Habs corresponding to the states of Q — Qjn with 
the initial state q'. We need to find output cycles that are common to Habs(q) and 
Habs (?')• One way to find common output sequences, and thus common cycles, 
is to first convert Habs to an equivalent mealy generator M-Habs in which output 
changes in Habs are represented as transitions. Let M-Habs{q) and M.Habs (q') be 
the sub-generators of M.Habs corresponding to Habs(q) and Habs (q'), respectively. 
It can be verified that Habs(q) and Habs (q') have common cycles (i.e., q' E Amb(q)) 
if and only if there is a cycle in meet(MMa b s{q), M„Habs (q1)). • 
Example 5.3.1. Figure 5.2 shows the DES abstraction of a hybrid automaton H 
with three fault types fl, f2 and f3 and the corresponding failure modes Fl, F2 and 
F3, respectively. The occurrence of the failure modes F1, F2 and F3 are modeled 
by transitions labeled with the events f1, f2 and f3, respectively. The unobserv-
able event 'u\' changes the discrete state of the system in normal mode. The labels 
'U2' and 'us' are unobservable events changing the discrete state of the system in 
the failure mode F2 and create a cycle of states with the same discrete output. 
The set of discrete states is Q — {9o, - -1 ,917} o,nd Qinf — {914,917}. The con-
dition set of the system is K = {N,F* ,F2,F3,F2>3}. The discrete states of the 
system can be partitioned according to the condition of the system. Here, QN = 
{qO,Ql,Q2,q6,Q7}, QF* = {<?3,98,9l2}, QF* = {?4, 99, 9l3, 9l6}, QF* = {95, 9ll, 915, 917} 
and QF2,3 = {510,914}- We also have QTi = QFi, Qjn = {94, 99,9io,9i3,9i4,9i6} 
and Q^s = {95,910,911,914,915,917}- Moreover, QElMl = {90,93,94,95}, QEiM2 = 
{92,98,99,9io,9n}, QEsM3 = {97,913,915} and QE*M* = {914,917}. The rest of 
the discrete states have different (E, M) functions. Fault type fl is active in the 
discrete states qz and q$, f2 is active in 94,99,910,913 and q^, and f3 is active 
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Figure 5.2: DES abstraction of a hybrid automaton with three failure modes. 
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in 95)9io,<7ii)<7i4 and Qn- Assume that the following set of isolators can be de-
signed for the system, namely: IS t r t = {Is^^1 ({f\f3}), Is**1"1 ( { / \ / 2 , f3}), 
IsQB2M2({P}), Is^M\{f\p}), / ^ £ 2 M 2 ( { / 2 , / 3 } ) ; Is^M\{f\f\n), 
/ / 3 M 3 ( { / 2 } ) , Is^M4({f2}), Is^M4({f}), / s ^ 4 M 4 ( { / 2 , / 3 } ) } . The set of dis-
crete outputs of the system is: D = {DQ,D\, D2, D$}. Let ZQ be the initial state of 
the diagnoser designed for Habs. Assuming that ZQ = Q, none of the failure modes 
are diagnosable using the diagnoser designed for Habs- Failure mode F1 is not diag-
nosable because it violates condition (3) of Theorem 2.3.1, F2 violates condition (1) 
and condition (2), and F3 violates condition (1) of that theorem. 
In order to make F1 diagnosable, we need to use isolators that make changes 
in the output sequence generated by the system when the system enters the cycle 
of states q8 and qu to distinguish the failure mode F1 from the normal condition. 
Thus we need a q%\q§-distinguisher or a q^lqi-distinguisher to make F1 diagnosable. 
There is no isolator designed based on the dynamics of the system at q\, q6 and qu • 
We have T ^ ^ ^ ^ i q , ) = 0, F ^ ^ ^ ' ^ i q e ) = 1, T 1 ^ " " ^ ^ ) = 0 
and r " g B a " a « ' s » ( f c ) = 1. Therefore, SBS({qs}\{q6}) = {{Is^M\{f2, / 3 } ) } , 
{ / S Q ^ ^ ( { / 3 } ) } ; { / S ^ M 2 ( { / 2 ) / 3 } ) ) / S Q B 2 M 2 ( { / 3 } ) } } ^ d s Q h a w 
SDS({g i a}|{g i}) = 0. Therefore, S I S F l = {{Is^M\{f2, / 3 } ) } , { / ^ 2 M 2 ( { / 3 } ) } , 
{Is^M\{f2J3})Js^M\{f3})}},and{IS^M\{f2^f3})}and{Is^M\{f3}^ 
are the minimal isolator sets for the diagnosability of F1. 
The failure mode F2 is not diagnosable in the diagnoser of Habs because the 
discrete output generated by the system in the cycle made by the states q^ and 
9i6 is not F2-indicative. For making F2 diagnosable, we need a set of isolators 
to generate appropriate discrete outputs when the system is in the discrete states 
qi3 and qi6 to distinguish F2 from F3 and the normal condition. There is no iso-
lator designed based on the dynamics of the system at q^. Therefore, we need a 
qi3\{qj,q\s}-distinguisher. We have 913,915,177 G QEiM3, and therefore according 
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to Theorem 5.2.2, SBS({ql3}\{q7,q15}) = SDS({g13}|{<?7}) f| SDS({g i3}|{gi5}) = 
{{Is® 3 3 ({ / 2 })}}- Moreover, q^ E Qm* but the discrete output generated by the 
system in qu is not F2-indicative. The system generates the same output when 
only F3 has occurred and the system is in qn- We need to use an isolator that 
generates appropriate discrete outputs when the system is in qu to distinguish q\$ 
from ql7. We can verify that SDS({q14}\{q,7}) = {{IsQE4M4({f2})}}. Therefore, 
SIS F 2 = { { / ^ E 3 M 3 ( { / 2 } ) , / ^ £ 4 M 4 ( { / 2 } ) } } , and { / S ^ 3 M 3 ({ / 2 }) , 
IsQE4M*({f2}}} is the minimal isolator set for the diagnosability of F2. 
We observe that qn € Qmf but the discrete output generated by the sys-
tem in qn is not F3-indicative. We need to use qu\qn-distinguishes As ex-
plained above, the isolator Is® 4 4 ({/ 2}) can distinguish qu from qn- Therefore, 
SIS F 3 = {{IsQE4M4({f2})}}, and {Is®*4™4 ({f2})} is the minimal isolator set for 
the diagnosability of F3. 
We can verify that failure modes F1, F2 and Fs are H-diagnosable for any 
II > 1. This implies that when F1, F2 or F3 occur, they can be detected and 
isolated after maximum one event generated in the system. Assume that Tmax = 100 
sec. Therefore, F1, F2 and F3 are A—diagnosable in the hybrid system for any 
A > 100 sec. • 
R e m a r k 5.3.2. In addition to a DES-first approach for isolator selection, a continuous-
first approach can be developed for the discrete sensor selection. In this approach, 
the diagnosability of failure modes is first investigated with the information provided 
by the isolators. If isolators designed for the system cannot isolate a failure mode 
on their own, then appropriate discrete sensors are added to the system to make the 
failure mode diagnosable. • 
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5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we investigated the problem of isolator selection in hybrid automata. 
We first developed a method for distinguishing discrete states from each other using 
isolators. Then, we developed a procedure for finding a minimal isolator set to 
ensure diagnosability of failure modes in hybrid automata. 




HYBRID FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN 
GAS TURBINE ENGINE 
Advanced aircraft such as military airplanes are able to meet stringent operational 
requirements such as short take-off, vertical landing, rapid maneuvering and threat 
avoidance. Because of their wide range of operational and performance requirements, 
jet engines have become very complex. Many of the jet engines are benefiting 
from afterburners, multiple stage compressors and complicated actuators and control 
systems. As a result, reliability and maintainability requirements demand systematic 
methods for detecting and isolating faults in jet engines. 
In this chapter, we illustrate the application of our hybrid diagnosis methodol-
ogy to a jet turbine engine. Faults in the fuel supply system and actuators have been 
the source of many failures in jet engines [104, 29]. We employ our hybrid diagnosis 
approach for investigating faults in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator of 
a single-spool turbojet engine with an afterburner. The dynamics of the components 
in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator such as pumps and solenoid valves 
can be described in terms of discrete transitions, and can be represented by DES 
models. On the other hand, thrust generation in the engine is a continuous process, 
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and the operation of the engine components such as compressor and turbine can be 
described by continuous static and dynamic thermodynamic relations (i.e., algebraic 
and differential equations). We develop a hybrid automaton model for describing 
the engine and its actuator systems. An extended DES is constructed for the en-
gine, and based on the extended DES model, a hybrid diagnoser is constructed and 
developed. We show that there are faults in the fuel supply system and the nozzle 
actuator that cannot be isolated by a purely DES diagnoser or by methods based 
on the residual generators alone. However, the faults can be isolated if the hybrid 
diagnoser is used. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we explain 
the basic principles of turbine engine design and modeling which are paramount 
for understanding the work presented here. We explain the static thermodynamical 
equations for each component of the engine and develop dynamic relations describing 
the transient behavior of the engine. In Section 6.2, we develop a hybrid model for 
the engine. We present a typical fuel supply system and a typical nozzle actuator 
and develop DES models for them. In this section, we also investigate different 
operating regimes of the engine and develop a set of linear system models describing 
its behavior in each operating regime. Fault diagnosis based on the hybrid model of 
the jet engine is explained in Section 6.3. We describe the simulation methodology 
and present the results in Section 6.4. 
6.1 Je t Engines 
Turbine engines are used in many land, sea and air vehicles. The primary purpose of 
a turbine engine is to give a change in momentum to a mass of fluid. This change in 
momentum is equivalent to an acceleration of a working fluid, producing an external 
force (thrust) on the system in accordance with Newton's Third Law of Motion. The 
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Figure 6.1: A General Electric J85-GE-17A turbojet engine (1970) [3]. 
jet engine (shown in Figure 6.1) belongs to one type of gas turbine engines and is 
used to generate a high-speed jet for propulsion. In a jet engine, first air is brought 
into an intake duct; then the mass of air is compressed by a compressor, and the 
temperature of the high pressure air is raised by mixing it with fuel and having 
the mixture burned in a combustion section. The resulting high-pressure, high-
temperature fluid is then expanded in a turbine section driving the turbines which 
in turn power the compressors. The fluid is further expanded through a nozzle 
section to a high velocity (conversion of pressure and thermal energy into kinetic 
energy) thus increasing the momentum of the fluid and producing thrust. 
Jet engine was near-simultaneously invented by Whittle in England and von 
Ohain in Germany in early 1940 [104]. Before that, aircraft were powered by the 
propeller/reciprocating engine propulsion system. Initially, the jet engine was de-
veloped solely for military use. Following a great deal of advancement in gas turbine 
technology, the first civilian airplane appeared in the early 1950s. Until today, jet 
engines are the main choice for generating propulsion in aircraft. 






In the following, we introduce the thermodynamic terminologies that are used 
in this chapter. 
6.1.1 Thermodynamic Terminologies 
Entropy - In thermodynamics, entropy is a measure of the unavailability of a 
systems energy to do work. In fact, entropy is a measure of the disorder of molecules 
in a system and is a function of a quantity of heat in a system which is capable of 
doing a work. 
Enthalpy - In thermodynamics and molecular chemistry, the enthalpy (de-
noted as h) is a quotient or description of thermodynamic potential of a system, 
which can be used to calculate the heat transfer during a quasistatic process taking 
place in a closed thermodynamic system under constant pressure. 
Adiabatic process - In thermodynamics, an adiabatic process is a thermo-
dynamic process in which no heat is transferred to or from the working fluid. 
Reversible process - A reversible process is a process that can be "reversed" 
by means of extremely small changes in some property of the system without loss or 
dissipation of energy. A process that is not reversible is called irreversible. In an 
irreversible process, finite changes are made. Thus, the system is not at equilibrium 
throughout the process. 
Isentropic process - An isentropic process is a process during which the 
entropy of the system remains constant. Any adiabatic and reversible process is an 
isentropic process. 
Specific heat - Specific heat (denoted as C) is the measure of the heat energy 
required to increase the temperature of a unit quantity of a substance by a certain 
124 
2 I o Combustion 3 
Air 
> Compressor 
Figure 6.2: Gas generator in a jet engine. 
temperature interval (usually IK). 
Specific heat ratio - Specific heat ratio (denoted as 7) is the ratio of the 
heat capacity at constant pressure cp to the heat capacity at constant volume cv. 
In this work, we study fault diagnosis in a turbojet with an afterburner. The 
operation of a gas turbine engine can be described by thermodynamic cycles. In the 
following, first we explain an ideal thermodynamic cycle called Brayton cycle [102]. 
6.1.2 Brayton Cycle 
Generally, a gas turbine consists of an upstream compressor coupled to a downstream 
turbine, and a combustion chamber (also called burner) in-between, as shown in 
Figure 6.2 [102], In most common air-breathing jet engines, these three components 
comprise the heart of the engine, called the gas generator. The idea behind the 
gas generator is to take in the air, mix it with fuel, and convert it into a high 
pressure and high temperature gas. The operation of an ideal gas generator can 
be described thermodynamically by the Brayton cycle shown in Figure 6.3. In this 
thermodynamic cycle, the intake air is compressed isentropically (1 to 2), burned at 
constant pressure inside the combustion chamber (2 to 3), expanded isentropically 










Figure 6.3: Brayton cycle. 
1 
S (Entropy) 
Figure 6.4: Brayton cycle with reheat. 
Depending on the applications of the gas turbine, the energy provided is extracted 
and used for different applications. 
The reheat cycle is an effective and widely-used method of increasing thrust 
quickly. It is mainly employed by military supersonic aircraft. The specific output of 
a Brayton cycle can be increased through a reheating process, where the expanded 
gas from the expansion process is reheated before the exhaust through the nozzle. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates an ideal Brayton cycle with a reheat process. 
A turbojet engine, as shown in Figure 6.5, can be constructed by adding an 
intake duct and an exhaust nozzle to a gas generator. The exhaust nozzle converts 
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Figure 6.5: A turbojet engine [4]. 
the internal energy of the hot gas into kinetic energy or thrust. The work extracted 
by the turbine is to drive the compressor, or to provide auxiliary power. In addition, 
part of the work extracted by the turbine is also used to drive a fan for a turbofan, 
or a propeller for a turboprop. 
In the following, we explain some concepts important for engine modeling. 
6.1.3 Engine Modeling 
A mathematical representation of a gas turbine engine is fairly common and has been 
investigated by several authors in the literature (e.g., [102, 89]). For this work, a 
simulation of a single-spool turbojet engine was developed by using thermodynamic, 
aerodynamic and mechanical relationships of each of the major components. This 
model represents the functional relations that exist among the engine variables, such 
as pressures, temperatures, and gas flow rates. The details of the thermodynamic 
relations reviewed in this chapter can be found in [102]. First, we specify the gas 
model we use. 
127 
Gas Model 
In this application, it is assumed that the working fluids, i.e., the air and combustion 
products are modeled as perfect gases in their thermodynamic equilibria. Generally, 
specific heat at constant pressure (cp) changes with temperature. Also, cp and 
specific heat ratio (7) for most typical hydrocarbons and air combustion products 
are functions of temperature and the fuel-air ratios [102]. Therefore, it is necessary 
to model the variation of cp and 7 across engine components where the changes 
are significant, for instance, downstream of the combustion chamber. Throughout 
the analysis, the variation of gas properties with temperature is approximated by 
assuming constant gas properties, such as cp, 7, and gas constant R, at two different 
sections across the engine (refer to Figure 6.6): 
• Section 1: components upstream of main combustion chamber (i.e., before 
station 3) 
• Section 2: components downstream of main combustion chamber (i.e., station 
3 and after station 3) 
Concept of Stagnation 
The change in the kinetic energy terms in the steady flow energy equation is ac-
counted for using the concept of stagnation or (total) enthalpy. The stagnation 
enthalpy h0 is the enthalpy which a steady fluid of enthalpy h and velocity C would 
possess when it is brought to rest in the absence of any heat or work interactions. 
From energy equations, we have: 
(ho-h) + ±(0-C2) = 0 (6.1) 
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and thus ho will be obtained from 
ho = h+ ]f2 
For calorically perfect gas (i.e., constant cv), h can be substituted by cpT and the 
above equation can be written for stagnation temperature or total temperature as 
To = T + | - (6.2) 
Usually, T is referred to as the static temperature and ^ - is called dynamic 
temperature. When a gas is slowed down, the temperature rises and there is a rise 
in the pressure at the same time. Assuming that the steady flowing gas is brought 
to rest not only adiabatically but also reversibly, i.e., isentropically, a stagnation (or 
total) pressure p0 can be defined in a similar way to T0. Therefore, we have 
P \Tj 
\ 7 / ( 7 - 1 ) 
(6.3) 
where p is the pressure of the fluid before being brought to rest. 
Isentropic Efficiencies 
Since the objective of the engine is to produce work, the efficiencies of the engine 
components are normally expressed in terms of the ratio of the actual and ideal 
power transfers: 
_ W _ Ah' 
V
~ W ~~Ah 
where W and Ah' are the ideal power transfer and enthalpy change of an engine 
component when the process is isentropic, and W and Ah are the actual power 
transfer and enthalpy change in the presence of friction. The ideal process in the 
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Figure 6.6: Station numbering in a turbojet engine with afterburner. 
a perfect gas, we have 
Ah = cpAT 
This relation is sufficiently accurate for real gases in gas turbines if a mean cp over 
the range of temperature is used. In addition, the ideal and actual temperature 
changes are not very different, and as a result, the mean cp can be assumed to be 
the same for both. Therefore, the isentropic efficiencies in the engine are defined in 
terms of temperature. 
In the following subsection, we explain the components and their thermody-
namic relations for a single-spool turbojet with afterburner which will be the focus 
of our work. 
6.1.4 Modeling of Components 
Figure 6.6 illustrates a schematic of a turbojet with an afterburner and the station 
numbering used in our work (adopted from [102]). In the following, we explain each 
component of the engine in more details. 
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Intake Duct 
Intake duct is placed before the compressor and supplies the engine with the re-
quired air flow at the highest possible pressure. The air velocity in the intake duct 
decreases when air reaches the compressor. At the same time, the temperature and 
the pressure increase because of stagnation properties. Let Ca,Ta and pa denote 
the velocity, temperature and pressure of the fluid gas at the entrance of the intake 
duct, respectively. 
Referring to Equation (6.2), we have 









•I \ 7 / (7 -1 ) 
where TQ\ and p0i are the temperature and pressure at the compressor inlet, respec-
tively, and TQJ is the temperature which would have been reached if the friction was 
absent. For cycle analysis, calculation of the stagnation pressure at the compressor 
inlet is necessary. In fact, the pressure rise poi ~ Pa which is referred to as ram 
pressure is of our interest. Since the process of ram compression is not isentropic, 
we introduce an isentropic efficiency, % for the intake duct defined as 
Vi = 
T" — T 
TQI — Ta 
Therefore, we have 
C2 
T' —T — n a J 0 1 1a — 'hey 




T" — T 
T 
1 7 / ( 7 - 1 ) 
1+7?; 1c T 
2 1 7 / ( 7 - 1 ) 
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We have the following relation for Mach number M: 
M = C/(-yRT)1/2 
We also have 
jR = cpa(7 - 1) 
Thus, the inlet pressure ratio equation can be written as 
Poi 
Pa 
1 + 77, 
7 - 1 Ml 
7/(7-1) 
(6.4) 
where Ma is the Mach number in the air temperature and pressure. The inlet 
temperature ratio can be expressed in terms of Ma as 
^01 1 + ^Ml (6.5) 
Compressor 
A compressor in a gas turbine engine is in charge of providing high-pressure air to the 
combustion chamber. There are two major classes of compressors used in aircraft gas 
turbines [104, 102]: centrifugal flow compressor and axial flow compressor. In the 
centrifugal compressor, air is taken into the compressor near the axis and accelerated 
outward from the axis by a centrifugal force. Subsequently, the spin of the air is 
removed and the air is ejected at high velocity and high kinetic energy. The pressure 
rise is produced in part by expansion of the air in a diffuser manifold by conversion 
of the kinetic energy of the moving air into static pressure energy. 
The advantage of centrifugal compressors is that they can be easily built in 
relatively small size. However, they have smaller efficiency in comparison with the 
axial flow compressors particularly in high pressure ratios. Centrifugal compressors 
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are usually used in small engines. Axial compressors are used in larger gas turbine 
engines. The axial flow compressors are composed of a series of rotating airfoils 
called rotor blades and a stationary set of airfoils called stator vanes. The air is 
compressed in direction parallel to the axis of the engine. Enthalpy rise occurs in 
the rotors in which both static pressure and kinetic energy are increased. Some 
of the swirl velocity produced by the rotor is then removed by the stator vanes, 
decreasing the kinetic energy and therefore increasing the static pressure. Modern 
compressors can yield compression ratios over 25 : 1 and efficiencies over 90 percent 
[104]. 
For a given pressure ratio PRCOmP = P02/P01, we have the following thermody-
namic relation for the compressor: 
102 — J 01 — - — 
Vc 
„ \ ( 7 - l ) / 7 
P01J 
(6.6) 
where r\c is the isentropic efficiency of the compressor. The power consumed by the 
compressor Wc can be calculated from 
Wc = cpama(T02 - r 0 i ) (6.7) 
where ma is the mass flow passing through the compressor. It should be noted that 
in this work, we do not consider air bleeding. 
In single-spool engines, there is only one main shaft (or rotor) in the system. 
The rotor consists of the rotatory parts of the compressor and the turbine. The 
speed of the engine is specified by the rotor speed and is presented in Revolution 
Per Second (RPS) or Revolution Per Minute (RPM). The speed of the engine is 
a function of the power generated by the turbine for turning the compressor and 
the total moment of inertia of the rotatory system. The power consumed by the 
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compressor is related to the speed of the shaft as follows: 
WC = J-^l (6.8, 
where J is the moment of inertia of the shaft and N is the speed (RPS) of the shaft. 
Combustion Chamber 
Combustion chamber is the place in the engine in which the fuel is burned in the 
high pressure air supplied by the compressor to rise the temperature. The rise in 
the temperature is due to the energy released by the burning fuel. An electrical 
spark is required only in the beginning of the combustion process. After initial 
ignition, the flame must be self-sustaining. It is desirable to keep the pressure of the 
gas unchanged in the combustion chamber. However, there is usually a loss in the 
pressure represented as a percentage of the total pressure. 
The pressure at the turbine inlet p03 is calculated as follows: 
P03 = (1 - Apb)po2 (6.9) 
where Ap^ is the combustion pressure loss. The temperature T03 at the steady state 
is calculated from the energy conversion give by the following relation: 
Cpa.rh.aT02 + rjbKfrhs = cpgmgT03 (6.10) 
where rji, is the combustion efficiency, Kf is the low calorific value of the fuel, rhf is 
the fuel mass flow rate and rhg is the gas mass flow rate at the turbine inlet. In the 
steady-state operation, we also have 
rha + rhf — rhg = 0 (6-11) 
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Turbine 
The function of the turbine in a jet engine is to extract a portion of the pressure and 
kinetic energy from the high-temperature combustion gases for driving the compres-
sor and accessories. In a typical jet engine about 75 percent of the power produced 
is used internally to drive the compressor. The remaining power is used to generate 
the required thrust [104]. In contrast to compressor, turbine is a rotatory component 
in which gas with high-temperature passes. Therefore, the choice of the material 
used in turbine is very crucial for the engine operation and performance. For any 
engine, the maximum allowable turbine inlet temperature is specified by the manu-
facturer. Like compressors, the behavior of a turbine is also usually represented by 
characteristic maps. 
The power developed by the turbine is proportional to the temperature de-
crease in the turbine and is given by 
Wt = mgcpg(T03-TM) (6.12) 
In a jet engine, the power generated by the turbine is proportional to the power 
consumed by the compressor, namely 
Wt = — 
Vm 
where rjm is the mechanical transmission efficiency of the engine. In this work, we 
study turbojet engines with no air bleedings. 
Temperature at the outlet of the turbine can be calculate from the work com-
patibility relation 
rp rp cpa(T02 — T0i) m io\ 
J03 — J 04 = ^O. iJJ 
^pg'jm 
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Pressure is calculated from the following thermodynamic relation: 
frnl \ 7/(7-1) 
P o 4 = P o 3 ( ^ J (6.14) 
where TQ4 is the temperature of the turbine outlet if the expansion process would 
be isentropic. In case of non-isentropic process, an isentropic efficiency r\t is defined 
for the turbine and TQ4 is calculated from the following equation: 
^ 4 = T 0 3 - - ( r o 3 - T 0 4 ) (6.15) 
Nozzle 
Nozzle is the final component of a jet engine in which the working fluid is expanded 
to produce a high-velocity jet. The high-pressure exhaust gas is accelerated in a jet 
pipe situated between the turbine outlet and the nozzle throat to come close to the 
ambient pressure and consequently, producing thrust. The flow through the nozzle 
may be subsonic or supersonic. For supersonic engines generating gas jets with very 
high speeds, the design of the nozzle is very paramount in the engine performance. 
Initially, assume that the afterburner is not in operation. 
The thrust produced by the engine is given by 
F = mnC5 + An(p5 - pa) (6.16) 
where mn is the mass flow rate of the gas exiting the nozzle, C5 is the speed of the 
jet passing through the nozzle, An is the area of the nozzle throat and P5 is the 
pressure of the gas at the nozzle throat. In this work, we assume that the mass flow 
rate exiting the nozzle is the same as the mass flow rate passing through the turbine 
if the afterburner is not in operation, i.e., mn = mg. 
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The nozzle exit temperature T5 is given by 
TQ4 -T5 = rjjTc 04 1 -
! \ (i-i)h' 
(6.17) 
,7WP5 
where rjj is the isentropic efficiency of the nozzle and is given by 
T04 — T5 
Vj = 7p if, (6-18) 
-*04 — -*5 
where T$ is the temperature which would be reached if the expansion process in the 
nozzle was isentropic. 
Let T05 denote the temperature of the gas in the jet pipe before the nozzle 
throat. Assuming there is no drop in the temperature when the gas passes through 
the jet pipe, i.e., T05 = T04, T04 — T5 is the temperature equivalent of the jet velocity 
(Cf/2cpfl). The speed of the jet is a function of the pressure ratio po4/ps- The critical 
pressure ratio po4/pc is the pressure ratio P04/P5 which results in M5 = 1. Here M5 
is the Mach number of the fluid jet. For pressure ratios up to the critical value, p5 
will be equal to the ambient pressure pa and the pressure thrust (An(p5 — pa)) is 
zero. For pressure ratios greater than the critical value, the nozzle is chocked, ps 
remains constant at the critical pressure pc, and C5 remain constant at the sonic 
value (7i?T5)1/2. 
We have the following relations for the speed of the jet 
§i
 = ^ = l + _^ L = l + l z i M 5 2 (6.19) 
For sonic speed M5 = 1, we have 
T04 = 7 + 1 
Tn 2 
(6.20) 
where Tc is the temperature of the gas corresponding to the critical pressure pc. 
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From Equation (6.18), we have 
1 
T — T04 (T04 — Tc) 
The critical pressure pc can be calculated from 
- E L
 = IIL V / ( 7 _ 1 ) 
P04 Ton J 
7 / ( 7 - 1 ) 
Replacing for TC/TM from Equation (6.20), we have the following relation for the 




The ratio pcw/Pa is called the nozzle pressure ratio. A convenient way to check 
if the nozzle is chocked is to calculate the nozzle pressure ratio. Nozzle is chocked 





where mn is the mass of the gases in the nozzle, pn is the density of the exiting gases 
and is obtained from j^r, and Cn is the speed of the exiting gases and is calculated 
from [2cpg(T04 - Tc)]* or ^RTc)h. 
Optimal nozzle performance occurs when the nozzle exit pressure is not far 
from the ambient pressure. As a result, for nozzles with a large range of operating 
pressure ratios, mechanisms for geometrical variation must be possible [89]. In this 
work, we consider nozzle with variable exhaust area. 
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Afte rburner 
Afterburner or reheat is another component which is added in the jet pipe of some 
engines, primarily those on military supersonic aircraft, to boost the thrust tem-
porarily, both for supersonic flight and for takeoff. The jet pipe of an engine with 
afterburner is longer than that of an engine without afterburner. Like the main 
fuel system of the combustion chamber, afterburner consists of a fuel system and 
some fuel injectors situated in the jet pipe. When the afterburner turns on, fuel is 
injected in the jet pipe. Since the temperature of the incoming gases is very high 
(in the range of 600 -1400 K for the engine in this work), fuel is ignited easily and 
as the result of the combustion process, the afterburner exit temperature increases 
significantly. Consequently, there will be a steep increase in the engine net thrust. 
The afterburner exit temperature, T04i is calculated from the following rela-
tion: 
cpgrhgT04 + r]ABKfrhfAB = cpgmnT04i (6.23) 
where TJAB is the afterburner efficiency, rhfAB is the afterburner fuel mass flow rate 
and rhn is the mass flow rate of the gases passing to the nozzle. Here, we also have 
fhg + rhfAB - m„ = 0 (6.24) 
We assume that the afterburner uses a fuel with the same low calorific value as 
is used in the combustion chamber. As a result of the afterburner combustion pro-
cess, nozzle mass flow which is the afterburner entry mass flow plus the afterburner 
fuel flow increases, but the afterburner exit pressure deceases due to the heating 
and friction and turbulence losses. We use a variable pressure loss factor for the 
afterburner. We assume that the pressure loss in the afterburner is proportional 
to the temperature increase by the afterburner [102]. Here, we assume that there 
will be a pressure loss of 10 percent when T04\ is two times of T04. Therefore, an 
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approximate value for the pressure at the end of the jet pipe, P041, can be obtained 
from 
P041 = P04 1 - 0 . 1 ( ^ - 1 
J 04 
(6.25) 
When using afterburner in the engine, the temperature in the jet pipe, T041, 
is no more equal to the temperature of the turbine outlet, T04. In fact, T041 is 
usually much larger than T04, and as a result, the temperature equivalent of the jet 
velocity, i.e., T041 — T5, yields greater speed for the gas jet. When the afterburner is 
in operation, the ratio po4\/pa gives the nozzle pressure ratio. Also, T04 and p04 will 
be replaced by T04\ and P041 in equations (6.18), (6.20) and (6.21). 
The large temperature rise due to the afterburner combustion process changes 
the density of the flow approaching the nozzle considerably. Specifically, the tem-
perature increase by the afterburner lessens the density of the gases passing through 
the nozzle and as a result, reduces the mass flow passing through the engine. Con-
sequently, the pressure in the combustion chamber as well as the turbine inlet tem-
perature will increase which may cause a compressor stall or turbine overheating. 
Therefore, it is essential for engines with an afterburner to use a variable area nozzle 
to increase the afterburner exit volume flow. Afterburner is normally brought into 
operation when the engine is at its maximum rotational speed [102]. The rotational 
speed of the engine should not change when afterburner is in operation, and the noz-
zle must pass the same mass flow at a much reduced density. This can be achieved 
only if the nozzle installed allows a significant increase in the nozzle throat area. 
The thermodynamic relations presented so far describe the engine performance 
in the steady state. However, for fault diagnosis purposes, the transient behavior 
of the engine is also required. In the following, we discuss the dynamic modeling of 
the engine. 
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6.1.5 Dynamic Modeling of Engine 
Transient behavior of the engine is critical in aircraft applications. It is very impor-
tant for aircraft to have rapid thrust response to meet their mission requirements 
while ensuring the safe operation of the engine. Therefore, understanding the dy-
namic behavior of aircraft engines is an important part of the design and develop-
ment of control systems. It is also essential for health monitoring and fault diagnosis 
of engines. 
For calculating the thermodynamic properties of the engine, one has to satisfy 
the requirements for compatibility of flow and work between the components. For 
example, the mass flow of the gas passing through the turbine is the sum of the 
mass flow of the air entering the combustion chamber and the mass flow of the 
fuel. The power generated by the turbine and applied to the rotor is equal to the 
power consumed by the compressor. During transient operation of the engine, the 
compatibility of the flow and work may be violated. In the following we explain this 
issue in more details. 
Violation of Work Compatibility [70, 102] 
The turbine power applied to the rotor changes when the flow rate of the fuel 
changes. The change of the turbine power does not transfer to the compressor 
instantaneously. In other words, the turbine torque can be greater or less than 
the compressor torque right after the mass flow of the fuel changes. The excess or 
deficiency of the power applied to the rotor causes the acceleration or deceleration 
of the rotor. The acceleration of the compressor rotor and the torque discrepancy 
are related by Newton's Second Law of Motion. We have 
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where J is the moment of inertia of the rotor, Co is the angular acceleration and AG 
is the difference between the turbine and compressor torques and is given by the 
following equation, 
sC _ rimWt - Wc = rjmmgcpgAT034 - mgcpaATo12 
2irN ~ 2nN 
where iV is the rotor speed, T034 is the temperature decrease by the turbine, i.e., 
7o34 = T03 — To4 and Ton is the temperature increase by the compressor, i.e., Ton = 
T02 — T0\ • We also have 
u = 2-nN 
and therefore, 
CO = 2TTN 
The rate of change of the rotor speed is therefore given by 
M _ VmrhgCpgAT034 - m,aCpaATQ12 , R. 
{2-KfJN l b b j 
Violation of Flow Compatibility [70] 
When the mass flow of the fuel changes in the combustion chamber, the flow of the 
gas does not change instantaneously [70]. In fact, we have 
rna + "V — i^g = Am s (6.27) 
where Arhg is an equality violation factor. In addition, pressures and temperatures 
in the combustion chamber cannot change instantaneously because of the finite 
volume of the chamber, and therefore, the assumption of flow compatibility at all 
times is not exactly true [102]. 
In this work, we assume the violation of the flow compatibility only in the 
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combustion chamber, and do not study the violation of flow compatibility in after-
burner and nozzle. Since the speed of the gases in the jet pipe is too high (relative 
to the speed of the gases in the combustion chamber), we assume that the mass 
flow of the gases after the afterburner rapidly follows the changes of the afterburner 
fuel flow. Furthermore, we assume that the pressures and temperatures in the after-
burner and in the nozzle change very fast (relative to the pressure and temperature 
in the combustion chamber) following the change in the afterburner fuel flow. 




— = mR (6.28) 
In equation (6.28), p, T, m and V are the pressure, the temperature, the mass and 
the volume of the gas, respectively, and R is the specific gas constant. Since we have 
assumed that the produced gases in the combustion chamber follow the perfect gas 
rules, the temperature and pressure of the gases in the combustion chamber satisfy 
the perfect gas equation, namely 
VmVcamb
 =
 m^R (6.29) 
where, VCOmb is the volume of the combustion chamber and the mass of the 
gases produced in the combustion chamber. 
Differentiating both sides of the equation (6.29) and assuming a constant vol-
ume for the combustion chamber yields the following dynamical equation. 






 = Amg 
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 with ma + rhf — rhg, and obtain the nonlinear equation 
RTQ3 . . . P03 + (R o rA £03 = 77 (m0 + m / - mfl) + — T 0 3 (6.30) 
Vcomb J- 03 
As a result of the violation of the flow compatibility in the combustion cham-
ber, the heat transfer equation is no longer in place and we have 
cparhar02 + rjbKfthf - cpgmgT03 = AQg (6.31) 
where AQg is an equality violation factor. In general, in steady state, heat and 
temperature have the following relation in a constant volume: 
Q = cvmT 
where m is the mass of the gases in the volume, Q is the heat energy, cv is the 
specific heat when volume is constant and T is the temperature in the volume. In 
the combustion chamber, we have: 
Q = cvgmc°mbTQz (6.32) 
The change in the mass flow rate changes the heat energy and temperature. 
Differentiating both sides of (6.32), we obtain 
Q = Cvgm^tn + Cygm^Toz (6.33) 
We also have 
Q = AQg 
and therefore, by substituting for AQg from Equation (6.31), we obtain the following 
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nonlinear dynamical equation for T03 
^
03 =
 T^b l(cP"T02ma + Kfrjbmf - cpgT03mg) - cvgT03 {rha + rhf - rhg)] 
(6.34) 
Control Inputs 
In our work, there are three mechanisms for controlling the parameters of the engine: 
mass flow rate of the main fuel rhf, mass flow rate of the afterburner fuel rrifAB and 
the area of the nozzle throat An. All of the control inputs are functions of the Power 
Level Angle (PLA) set by the pilot. In our work, the PLA may vary from zero 
degree to 90°. We assume that when the PLA is at 70°, the maximum thrust can 
be obtained with the maximum of mass flow rate of the main fuel. For producing 
greater thrust the afterburner must be used. Therefore, for the values of the PLA 
from 70° to 90° the mass flow rate of the main fuel remains at its maximum and 
the mass flow rate of the afterburner fuel increases linearly with the PLA to reach 
its maximum at 90°. Furthermore, we assume that the area of the nozzle remains 
at its initial value if the PLA is less than 70°. For the PLA values greater than 70°, 
the area of the nozzle increases linearly with the PLA to reach its maximum when 
the PLA reaches 90°. Let rh™ax, 171™%%, A™ax and A™u denote the maximum mass 
flow rate of the main fuel, the maximum mass flow rate of the afterburner fuel, the 
maximum nozzle area and the initial nozzle area, respectively. 
The relation between the PLA and the control inputs are as follows 
" V = \ 
^ ^ r i if PLA < 70° 
(6.35) 
mTx if PLA > 70° 
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( 0 if PLA < 70° 
(6.36) 





" ^ if PLA > 70° { Arnit i f p L A < 7Qo 
(6.37) 
Engine States 
Dynamic equations (6.26), (6.30) and (6.34) describe the transient behavior of the 
engine. Given the set of control inputs and atmospheric condition parameters Ma, 
pa and Ta, one can calculate all the parameters of the engine such as temperatures, 
pressures and mass flow rates at any station by using these three dynamical equations 
and the thermodynamic static equations (6.4) to (6.25) explained in the previous 
subsections. Hence, the variables T03, P03 and N are considered as the state variable 
of the system in the remaining parts of this chapter. 
Engine Measured Variables 
Reliability of aircraft engines is a very important factor in the design stage. There-
fore, it is desirable to measure and monitor the key parameters of the engine. How-
ever, measuring some of the engine parameters may not be easy due to the very high 
temperature and pressure in the engine components. For example, the temperature 
in the jet pipe (T04i) when the afterburner is in operation can exceed 2000/C. Be-
sides, the speed of the gas jet can be very high particularly when the afterburner 
is in operation. It is not easy to build temperature sensors which can measure the 
temperature with high precision under these severe conditions. 
We assume that three states of the system, namely T03, p03 and N are mea-
sured. In real applications, due to practical limitations the turbine outlet temper-
ature (T04) is measured instead of T03 [102]. Since we assume that the turbine is 
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reliable and fault free, T03 can be calculated by using the turbine characteristic map 
and the turbine outlet temperature T04. We also assume that the pressure at the 
turbine inlet p03 is proportional to the pressure at the compressor outlet p02- There-
fore, by measuring the temperature at the combustor inlet (after the compressor), 
we are able to calculate p03-
Nonlinear Static and Dynamic Engine Models 
Based on the thermodynamic relations discussed in the last subsection for the engine 
components, we can represent a nonlinear static model of the engine according to 
the following system 
f(x,u,v) — 0 
< V ' (6.38) 
k y = g(x,u,v) 
where x = [TQ3,PO3,N] is the state vector, u = [Wf, WfAB,An] is the control input 
vector, v = [Ma,Ta,pa] is the vector of flight atmospheric conditions, and y — 
[T03,po3, N] is the vector of measured variables. 
Using the dynamical equations (6.26), (6.30) and (6.34), and thermodynamic 
static equations (6.4) to (6.25), the nonlinear differential equations of the system 
can be developed as 
( 
x = f(x,u,v) M
 (6.39) 
y = f(x,u,v) 
The vectors x, u, v and y are defined similar to those of the static model of the 
engine. In steady-state conditions, all derivatives are equal to zero and Equation 
(6.39) reduces to the system of Equation (6.38). 




Techniques based on linear system models are well established when compared to 
nonlinear modeling techniques. Analyzing and verification of linear systems, in 
general, are easier than the nonlinear case. Linear system models have been used in 
jet engines for control, diagnosis and simulation [70]. The hybrid diagnosis method 
that we develop here is based on the linear system models of the engine. In this 
subsection, we explain the methods for obtaining the linear system models for the 
engine assuming a fixed flight atmospheric condition. In fixed flight atmospheric 
conditions, Equation (6.38) can be represented by 
x = F(x,u) 
(6.40) 
y = G(x,u) 
Linearization of the nonlinear differential and algebraic equations is a con-
ventional method for deriving a linear system. In this method, a Taylor's series 





F(x, u) ~ F(x0, u0) + -£- x=x° {% - Xo) + -5— xzx° (u ~ uo) U=U() u=uo " ' du 
At the operating point, we have F(xo, UQ) = 0. The series is truncated after the 
linear terms and by the change of variables A X — X ~ XQ J An = u — no, Ay = y — yo, 
we obtain the linear system model 
Ax = A(a)Ax + B(a)Au 
K J V
 ' (6.41) 
Ay = C(a)Ax + D{a)Au 
X=XQ 
U—UQ 
where A(a) = f « , 5 ( a ) = £ x=,o, C(a) = § ™ and D(a) = % 
are the Jacobian matrices calculated at the operating point a. It is observed that 
the eigenvalues of A are all in the left side of the s-plane for all linearized models. 
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The system matrices A and B can also be estimated by using the observations 
of inputs and outputs based on the numerical methods developed for system iden-
tification. This method is easier for computer implementations and is useful when 
an engineering system is modeled using detailed computer routines. In this method, 
the states of the model are successively perturbed about their operating points and 
the responses are measured. Then, system matrices are calculated using numerical 
algorithms. 
MATLAB software has built-in routines for linearization of nonlinear models 
using numerical perturbation techniques. We use these routines for linearization of 
the engine dynamics in our work. 
6.1.7 Actuator Systems 
As mentioned earlier in this section, we have three ways of controlling the engine 
parameters, namely: the mass flow rate of the main fuel rhf, the mass flow rate of 
the afterburner fuel rhfAB and the nozzle throat area An. In this subsection, we 
describe general structures of the actuators in our work. The functionality of the 
fuel supply system (and the nozzle actuator) in many jet engines is more or less 
based on similar concepts. The detailed description of the fuel supply system and 
nozzle actuator can be found in [104, 24, 88]. In the following, we refer to the fuel 
supply system and the nozzle actuator as our actuator systems. 
Fuel Supply System 
In general, the fuel supply system for an aircraft engine must provide the following 
characteristics[103]: 
• Sufficient pressure to move the fuel from the tank to the engine. 
• A metering device to regulate the flow. 
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Fuel Tank V AB 
Vs 
GAB pSAB 
= IE VP v r A B 
G„ p S M 
M o VPM 
Figure 6.7: Schematic of a simplified typical fuel supply system of a turbojet with 
afterburner. 
• Sufficient pressure at the combustion chamber and afterburner to ensure proper 
atomization. 
• An injection method that will ensure proper fuel distribution. 
Figure 6.7 shows a schematic of the fuel supply system that is used in our 
work. The fuel is reserved in a tank. The fuel supply system has two branches. One 
branch models the main fuel supply system and is in charge of providing the fuel 
with sufficient pressure to the combustion chamber and the other branch models 
the afterburner fuel system and is in charge of supplying afterburner with fuel. In 
Figure 6.7, the components of the main fuel branch are shown by indices M and 
the components of the afterburner fuel branch are shown by indices AB. There is a 
pressurizing pump in each branch for boosting the fuel pressure (PM and PAB)-
When the engine starts, the pumps become operational. They remain in opera-
tion until the engine shuts off. Both branches utilize a governor (servo valve/metering 
system) (shown as GM and GAB) for regulating the flow of the fuel supplied to the 
engine. The governors are equipped with a metering device whose position controls 
the effective area that the fuel passes through. There is also a shut-off solenoid valve 
(Vs) after the tank to shut-off the fuel flow when the engine is off. Since afterburner 
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Figure 6.8: Schematic of a simplified typical nozzle actuator of a turbojet. 
is not in operation at all times, there is also an on-and-off solenoid valve (VAB) m 
the path of the fuel to the afterburner. The pressurizing valves (VPM and VPAB) 
ensure that the pressure in the pipe is sufficient for proper atomization in the com-
bustion chamber and afterburner. Two (discrete) pressure sensors (PSM and PSAB) 
are placed after the governors to measure the pressure in the pipes. The pressure 
sensors have only two discrete outputs "low" and "high". 
Usually, there is a mechanism that maintains a constant pressure at the two 
ends of the governors as long as the pressure in the pipes is sufficiently high. There-
fore, the pressure at the ends of the governors can be assumed independent of the 
pressure in the pipes if the pressure in the pipes is above a certain threshold. As 
a result, the position of the metering device in the governor can be assumed to be 
proportional to the fuel flow rate passing through the governor. 
Nozzle Actuator 
We assume a hydraulic actuator for the nozzle variable area as shown in Figure 6.8. 
This actuator system consists of an oil tank, a pump (P/v), a discrete pressure sensor 
(PSN) and a governor GN- The pump provides the required pressure at both ends 
of the governor. The governor operation is similar to that of the governors of the 
fuel supply system. 
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6.1.8 Operat ing regimes 




3. Maximum Power 
4. Afterburner On 
5. Maximum Afterburner Thrust 
6. Cruise Thrust 
7. Idle Thrust 
8. Over-speed Limit 
9. Maximum Turbine Temperature 
10. Maximum Compressor Pressure 
11. Deceleration 
12. Shutdown 
The operating regimes are defined in terms of the logical steps in the engine operation 
from starting to shutdown. Evaluation of these operating regimes is important for 
engine control system. 
In previous discussions, we have explained the operation of the engine and its 
components and actuator systems. We have also derived the differential equations 
governing the operation of the engine. Since the components of the fuel supply 
system and the nozzle actuator have a discrete-event behavior, the engine actuator 
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systems can be described by DES models. In the next section, we develop DES 
models for the components of the engine actuator systems and develop a hybrid 
model for the entire engine by integrating the DES models of the actuator systems 
and the continuous differential equation models of the engine. 
6.2 Hybrid Modeling of a Jet Engine 
In this section, we explain the hybrid modeling of the engine. First, we explain the 
continuous system model of the engine in different operating regimes. 
6.2.1 Continuous Models in Different Operat ing Regimes 
As explained in the last section, a turbojet engine equipped with an afterburner has 
12 operating regimes. We do not consider regimes 8, 9 and 10 in this work. We 
also assume similar dynamics for the Acceleration and the Deceleration operating 
regimes. For simplicity of the modeling and diagnosis discussions, in the rest of this 
chapter, we assume that the engine works at sea level atmospheric conditions, i.e., 
Ta = 288 K, pa = 1 bar = 105 Pa. In many real-world situations, it may be required 
to test the engine in all its operating regimes at the sea level by the manufacturer. 
It is also important to note that the discussions in this work are for the case of a 
manual control of the engine by the pilot (or manufacturer in the case of factory 
tests). 
Normally, the operating regimes of the engine are related to the PLA input 
from the pilot [103]. Some typical tables exhibiting the range of the PLA input for 
different operating regimes of the engine can be found in [103]. 
We partition the complete range of the PLA into 10 regions each of which 
corresponding to an operating regime. We call each region an operating section 













Range of the PLA 
0 
0° - 10° 
10° - 20° 
20° - 30° 
30° - 40° 
40° - 50° 
50° - 60° 
60° - 70° 
70° - 80° 





Acceleration 1/ Deceleration3 
Acceleration2/Deceleration2 




Maximum Afterburner Thrust 
Table 6.1: Operating sections and corresponding operating regimes and range of the 
PLA. 
in our work and their corresponding operating sections and their corresponding range 
of the PLA. 
We develop a linear system model for each operating regime by linearizing the 
nonlinear system model about an operating point. The operating conditions (values 
of the continuous states TQ3, p03 and N) for each operating section correspond to 
the value of the PLA in the middle of the range, and are calculated using the 
nonlinear dynamics. Therefore, the resulting system will be a piece-wise linear 
system approximation of the nonlinear model. 
Assuming that the system starts when the engine is in the "Shutdown" oper-
ating regime, the system transition among different operating sections is shown in 
Figure 6.9. The FSA shown in Figure 6.9 is the model of the engine at the regime 
level. The transitions among the states in Figure 6.9 occur autonomously when the 
engine transitions from one operating section to another. We have labeled these 
transitions by appropriate events such as 'start2idle\ etc. 
Since we did not have access to the manufactures characteristic maps for the 
turbine and the compressor, we have assumed that the compressor (or turbine) 
behaves the same when the engine is accelerating and decelerating. In other words, 
the trajectory of the compressor pressure ratio versus speed (or mass flow rate of 
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Figure 6.9: The FSA modeling the sequence of the operating regimes of the engine, 
the fluid) is the same for both acceleration and deceleration of the engine. 
Engine Control Approach 
There are many types and modifications of control characteristics for jet engines. 
However, the control system used on aircraft engines usually falls into one of the 
following categories [103], namely: 
1. Two positions (on/ off) 
2. Open-loop scheduling 
3. Proportional 
4. Integrating 
5. Proportional plus integral 
6. Pulse integrating 
As explained earlier, in our work, the values of the control inputs are functions 
of the PLA. In other words, we have adopted the "open-loop scheduling" as the 
control algorithm for the engine. The open-loop scheduling is not the best control 
algorithm and has many disadvantages. However, it simplifies the modeling and 
allows us to concentrate more on the diagnosis problem in the engine. 
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In the following, we specify the faults in the components of the actuator sys-
tems. 
6.2.2 Faults Considered in the Actuator Systems 
Table 6.2 shows the faults of the actuator systems (Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8) that 
are studied in our work, the fault events modeling the occurrence of the faults 
and the failure modes corresponding to the faults. We assume that the faults are 
permanent, i.e, they remain in the engine indefinitely when they occur. 
Fault 
Stuck-closed of the main shut-off valve 
Stuck-closed of the afterburner shut-off valve 
Main fuel pump is not energized 
Afterburner pump is not energized 
Nozzle actuator pump is not energized 
Up to 10 % loss-of-effectiveness of the main fuel 
governor 
Oversupplying of the main fuel governor 
Up to 10 % loss-of-effectiveness of the afterburner 
governor 
Oversupplying of the afterburner governor 
Up to 10 % loss-of-effectiveness of the nozzle ac-
tuator governor 







































Table 6.2: The faults studied in the engine and their corresponding fault events and 
failure modes. 
In this work, we have assumed that a discrete pressure sensors generate a 
"high" symbol if the pressure in the pipe is above 90% of its nominal value. There-
fore, we study loss-of-effectiveness faults of up to 10% in the governors. We have also 











(a) Vs (b) VAB 
Figure 6.10: The FSA modeling the shutoff valves Vs and VAB-
6.2.3 DES Models of the Actuator Systems 
Components of the actuator systems exhibit a discrete-event behavior. For example, 
the pumps are either on or off. The solenoid shut-off valves are either open or closed. 
The discrete-event nature of these components enables us to model the components 
by DES models. In the following, we explain the DES modeling of the components of 
the actuator systems for both normal and faulty mode of operation. In the following, 
unobservable events are shown by dashed-lines in the automata models. 
Valves 
Figure 6.10 shows the automata modeling the shutoff valves Vs and VAB- The fault 
events are unobservable and are shown by dashed lines. We have considered "stuck-
closed" fault for these valves. The events 'Vs : open', 'Vs : close', 'VAB '• open' and 
'VAB '• close' are commands (controllable events) generated by a supervisor. These 
commands are generated based on the values of the PLA. We explain the generation 
of these commands in more detail later in this section. 
Figure 6.11 illustrates the automata models of the pressurizing valves VPM and 
VPAB- For simplicity, these valves are assumed fault-free. The events 'VPM '• close', 
'VPM '• open', 'VPAB '• close' and 'VPAB '• open' are controllable events generated 









CLOSED I ( OPEN 
VPAB:close 
(b) VPAB 
Figure 6.11: The FSA modeling the pressurizing valves VPu a n d VPAB-
Pumps 
Figure 6.12 shows the automata models of the pumps in the engine. When the pumps 
become faulty, they are not energized when they are turned on or they are turned off 
if they are in operation. The events ' P M : ° / / \ '-P/w : on\ 'PAB '• off\ 1PAB '• on', 
'Pjv : ° / / ' and 'P/v : on' are controllable events generated by the supervisor. 
Pressure sensors 
Pressure sensors measure the pressure in the pipes. Usually there are one or more 
redundant sensors that are used to increase the reliability of the measurements. 
Therefore, we assume that pressure sensors are fault-free. Pressure sensors generate 
a discrete output based on the pressure in the pipes. For efficient operation of the 
governors, the pressure in the pipes has to be above a threshold TT. Moreover, the 
pressurizing valves in the main fuel supply and the afterburner fuel supply become 
open only if the pressure in the corresponding pipe is above T. Initially, the pressure 
in the pipes are below the threshold Tr and the pressure sensors generate "low" as 


















Figure 6.12: The FSA modeling the pressurizing pumps PM, PAB and PN-
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Figure 6.13: The FSA modeling the discrete pressure sensors PSM, PSAB and PSN-
that pipe generates the discrete output "high". Figure 6.13 illustrate the automata 
models of the pressure sensors. All events in the models of the pressure sensors are 
uncontrollable. 
Governors 
The governor is a servo valve. As explained in Subsection 6.1.7, there is a mecha-
nism (not shown in this work) that maintains a constant pressure at both ends of 
a governor as long as the pressure is sufficiently high (above the threshold Tr) in 
the pipe. Therefore, the amount of the fluid passing through the governor will be a 
function of the effective area of the governor. The effective area of a governor is con-
trolled by a metering rod (metering device) which is actuated by a servomechanism. 
The servomechanism can be either an electronic system or a mechanical system. In 
both cases, the position of the metering rod in a governor is a function of the PLA. 
Figures 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 show the automata modeling the governors. 
When more fuel/oil is needed, the position of the metering rod changes con-
tinuously to increase the effective area of the governor. This state of the governor 
is refereed to as acceleration (shown as "ACC" in the models). When the amount 





GM:steady \ J GM:sleady 
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Giu-steady \ J GM-'steady 
Figure 6.14: The FSA modeling the governors G M-
is called steady (shown as "STEADY" in the models). When less fuel/oil is needed, 
the position of the rod changes to decrease the flow rate. This state of the gover-
nor in motion is refereed to as deceleration (shown as "DEC" in the models). The 
events 'GM • acc\ 'GM '• dec\ 'GAB • ace', 1GAB • dec1, 'GN : ace' and 'Gyv : dec' 
are the commands generated by the supervisor to change the position of the rod. 
The events 1GM : steady', 'GAB '• steady' and 'Gjv : steady' are uncontrollable and 
unobservable events modeling the stopping of the metering rod in GM, GAB and 
GJV, respectively. 
Supervisory controller 
Figure 6.17 illustrates the sequence of the events generated by the supervisory con-
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Figure 6.16: The FSA modeling the governors G N-
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Gu'.dec GMLSCC 
Vs:open PM:on VPM:open £^ GM:acc 
Vs'.close PfA^off ~"VPM:close^~^ " G^'dec t. 
GAB:acc, ^ GAB:dec, 
GN:acc G^dej^J^*^ GN:dec 
Pv^oir^yPAB-close PAB:off 
^\_)yPAB:open"{J)A PAB:on 
Figure 6.17: The FSA modeling the sequence of the events generated by the super-
visory controller: SequenceControiler. 
Interactions among the components 
The following interactions are present among the components. The interactions can 
be modeled by FSA. 
• The pressure in the pipe of the main fuel system passes the threshold Tr only 
if the valve Vs is open and the pump PM is operational, and it goes below T if 
Vs becomes closed or fails stuck-closed, or PM is turned off or fails. The FSA 
VsPMlntPSM shown in Figure 6.18 models this interaction. The pressure in 
the pipe of the afterburner fuel system passes the threshold Tr only if the 
valves Vs and VAB are open and the pump PAB is turned on, and it goes below 
T if Vs or VAB become closed or fail stuck-closed, or PAB is turned off or fails. 
The FSA VSVABPABIKIPSAB shown in Figure 6.19 models this interaction. 
Moreover, the pressure in the pipe of the nozzle actuator passes the threshold 
TT only if the pump in the pipe is operational, and it goes below T if the pump 
is turned off or fails. The FSA P^IntPSN shown in Figure 6.20 models the 
interaction between the pump and the pressure sensor in the nozzle actuator. 
• A pressurizing valve becomes open only if the pressure in the pipe where it is in-
stalled is above the threshold Tr. The FSA VPMIntPSM and VPABlntPSAB 






*: PSM:h2l, Vs:close, Vs:open, Pu'-off, PM'-OYI, f ,f 
Figure 6.18: The FSA VsPMlntPSiw modeling the interaction among Vs, PM and 
PSM-
valve and the sensor in the main fuel supply system and in the afterburner 
fuel supply system, respectively. 
Automata models of the actuator systems 
The FSA modeling the actuator systems can be obtained by integrating the models of 
the components and their interactions and the model of the sequence controller using 
the synchronous product operator. Let ActuatorDES denote the FSA modeling the 
actuator systems. ActuatorDES can be obtained as 
Actuator DES = sync(ComponentD ES', InteractionsDES, SequenceContr oiler) 
where 
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*: PSAB:h2l, Vs:close, Vs:open, Vs:close, Vs:open, PAB:off, PAB:on, f ,f J 
Figure 6.19: The FSA VsVABPABIntPSAB modeling the interaction among Vs, VAB, 




f \ PSN:h2l 
ry 
Figure 6.20: The FSA PNIUIPSN modeling the interaction between P/v and PS N-
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VPu-close VPM:open, VPAB:close VPAB:open, 
vtMLciose ^y?u:dose , ^ ^VPAB:close 
PSM:l2h 
PSM:h2l ^ - ^ ^ ^ PSAB:h2l 
(a) VPhdlntPSM modeling the interaction be- (b) VPABlntPSAB modeling the interaction 
tween VPM and PSM between VPAB and PSAB 
Figure 6.21: The FSA ensuring that the pressurizing valves do not open unless the 
pressure in the pipes is sufficiently high. 
and 
InteractionsDES = sync(VsPMIntPSM, VsVABPABlntPSAB, PNlntPSm, 
VPMIntPSM, VPABIntPSAB) 
6.2.4 Hybrid Modeling 
The discrete-event evolution of the components of the actuator systems is related 
to the operating regime of the engine. The status of the valves, pumps and the 
effective area of the governors change when the operating regime of the engine 
changes. Tables 6.3 - 6.10 present the state transitions of the components of the 
actuator systems that must occur when the operating regime of the engine changes. 
We assume that initially when the engine is shutdown, the valves are closed, the 
pumps are off, the pressure in the pipes are below the threshold TT and the governors 
are at their STEADY discrete states. 
It should be noted that while the engine evolves in an operating regime, the 
governors may have transitions 'STEADY -» ACC -> STEADY' and 'STEADY -
DEC -* STEADY'. 
The FSA EngineSupervisor shown in Figure 6.22 models the engine supervi-
sor. Each state in EngineSupervisor specifies an operating regime. The events of 
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Regime Transition: 
















CLOSED - • OPEN 
CLOSED 
OFF -> ON 
OFF 
OFF 
LOW - • HIGH 
LOW 
LOW 
CLOSED - • OPEN 
CLOSED 
STEADY - • ACC - • STJEML>y 
ST£ML>y 
ST£M£>y 
Table 6.3: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
engine starts. 
Regime Transition: 
Starting to Idle Thrust 
Idle Thrust to Acceleration 



























STEADY - • ACC -» STEADY 
STEADY 
STEADY 
Table 6.4: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
operating regime changes from Starting to Idle Thrust/ Idle Thrust to Acceleration/ 
Acceleration to Cruise Thrust/ Cruise Thrust to Maximum Power. 
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Regime Transition: 

















CLOSED -* OPEN 
ON 
OFF -> ON 
OFF -> ON 
HIGH 
LOW -» HIGH 
LOW -» HIGH 
OPEN 
CLOSED - • OPEN 
STEADY 
STEADY -> ACC - • STEADY 
STEADY -* ACC - • STEADY 
Table 6.5: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
operating regime changes from Maximum Power to Afterburner On. 
Regime Transition: 



























STEADY -» ACC -> STEADY 
STEADY -» ACC -> STEADY 
Table 6.6: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
operating regime changes from Afterburner On to Maximum Afterburner Thrust. 
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Regime Transition: 



























STEADY -» DEC - • STEADY 
STEADY -* DEC -> STEADY 
Table 6.7: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
operating regime changes from Maximum Afterburner Thrust to Afterburner On. 
Regime Transition: 

















OPEN -» CLOSED 
ON 
ON -* OFF 
ON - • OFF 
HIGH 
HIGH -> LOW 
HIGH -> LOW 
OPEN 




Table 6.8: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
operating regime changes from Afterburner On to Maximum Power. 
Regime Transition: 
Maximum Power to Cruise Thrust 
Cruise Thrust to Deceleration 
Deceleration to Idle Thrust 


























STEADY - • DEC -> STEADY 
STEADY 
STEADY 
Table 6.9: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
operating regime changes from Maximum Power to Cruise Thrust/ Cruise Thrust 
to Deceleration/ Deceleration to Idle Thrust/ Idle Thrust to Starting. 
Regime Transition: 
















OPEN - • CLOSED 
CLOSED 
ON -» OFF 
OFF 
OFF 
HIGH -* LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
OPEN -» CLOSED 
CLOSED 
STEADY -> DEC - • STEADY 
STEADY 
STEADY 
Table 6.10: State transition of the components of the actuator systems when the 
operating regime changes from Starting to Shutdown. 
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2,6,10,1631,23 1,5,9,15 21,22,23

















1 - Vs:open 6 - VPM:close 
2 - Vs:close 7 - VPAB:open 
3 - VAB:open 8 - VPAB:close 





13 - Ppj:on 
14-PN:off 











21 - GM:steady 26 - GAB:dec 
22 - GM-'OCC 27 - G^.-steady 
23 - GM:dec 28 - GN:acc 
24 - GAB:steady 29 - GN:dec 
25 - GAB:acc 
Figure 6.22: The FSA modeling the engine supervisor: EngineSupervisor. 
the actuator components that can occur in each operating regime are represented 
as self-loop events in that operating regime. 
The DES abstraction of the engine can be obtained by the synchronous product 
of the FSA modeling the actuator systems and the FSA modeling the interactions 
between the actuator systems and the operating sections. Let the FSA 
rjEng __ /y-^.Eng ^Eng rpEng T-\Eng \Eng Eng \ 
n
abs ~~ Wabs ' ^abs > l abs iUabs ' Aabs iHabsfl) 
denote the DES abstraction of the engine. We have 
Ha}^s9 = sync(ActuatorDES', EngineSupervisor) 
The hybrid automaton modeling the engine is a tuple HEn9 = (QEng, XEn9 MEni', 
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TTEn\ yEn\ lnitEn\ SEn\ Y?n\TEn\ GEn\ pEng, DEn\ \Eng, qEng) where 
XEn9MEn9,FTEn\yEn9JnitEn9 C M3; 
QEn9 = Qfb7; 
v E n j _ y\En9-
rpEng _ rpEng, 1 1
 abs ' 
jjEng
 = DEn9. 
\Eng _ \Eng_ 
(6.42) 
and 
% n9 = A (6-43) 
Function pEng is a unity reset map that maps the states of the engine to 
themselves. Function GEn9 becomes true when the boundaries of the partitions 
corresponding to the operating sections are passed, and S is a set of linear systems 
each modeling the engine dynamics at a discrete state. 
Totally, there are 13 components in the actuator systems. Each discrete state 
of HEng can be represented by a 14-tuple q = (q\, • • • qu), where each of qi, • • • , gi3 
corresponds to a component model and qu specifies the operating regime of the 
engine in q. 
All the faults considered in this work affect the control input signals. Hence, 
the faults can be modeled by additive faut type signals. Let Z1, / 2 and f3 be the fault 
type signals modeling the faults in main fuel supply system, afterburner fuel supply 
system and nozzle actuator, respectively. Therefore, we have FTEng = { Z 1 , / 2 , / 3 } , 
HI1) = { F \ F 3 , F 6 , F 7 } , £(/2) = {F\F*,F*,F*,F*} and £( / 3) = {F 5 , F 1 0 , ^ 1 } . 
The dynamics of the engine in the discrete state q, Sq, is represented by a 
linear system model 
f 
X = AQX + BqU + Lqf 
s q = < (6.44) 
k y = cqx 
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where Aq, Bq and Cq are the system matrices and belong to one of the operating 
sections i € {0, • • • , 9}, / = [f1, / 2 , f 3 ) T , and Lq is the vector of the fault signatures 
in the discrete state q. For simplicity, in this work we take Lq = Bq. Totally, there 
are 10 sets of EM-similar (here ABC-similar) discrete states each corresponding to 
an operating section. Let Q1 be the set of ABC-similar discrete states corresponding 
to the operating section i. We have QEng = <2°|J • • • \JQ9- The set Ql includes all 
the discrete states whose A, B and C matrices are the same as those of the operating 
section i. Fault signatures at the discrete states of Q% can be different. 
In the following section, we explain our proposed hybrid diagnoser design for 
the hybrid system model of the engine. 
6.3 Fault Diagnosis in Je t Engines 
First we explain isolator (residual generator) design based on the continuous dy-
namics of the engine. 
6.3.1 Isolator Design 
The continuous dynamics of the engine at any discrete state of the hybrid model 
is represented by a linear system. The A, B and C matrices of the system at 
any discrete state belong to the dynamics of one of the operating sections. We 
have assumed that the fault signature at any faulty discrete state is equal to the B 
matrix of that discrete state. Therefore, we develop a bank of isolators based on the 
dynamics of the operating sections. 
As explained in Section 6.1, the measurable variables in our work are T03, P03 
and N. These output variables change when the input variables riif, TTIJAB and An 
change. It can be shown that the input variables rhfAB and An have opposite impact 
on the output variables. For example, when the mass flow rate of the afterburner 
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fuel increases the turbine inlet temperature TQ3 increases. But when An increases, 
T03 decreases. We also observe that the effect of these two inputs on the outputs 
(for the same value of inputs) are proportional to each other. In other words, matrix 
B in the developed linear system models is not full rank, i.e., 
rank(Bq) = 2, for all q E QEng 
More precisely, 
rank([b2qb3q]) = 1 
where b2 and b3 are the vectors corresponding to rhfAB and An, respectively, in 
matrix Bq. 
Since we have Lq = Bq in the dynamics of faulty discrete states, the solvability 
conditions for the existence of the isolators discussed in Section 2.4 are satisfied for 
f1 but not for f2 and / 3 . Fault types f1, f2 and f3 are the signals modeling 
the faults in main fuel supply system, afterburner fuel supply system and nozzle 
actuator, respectively. Thus, we cannot design isolators that isolate faults in the 
afterburner fuel supply system from the faults in the nozzle actuator. However, the 
solvability conditions will be satisfied if f2 and / 3 are considered together. In other 
words, we can design isolators that isolate faults in the main fuel supply system from 
faults in the afterburner fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator, and isolators 
that isolate faults in the afterburner fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator from 
faults in the main fuel supply system. Moreover, the states of the linear systems are 
all observable, and we can design full observers for the normal mode of operation in 
each operating section. 
The discrete states of Q° correspond to the Shutdown operating regime. The 
dynamics of the engine in these discrete states is x = 0. We have designed three 
isolators for each state set Q% (i E {1, • • • , 9}). In total, we have a bank of 27 isolators 
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for fault diagnosis at the continuous level. Each isolator will be modeled with an 
FSA. Let i V ' d / 1 } ) be the isolator deigned for Ql to distinguish faults in the main 
fuel supply system from faults in the afterburner fuel supply system and the nozzle 
actuator. Also let ^5^*{/2 , /3}) denote the isolator deigned to distinguish faults 
in the afterburner fuel supply system or the nozzle actuator from the faults in the 
main fuel supply system while the engine is in a discrete state of Ql. Furthermore, 
let Obs1 = 1s®1 ({Z1, f2, / 3 }) be the observer designed for the normal (non-faulty) 
dynamics of Q\ 
6.3.2 Constructing the EDESA of the Engine and Isolators 
Let 7f\w) be the FSA modeling the isolator Is^(W) for any W E {{f1}, {/2, / 3 } , 
{ Z 1 , / 2 , / 3 } } - The EDESA developed for the engine HEn9 can be obtained from 
HBn° = sync(H29^En9,ASMEn9) 
where Habns9 is the modified form of Habnsg satisfying the consistency specifications 
(described in Section 3.2). Furthermore, 
^ " ^ S y n c ( ^ Q \ { / 1 } ) , 7 i Q \ { / ^ / 3 } ) , 0 6 ^ ^ • • . 7 ^ ^ { / 1 } ) , 7 ^ 9 ( { / 2 , / 3 } ) , 0 6 ^ 9 ) 
and 
ASMEn9 - sync(ASMIsQi({n),ASMIsQi{{f2j3}),ASM0bsQi,---
• • • , ASM[sQ9 ( { / 1 } ) , ASM[sQ<> ( { / 2 i / 3 } ) , ASM0bsQ9) 
Here, the FSM components of ASMEng enforce the assumption that an event will 
be generated by an isolator between every two consecutive events generated by the 
system (described in Section 3.2). 
The discrete output of the EDESA is an array with 30 elements. The first three 














105 Pa (IBar) 
288K 
Table 6.11: Atmospheric conditions. 
DES diagnoser is designed for the EDESA of the engine and the isolators based on 
the method described in Section 2.2. 
In the following section, we describe the simulation method and present the 
simulation results. 
6.4 Simulation Results 
We used the MATLAB/SIMULINK software for conducting the engine dynamics 
simulations. We used TTCT software [2] for performing DES simulations. The 
hybrid automaton model of the engine has 1,969,920 discrete states and 13,882, 752 
transitions. 
6.4.1 Engine Parameters 
Table 6.11 shows the atmospheric conditions used for the simulations. Table 6.12 
shows the gas parameters and Table 6.13 shows the engine parameters used in our 
work. We assume that the ambient operating conditions and power settings do not 
change, and the aircraft is static at all times {Ma = 0). 
6.4.2 Simulation Results 
Engine dynamic simulations 
First, we present the continuous output variables of the engine for a ramp PL A 











Specific gas constant 
Specific heat capacity at constant pressure for air 
Specific heat capacity at constant volume for air 
Specific heat capacity ratio for air 
Specific heat capacity at constant pressure for the 
gases in the combustion chamber and afterburner 
Specific heat capacity at constant volume for the 
gases in the combustion chamber and afterburner 
Specific heat capacity ratio for the gases in the 







































Rotor moment of inertia 
Volume of the main combustion chamber 
Maximum of the nozzle area 
Maximum of the main fuel flow rate 
Maximum of the afterburner fuel flow rate 
Low calorific value of fuel (Kerosene) 
Percentage of pressure loss in the main 
combustion chamber 
Isentropic intake efficiency 
Isentropic compressor efficiency 
Isentropic turbine efficiency 
Isentropic nozzle efficiency 
Mechanical transmission efficiency of the 
turbine 
Efficiency of the main combustion cham-
ber 
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Figure 6.23: A ramp PLA command. 
from zero to 90°. The continuous output variables of the engine (N, T03 and p03) 
generated by the nonlinear model are shown in Figures 6.24, 6.25 and 6.26. As it 
can be seen from these figures, the maximum nonlinearity is at low PLA values (the 
PLA below 10°). 
Figure 6.27 depicts a staircase PLA command. The responses of the nonlinear 
model are shown in Figures 6.28, 6.29 and 6.30. 
The operation of the hybrid diagnoser 
We present the simulation results for three fault scenarios. Although the isolators are 
designed based on the linearized models, in the simulations, we use the output of the 
nonlinear model as the input to the isolators. The hybrid diagnoser is constructed 
systematically using the EDESA model. Here, we explain the operation of the hybrid 
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Figure 6.26: Turbine inlet pressure (p03) for a ramp PLA command. 
We used the PLA signal as shown in Figure 6.31 for generating the inputs for 
these fault scenarios. The continuous control input variables of the engine (rhj, rh^B 
and An) in normal mode of operation for this PLA signal is showns in Figure 6.32. 
Fault scenario 1: 5% loss-of-effectiveness of the main fuel system governor 
GM applied at t = 30 sec. 
Figure 6.33 shows the fault type signals corresponding to this fault scenario. Initially, 
all the fault type signals are zero. At t = 30 sec, the value of the fault type 
corresponding to the main fuel system changes from zero to —0.04 which is 5% of 
the main fuel flow rate at t = 30 sec. The fault is assumed permanent. Therefore, 
the value of the fault type signal does not change during the rest of the simulation 
period. 
Initially, we present the simulation results for the case that no measurement 
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Figure 6.27: A staircase PLA command. 
noise is present. The engine enters the operating regime 8 at t = 9.33 sec. It can 
be shown that from t ~ 9.33 sec. (when the engine enters the operating regime 
8) to t = 50 sec., the response of all isolators except the isolators designed for 
the operating section 8 (i.e, / ^ ( { J 1 } ) , Is8({f2, f3}), Obs8) are one. This implies 
that the engine is in the operating section 8 (corresponding to the operating regime 
Afterburner On) during this interval, and no fault has occurred. Figure 6.34 shows 
the response of the isolators designed for the operating section 8. The isolator 
/ s 8 ^ / 1 } ) generates zero at t ~ 9.71 sec. implying that the engine is in the operating 
section 8. Response of the isolators designed for the operating sections 2 and 5 are 
shown, as an example of the output of other isolators, in Figures 6.35 and 6.35. The 
fault is applied at t — 30 sec. and is detected at t = 30.17 sec. From t = 30.17 sec. to 
t = 50 sec, the output of / s 8 ({ / 1 }) changes to one but the output of Iss({f2, f3}) 
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Figure 6.31: The PLA command used for diagnosis simulations. 
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Main Fuel Flow Rate (Kg/sec) 
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Figure 6.32: Input signals in the normal mode of operation. 
occurred. However, one cannot determine which of the failure modes F1, F3, F6, 
F7 has occurred1. In other words, it cannot be inferred from the output of the 
isolators if the main fuel system governor has failed or the main shut-off valve is 
stuck-closed or the main fuel system pump failed while in operation. 
We also performed simulations in the presence of measurement noise in the 
engine. Figure 6.37 shows the output of the isolators designed for the operating 
regime 8 when measurement nose is present. We have used Monte Carlo method 
for obtaining the threshold values of the isolators in this case. It can be shown that 
the detection time of the fault (the time that the output of the isolator Is8({p}) 
changes from zero to one) has changed to 30.27 sec. implying that it takes longer to 
detect the fault comparing with the case that no measurement noise was present. 
At the DES level of the engine, this fault does not change any discrete output 
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Figure 6.33: Fault type signals for the Fault Scenario 1. 
in the operating section 8, and therefore cannot be detected by using only the 
discrete outputs. Combining the information at the DES level and the information 
coming from the isolators, the fault can be detected and isolated in the hybrid 
diagnoser. As described earlier in Section 6.3, the discrete output of the EDESA is 
an array with 30 elements. The first three elements come from the discrete sensors 
and the rest comes from the isolators. We observe that for the entire time that 
the engine is in the operating section 8, the first three elements of the output are 
'[PSM '• high, PSAB '• high, PSN '• high]' implying that the fault has not changed the 
output of the pressure sensor. Hence, the fault cannot be in the main shut-off valve 
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Figure 6.34: Fault Scenario 1: Outputs of the isolators designed based on the dy-
namics of the operating section 8 when there is no measurement noise present. 
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Figure 6.35: Fault Scenario 1: Outputs of the isolators designed based on the dy-
namics of the operating section 2 when there is no measurement noise present. 
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Figure 6.36: Fault Scenario 1: Outputs of the isolators designed based on the dy-
namics of the operating section 5 when there is no measurement noise present. 
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Figure 6.37: Fault Scenario 1: Outputs of the isolators designed based on the dy-
namics of the operating section 8 in the presence of measurement noise. 
189 
Fault scenario 2: Nozzle actuator pump is not energized 
Figure 6.38 shows the fault type signals corresponding to this fault scenario. Initially, 
all the fault type signals are zero. When the engine enters the operating section 8 at 
t ~ 9.33 sec, the nozzle actuator pump is commanded to turn on. From this time, 
the value of the fault type corresponding to the nozzle area becomes f2 = —An, 
modeling the failure in the nozzle actuator pump. Figure 6.39 shows the output of 
the isolators designed for the operating section 8 when there is no measurement noise 
present in the engine. We observe that from t ~ 11.92 sec, all isolators generate 
non-zero residuals, but Is® ({Z1}) generates a zero residual implying that the engine 
is in the operating section 8 and f1 has not occurred but f2 or / 3 has occurred. 
However, one cannot determine which of the afterburner fuel supply system or the 
nozzle actuator has failed. 
We also performed simulations in the presence of measurement noise in the 
engine. Figure 6.40 shows the output of the isolators designed for the operating 
section 8 in the presence of measurement noise. We observe that when measurement 
noise is present, the isolator IsQ ( j / 1 }) generates zero output at t = 9.16 sec, but 
when there is no noise present, it generates zero output at t — 11.92 sec. 
We observe that for the entire time that the engine is in the operating section 
8, the first three elements of the output of the EDESA are '[PSM '• high,PSAB '• 
high, PSN '• low]' implying that the fault is not in the afterburner and it has to be 
in the nozzle actuator. The discrete output generated by the pressure sensor PSN 
can only stay at "low" (while the engine is in the operating section 8) if the pump 
of the nozzle actuator has failed and the failure mode F5 is present in the engine. 
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Figure 6.38: Fault type signals for the Fault Scenario 2. 
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Figure 6.39: Fault Scenario 2: Output of the isolators designed based on the dy-
namics of the operating section 8 when there is no measurement noise present. 
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Figure 6.40: Fault Scenario 2: Output of the isolators designed based on the dy-
namics of the operating section 8 in the presence of measurement noise. 
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Fault scenario 3: Simultaneous 5% loss-of-effectiveness of main fuel sys-
tem governor applied at t = 20 sec. and 5% oversupplying of the after-
burner fuel system governor applied at t = 40 
Figure 6.41 shows the fault type signals corresponding to this fault scenario. Initially, 
all the fault type signals are zero. At t = 20 sec, the value of the fault type 
corresponding to the main fuel system changes from zero to —0.04 which is 5% of 
the main fuel flow rate at t = 20 sec. 
Initially assume that there is no measurement noise present in the engine. 
Similar to the Fault Scenario 1, we observe that from t ~ 9.71 sec to t = 20.17 sec, 
the response of all isolators except the isolators designed for the operating section 
8 (i.e, Is8({f1}), Is8({f2,f3}), Obss) are one. This implies that the engine is in 
the operating section 8 during this interval and no fault has occurred. Figure 6.42 
shows the response of the isolators designed for the operating section 8. From 
t = 20.17 sec. to t = 40.03 sec, only the response of Is8({f2, / 3 }) remains at zero 
implying that the fault type f1 is active and f2 or / 3 have not occurred. However, 
one cannot determine which of the failure modes F1, F3, F6, F7 has occurred. 
We observe that from t = 20.17 sec. to t = 40.03 sec, the first three elements 
of the EDESA output are '[PSM '• high, PSAB '• high,PSM '• high]' implying that 
the fault has not changed the output of the pressure sensor. Hence, the fault cannot 
be in the main shut-off valve or the main fuel system pump, and it has to be in the 
main fuel system governor. 
At t = 40.03 sec, all the residuals provided by the isolators become nonzero. 
This can be interpreted as the simultaneous activeness of Z1 and either of f2 or / 3 , 
or the change of the operating regime of the engine (which consequently changes 
the operating section). If there was a transition to a discrete state with different 
dynamics (different operating section), the isolators designed for that operating 
section to isolate f2 and / 3 from f1 will generate a zero output after the effect of 
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the mismatch between its initial condition and the continuous state of the system 
dies out (in our simulations, this time is less than 2 sec). Since no transition from 
one to zero is observed from any isolators, it can be concluded that at t = 40.03 sec, 
one of the fault types f2 and / 3 becomes active. However, one cannot determine 
which of the afterburner fuel supply system or the nozzle actuator has failed. 
We observe that from t = 40.03 sec. to t = 50 sec, the first three elements of 
the output of the EDESA are '[PSM : high, PSAB '• high,PSN '• High\ implying 
that the fault is not in VAB, PAB and PN- Therefore, fault has to be in the afterburner 
fuel system governor or nozzle actuator governor. The information received from 
the sensors, however, is not sufficient to find the faulty component. 
We also performed simulations in the presence of measurement noise in the 
engine. Figure 6.43 shows the output of the isolators designed for the operating 
section 8 when measurement nose is present. We observe that the detection time 
of the first fault (5% loss-of-effectiveness of main fuel system governor) has changed 
to 20.32 sec. Moreover, the detection time of the second fault (5% oversupplying of 
the afterburner fuel system governor) has changed to 40.10 sec This implies that 
it takes longer to detect the faults comparing with the case that no measurement 
noise was present. 
6.4.3 Discussion 
Diagnosis in the presence of noise 
It should be pointed out that occasionally false alarm signals are generate by the 
isolators when measurement noise is present in the engine. Table 6.14 shows the 
percentage of the false alarms corresponding to different operating sections. For 
conducting the simulations, we have performed a Monte Carlo simulation of 50 
randomly generated PLA commands in each operating section. The high rate of false 
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Figure 6.41: Fault type signals for the Fault Scenario 3. 
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Figure 6.42: Fault Scenario 3: Outputs of the isolators designed based on the dy-
namics of the operating section 8 when there is no measurement noise present. 
195 
Output of the Observer Designed Based on the Dynamics of Operating Section 8 
0.5 
i I i i I r T r 
J i 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Output of the Residual Generator Designed Based on the Dynamics of Operating Section 8 to isolate f 
i 1 1 r 
1 
"i 1 1 r 
0.51 
j i_ j i i i_ 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 




" ' ' I •" "! I ! 
i i i 
! ! ! 
1 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Time (sec) 
Figure 6.43: Fault Scenario 3: Outputs of the isolators designed based on the dy-
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Table 6.14: Percentage of the false alarms in different operating sections. 
discrepancy between the actual nonlinear model of the engine and its approximated 
linearized models. In this work, we have developed 9 linearized models corresponding 
to 9 operating sections. In order to reduce the rate of false alarms, one can increase 
the number of the operating sections and therefore, increase the number of the 
linearized models. As explained in the fault scenarios, detection time of the faults is 
also longer in the case that measurements are noisy because thresholds are higher. 
It should be noted that residual generators in our framework can be designed 
according to any model-based technique. In case of noisy measurements, Kalman 
filter-based isolators may represent a better choice. In case of unmodeled dynam-
ics and uncertainties in the system model, robust H^ techniques can be used for 
designing the residual generators. 
Performance of the isolators 
Although the isolators are designed based on linear models, we have used the output 
of the nonlinear model of the engine to drive the isolators. Therefore, the perfor-
mance of the isolators becomes dependent on the values of the fault types. For 
example, we observe that the isolator IsQl({f2, f3}) passes its threshold when fl 
is large. Therefore, for large values of fl, the output of all isolators passes the 







Range of the size of the fault types that can be detected and 
isolated 
0.065m^201 < p < 0.2m^2aI, -0.2m^2ax < Z1 < -0.llrhj2ax 
0.05m^| < f2 < mJX% 
0.055A™ax < p < A™ax 
0.03mfax < f1 < 0.35mfax, -0.35mJax < fl < -0.035m^ax 
Q.OGmJffi < f2 < rhyXk 
0.065A™ax < / 3 < A™ax 
OmmJax < P < 0.2m^QX, -0.2mfax < P < -0.02m^QX 
0.06m7Xfl < P < MfAB, -™7AB < f < -0.07my%xB 
0.055A™ax < p < A™ax, -A™ax < p < - 0 . 0 5 ^ a i 
Table 6.15: Performance of the isolators. 
values of the fault types that can be detected and isolated (fault type isolation) with 
the isolators for the three operating sections 2, 7 and 9. In Table 6.15, m™* is the 
maximum mass flow rate of the main fuel supply system when the engine is in the 
operating section 2 (m^1* ~ 2rn1Jiax/7). The nozzle actuator and the afterburner 
become operational only in the operating sections 8 and 9. Therefore, we have not 
considered the negative values of fault types p and p in the operating sections 2 
and 7. 
Diagnosability of failure modes 
The autonomous transitions in the hybrid automaton model of the engine occur 
instantaneously when the guard conditions (conditions on passing the boundaries of 
the operating sections) become true. It can be verified that all the operating sections 
are reachable from the initial conditions. Moreover, due to the constraints on the 
fuel supply, at least one of the autonomous transitions defined at each discrete 
state is prospective. We also assumed that the controllable events generated by 
the supervisor are all prospective. Therefore, QEn9<Inf — 0; a n d a value for rmax 
can be calculated for the hybrid model based on the PLA signal (as described in 
Section 4.1, rmax is the maximum time that the hybrid system can stay in a discrete 
state without becoming stuck in that state). 
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As described in Fault scenario 1, failure modes of the main fuel governor GM 
cannot be distinguished from the failure modes of the main shut-off valve Vs or main 
fuel pump PM by using only discrete outputs generated in the engine or by using 
only the response of the isolators designed for the engine. 
Hybrid diagnoser can be used to distinguish failure modes of GM from failure 
modes of Vs or PM- However, using the hybrid diagnoser, one cannot isolate over-
supplying of GM (the failure mode F7) from loss-of-effectiveness of GM (the failure 
mode F 6 ) . Therefore, we group the failure modes F 6 and F7 together and call them 
the failure modes of the main fuel governor. Now, we observe that {F 6 , F7} is diag-
nosable using the hybrid diagnoser. Similarly, we denote {FS,F9} and { F 1 0 , F U } 
the failure modes of the afterburner fuel system governor and the failure modes of 
the nozzle governor, respectively. 
Failure modes of the nozzle actuator governor and afterburner fuel system 
governor cannot be isolated from each other. More sensors are needed to isolate 
them in our hybrid diagnoser. Table 6.16 shows the resolution of the isolation of 
failure modes in our hybrid diagnoser for the case of maximum two simultaneous 
failure modes. 
Diagnosability in the presence of isolators generating incorrect output 
Assuming that a maximum of two failure modes may occur simultaneously, the 
failure modes F 1 , F 3 and F 5 and the group of failures {F2,F4} (viewed as one failure 
mode) can be diagnosed by using only the output of the discrete sensors (as shown in 
Table 6.16). Therefore, these failure modes are diagnosable even if all the isolators 
generate incorrect output. The output of the observer designed for each operating 
section is one if the output of one of the isolators designed for that operating section 
is one. Therefore, in the case that one of the isolators generates incorrect output, 



































































































































Table 6.16: Diagnosability of failure modes. 
hybrid diagnoser. 
Isolator selection 
Assuming that maximum of two failure modes may occur simultaneously, the failure 
modes F 1 , F 3 and F 5 and the group of failure modes {F 2 , F 4 } can be diagnosed by 
using only the output of the discrete sensors. Therefore, 






As mentioned earlier, one of the isolators designed for each section generates 
redundant output. Therefore, a minimal set of isolators for diagnosability of the 
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group of failure modes {F6, F7} is 




The components of the afterburner fuel supply system and the nozzle actua-
tor become operational only in the operating sections 8 and 9 corresponding to the 
operating regimes Afterburner On and Maximum Afterburner Thrust. Therefore, 
diagnosis and diagnosability of the failure modes of the components of the after-
burner fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator is only possible in the operating 
sections 8 and 9. Therefore, a minimal set of isolators for diagnosability of the group 
of failure modes {F8, F9, Fw, Fu} is 
Is£f'Fl0'FU} = {^Q8({/1}),^8({/2,/3}),^09({/1}) ,/*Q9({/2,/3})} 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we investigated fault diagnosis in the actuator systems of a single-
spool turbojet engine. We described the static thermodynamic relations in the 
engine components and reviewed dynamical equations for describing the transient 
behavior of the engine. We described different operating regimes of the engine and 
developed linear system models for the engine in each operating regime. Moreover, 
we developed DES models for the fuel supply systems and nozzle actuator. Com-
bining the DES models with the linear system models developed for each operating 
section, we built a hybrid automaton model for the engine. Based on the hybrid 
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automaton model and the isolators designed based on the dynamics of the operating 
regime, we constructed a hybrid diagnoser. We presented the simulation results and 
demonstrated the operation of our hybrid diagnoser for three fault scenarios. We 
also discussed the diagnosability of failure modes, isolator selection and isolator per-
formance in the hybrid diagnoser developed for the engine. We showed that some 
failure modes such as the failure modes in the main fuel governor cannot be isolated 
by using only the output of the discrete sensors or by using only the response of the 





Stringent reliability and maintainability requirements for modern complex systems 
demand development of systematic methods for fault detection and isolation. In 
this work, we presented a novel framework for fault diagnosis of systems that are 
modeled by hybrid automata. Many complex systems can be modeled as hybrid au-
tomata. The dynamics of a hybrid automaton are characterized by a Discrete-Event 
System (DES) representing transitions among various modes of operation and a set 
of continuous models (i.e., differential equations) describing the system's behaviour 
in the discrete modes. Generally, in a hybrid system, two types of sensors may 
be available, namely: continuous supplying continuous readings (i.e., real numbers) 
and threshold sensitive (discrete) supplying discrete outputs (e.g., level high and 
pressure low). 
In our hybrid framework, we assumed a bank of residual generators (detection 
filters) based on the continuous models of the system is available. We modeled 
each residual generator by a DES model, and then integrated the DES models 
of the residual generators and the DES model of the hybrid system to build an 
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"Extended DES" model. A hybrid diagnoser was constructed based on the extended 
DES model. The hybrid diagnoser effectively integrates the readings of discrete 
sensors and the information supplied by the residual generators (which is based on 
continuous sensors) to determine the health status of the hybrid system. 
We also studied the problem of diagnosability of failure modes in hybrid au-
tomata. We introduced a notion of diagnosability in hybrid automata and developed 
a systematic approach for verifying the diagnosability of failure modes in our hybrid 
diagnosis framework. We showed that for diagnosability of a failure mode in a hy-
brid automaton, it is sufficient that the failure mode be diagnosable in the extended 
DES model developed for representing the hybrid automaton and residual gener-
ators. We also investigated diagnosability of failure modes in the case that some 
residual generators produce unreliable outputs in the form of false alarm or false 
silence signals. Moreover, we investigated the problem of isolator (residual genera-
tor) selection and developed procedures for computing a minimal set of isolators to 
ensure the diagnosability of failure modes. 
In this thesis, we employed our hybrid diagnosis approach for investigating 
faults in the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator of a single-spool turbojet 
engine with an afterburner. Components in a fuel supply system and a nozzle 
actuator such as pumps and solenoid valves behave in a discrete-event manner. 
The status of these components varies when the operating regime of the engine 
changes. The discrete-event behavior of these components can be described by 
DES models. On the other hand, thrust generation in an engine is a continuous 
process, and operation of engine components such as compressor and turbine can be 
described by continuous static and dynamic thermodynamic relations (i.e., algebraic 
and differential equations). We developed linear system models to represent the 
continuous dynamics of the engine in different operating regimes. Our developed 
hybrid automaton model for the engine was obtained by integrating the DES models 
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of the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator with the aforementioned linear 
system models. A bank of residual generators was then designed based on the 
linear system models. Each residual generator was modeled by a DES system and 
an extended DES was constructed by combining the DES models of the residual 
generators and the DES model of the engine. Based on the extended DES model, 
a hybrid diagnoser was built. We showed that there are cases when the faults in 
the fuel supply system and the nozzle actuator cannot be isolated by a purely DES 
diagnoser or by methods that are based on the residual generators alone. However, 
the fault can be isolated if the hybrid diagnoser is used. A number of simulation 
studies were conducted to demonstrate and verify the advantages of our proposed 
hybrid fault diagnoser. 
7.2 Future Research 
In this thesis, we showed that a failure mode F% is diagnosable in the hybrid system 
if Fl is diagnosable in the extended DES of the integrated system and isolators. In 
Section 4.1, we showed by an example that the Fl may be undiagnosable in the 
extended DES, but diagnosable in the hybrid system. Developing conditions that 
make diagnosability of F% in the extended DES equivalent to the diagnosability of 
Fl in the hybrid system will be a subject of future research. This may require a 
change in the way isolators are defined and designed. 
In this work, we assumed that the system is slow enough and stays in each 
discrete state for at least r m m , and isolators are designed so that the transient 
response due to the mismatch in the initial conditions of the isolators and the system 
dies out in less than
 T
min
.) Finding the conditions under which the system can 
be guaranteed to stay in each discrete state for at least r m m seems important. 
Furthermore, fault diagnosis in the case that it cannot be ensured that the transient 
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response due to the mismatch in the initial conditions of residual generators and 
system dies out in less than r m m is an issue for future work. 
The diagnosability of failure modes in our work was studied assuming that the 
continuous dynamics are represented by continuous-time systems. Extending the 
results to the case that the continuous dynamics are represented by discrete-time 
systems is a subject of future work. Moreover, investigating the performance of the 
proposed fault diagnosis scheme in the presence of noise and uncertainties in the 
system's model is an interesting topic for future research. 
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